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ABSTRACT 
An oral history compiled from recollections of fourteen combat veterans, 
documented by over forty hours of tape-recorded interviews, the paper recreates 
Gls' mentality upon eritering combat. The formation of the collective mentality is 
examined by exploring the attitudes, motivations, and historical circumstances 
determining thought and actions of these reluctant, yet dedicated soldiers. The 
collective mentality, defined as the way of thinking allowing the majority to best 
cope with their predicament, answers why men fought and how they persevered 
once in combat. Explaining sustained combat performance the paper proves how 
the collective mentality gave Gls the will and ability to withstand war's brutal and 
unforgiving reality. 
Describing the salient characteristics of the infantrymen's war, the 
participants' experiences reveal the whole story of what really happened; with the 
ugly truths some sources chose to omit. Veterans' recollections provide the Gls 
relation to his own mortality, how this changed with time, and how this change 
affected their way of thinking. Accordingly, special care is given to how soldiers 
were influenced by what they had to endure in combat. This includes emphasis 
on the adjustment facilitating Gls ability to tolerate and accept what transpired. 
This adjustment amounted to a moral and emotional insensitivity resulting from 
Gls' understanding they withstand, or "take" in their words, all combat could 
possibly have in store. With survival and the successful completion of their duty 
their foremost concerns, their moral and ethical lapse also explains the ruthless 
actions of some Gls in combat, including atrocities. 
Gls had the determination and self-pride not to quit and give up the fight, 
but there was another significant element of successful perseverance. The 
collective mentality gave soldiers the ability to laugh and enjoy situations normaly 
not associated with humor. Fixating on the positive aspects of life gave soldiers 
the uncanny ability to look past their problems and bear with the misery. Men 
discovered the simple feeling of life was overpowering when one became aware 
of how abruptly it could be cut short. 
Veterans' fond and pleasurable memories reveal what soldiers actually 
found humorous and what activities kept them amused. When enjoying friendships 
and camaraderie, and the other startling actions that kept soldiers occupied, 
soldiers were distracted from excessive worry over the terrible fear and deprivation 
of war. Distractions and diversions had the benefit of fostering a positive fighting 
spirit while facilitating soldiers' ability to cope. Accordingly, the "good times" 
veterans experienced performed a vital role in sustaining individual efforts. 
ii 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent scholarship on American military involvement in the war against 
Nazi Germany departs from histories of prominent leaders, strategy, and 
circumstances of key battles. Emphasis now rests on the experiences of the 
individuals who actually did the fighting and made the sacrifices. 1 This new focus 
is not meant as a tribute to the fortitude of these brave but often terrified men, but 
due to the paramount importance of the human element in warfare. 2 It can be 
stated justifiably that the most meticulously prepared plans and immense logistical 
support would have been meaningless if the Gls themselves were not motivated 
to repeatedly place their lives at risk (see Appendix A). 
Nevertheless a sufficient number of men, those who did not first become a 
victim of the vast variety of casualties, defied the natural urge to flee danger and 
fought on until Germany was defeated. The paper illustrates that Gls thought and 
acted in the manner in which they did due to the mentality they took into combat. 3 
This makes it possible to demonstrate how this mentality accounts for the success 
of the traditionally accepted principles of combat motivation. 4 
To demonstrate how one's mentality permitted sustained combat 
performance, it is necessary to explore the circumstances that determined thought 
and actions; the reasons why men fought. This requires examining attitudes 
specifically relating to individuals role as infantrymen prior to combat. Oral 
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histories from the men with firsthand knowledge provided this information, 
supplemented with the helpful, but limited, literature dealing with this subject. 5 Due 
to the fact soldiers' attitudes underwent a change during combat, it is also 
necessary to determine what an individual was forced to perform and endure if he 
was to survive in his new turbulent world. It would seem that literature chronicling 
the events of battles would be a helpful supplement to ascertain this change. 
However, compared against the information collected in oral histories, certain 
accounts of the war contain considerable drawbacks.6 
The sources in question not only fail to address the attitudes of the men 
who actually determined the outcome of battles, but more importantly some of the 
unpleasant incidents which profoundly influenced soldiers attitudes were omitted. 
It is vital to point out that this literature is accurate in its portrayal of events but "it 
is in the things not mentioned that the untruth lies. "7 There is no contention that 
key facts of the terrible conflict were "sanitized"8 in what has been labeled the 
"domestification"9 of the war. However oral histories that reveal the missing truth 
can redress this problem. 10 Without the entire story it is not possible to judge 
correctly how individuals attitudes changed while they participated in the "real 
war."11 Therefore, to first gain a holistic understanding of how Gls continued to 
fight it is necessary to ascertain the "actuality" of combat. 12 
Combat veterans continually voice the opinion that people without personal 
experience can never know what combat was actually like. One individual, 
representing the outlook of several of his comrades, insisted "you have to 
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experience it to really understand it. . You can have an intellectual 
understanding but you can't have much of an emotional understanding until you've 
experienced it. "13 Considering soldiers were officially forbidden to keep wartime 
diaries or journals (although some did), and the paucity of veteran's personal 
biographies, oral histories are invaluable in documenting what men experienced. 
Personal insights and details only combat veterans could provide will demonstrate 
how they had to overcome several shortcomings in military hardware, despite the 
popular notion that America fielded the "best equipped army in the world. "14 
Assuming no two men are completely alike and every GI had his own 
unique wartime experience, it must be stipulated there was no "average" Gl. 15 
However despite the inherent differences in men (such as age, marital status, 
intelligence, physical ability, etc.), all combat veterans experienced similar 
situations and the majority felt compelled to act for similar reasons. 16 Combat 
infantrymen had such a distinctive experience when compared to other U.S. 
servicemen 17 that it is permissible to state that infantrymen have their own 
"collective experience. "18 The collective experience is best defined as an 
experience, attitude, and motivation common to the highest number of men within 
a specific sample and not a definitive experience true to all men. 
To refine the concept of the collective experience this paper will 
demonstrate when a sample is better defined, the collective experience will be 
more distinct. To illustrate this premise, fear afflicted all World War II combatants 
wishing to avoid bodily harm no matter which branch of service or nation for which 
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they fought. 19 However, if one were to delve into the experiences of the men in 
the different branches of each of the different nations involved, one would naturally 
find that men in these different groups possessed different fears and were exposed 
to different levels of danger. Obviously, when studies focus on analogous samples 
findings will be more explicit. Therefore this study will concentrate on the U.S. 
infantryman in the last eleven months of the struggle against Nazism in western 
Europe. 20 
Not surprisingly those who lived through the hellish reality of combat 
espouse one general conclusion: an abhorrence of war. 21 Men who had their 
unwanted share of warfare deem the violence and bloodshed a "shame"22 or a 
"waste. "23 Combat was so terribly appalling that many veterans, given the 
opportunity, will not even discuss their experience.24 Reticence among men that 
agreed to reminisce about their ordeal indicates even after nearly fifty years, 
certain issues are still too sensitive to openly discuss. Some veterans felt 
fortunate to suppress some of their worst memories, but at the same time, certain 
disturbing memories persist no matter how hard they try to forget. 25 
Thus it would seem apparent war is inimical to anything delightful, but just 
as men could not forget the horrors of war, they also have indelible impressions 
of the good things they experienced.26 Every veteran interviewed stressed the 
horrible characteristics of war, but it is also true every man found something to 
laugh and joke about. Two contradictory statements introduce an ill-explored 
paradox this paper confronts. "It was a brutal experience from beginning to end. "27 
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"It was a wonderful experience. I wouldn't take anything for it."28 
Without question there was an overabundance of terror and misery in war, 
but how can war truly be associated with anything closely resembling "wonderful"? 
It is possible to gain an answer to this question by positing the mentality the 
majority shared. What can appropriately be termed the collective mentality was 
an integral part of the collective experience. It is essential to note the collective 
mentality had nothing to do with individual's ability to reason. Instead it is best 
defined as the collective way of thinking; how the majority thought and acted to 
best cope with their predicament. After the circumstances of war determined 
men's situation the affinity of human nature played a significant role in the 
development of their way of thinking. All men had similar aspirations, and their 
way of thinking was how they planned to achieve both their own goals and what 
was expected of them. 
CHAPTER ONE 
Dearest Mom and Dad: 
Aboard ship somewhere in the ocean. . . . There isn't much I can 
tell you, except about myself. I am alright but have been seasick, 
homesick, and Mad .... It looks like I'm getting stuck with all the 
bad deals. I'll just have to take it, that's all. Easy or hard I'm coming 
back, no doubt. I will see a lot of sights, but the sight of home with 
Erma and Ronnie [wife and son] will be the best of all. Loving son, 
Willis. [late November, 1944] 1 
The letter implicitly expresses the fear of the dangers war posed to the 
author's well-being. It was the element of fear that made this GI emphatically 
"Mad." Displeased with his situation, the soldier was nevertheless there, 
reluctantly heading towards what he expected to face. To explain his predicament 
a euphemistic phrase was used which, in effect, illustrates the collective mentality. 
"I'll just have to take it, that's all. Easy or hard I'm coming back, no doubt." 
Preparing himself to endure the supreme emotional and physical tests of combat, 
he made the decision "I'll just have to take it, that's all." This was a natural 
rationalization considering he was motivated by his explicitly stated desire of 
getting home to his wife and child, for whom he was already "homesick." 
The euphemism's conclusion, "easy or hard I'm coming back, no doubt" 
allowed this man a means to avoid the negative thoughts war produced by 
concentrating on positive optimistic thoughts. This wishful thinking is indicative of 
a generation of Americans who in the midst of war had the tendency to 
6 
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"accentuate the positive."2 The author's conviction he would survive, "no doubt", 
best shows this optimism. Because there was always the chance he would not 
survive this was a symbolic reassurance to convince himself (and his family) he 
would make it home alive. Pointing out anything good that might be found, like the 
"sights", illustrates how Gls suppressed adversity by focusing on the bright side 
of bad situations. 
Because men subject to similar situations reacted in similar ways it is 
possible to demonstrate that the way of thinking expressed in the letter illustrates 
the collective mentality. The factors that determined the formation of the collective 
mentality transcended the inherent differences in men because men based their 
thought and actions on the same key facts of life. 
One fact determining Gls' attitudes was that the United States was forced 
to go to war as a matter of self-defense. Pearl Harbor and Adolf Hitler's decision 
to declare war four days later put an abrupt end to the isolationist notion the U.S. 
could remain out of the global conflict. 3 Judging from the history of Nazi 
aggression and subjugation, the American public realized war was a "necessity" 
for national self-preservation. 4 Faced with a direct threat, all men contemplated 
the same reality: Germany was the aggressor that had to be defeated. 5 Americans 
made this conclusion due to the message all means of communication conveyed 
as if "with one voice. "6 The American public understood the need to defend their 
own liberties, while simultaneously defending and restoring the liberties of the 
other victims of the Nazi onslaught. As a result American citizens were imbued 
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with a belief in the righteousness of their "cause."7 One man reasoned the 
Germans "did what they were made to do, and we Americans did what we knew 
was right. "8 
The sentiment that anything citizens were called on to perform was just and 
necessary alludes to another determining factor of the collective mentality: the 
obligation to serve in the armed forces according to the Selective Service Act and 
the Articles of War. 9 Even before America was at war popular attitudes expected 
men to faithfully perform their duty anytime they were selected by the draft. The 
opinion of an individual drafted in April of 1941 exemplifies the national mind set. 
"I wanted to go .... It was a different attitude than it is now. Everything was 
different. ... You knew that you had to go."10 This individual knew he "had to" 
serve since it was unthinkable for him to break the law. Furthermore, by refusing 
service he would ruin his reputation by failing to live up to his fellow citizens' 
expectations. 
Apparent in another individual's opinion, who was drafted in May 1941, is 
the same feeling of the citizen's obligation. It also introduces another aspect which 
influenced men's attitudes: the Depression. 
We [a group of friends from rural Missouri] were taken 
in for this one year of Selective Service that Roosevelt 
was doing. Building up the army a little bit and kind of 
giving some guys something to do .... There was no 
jobs hardly, however I did have a job and I went. 11 
Another man could not find a job so he found it beneficial to enlist. The man 
recalled that it was 
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hard times and I couldn't find a job. I worked around on a farm and 
baled some hay and stuff like that for a dollar a day. By fall [of 
1940] a couple of us in Toledo [IL] decided we'd go into the army, 
enlist for four years. And that's the reason I went into the Army. I 
can't say that I was patriotic. . . . I just enlisted because I didn't 
have a job. 12 
References to the Depression suggest that attitudes created in that era 
facilitated the acceptance of enlistees and draftees new role. Members of the 
generation with personal memory of the Depression were already hardened and 
conditioned to deal with adversity. 13 Accordingly, the majority of men serving 
before December 7, 1941, tolerated, even appreciated their situation. 14 For these 
men, rather than focus on the worst possible scenario, they tried not to think about 
having to fight in a war that was already raging in Europe and Asia. 15 Instead they 
were much more concerned with when they were going to finish their one-year 
term. 16 How these men made their situation agreeable with the aid of humor and 
newly created friendships reflects the developing collective way of thinking. 17 
When an individual contemplated his role as a soldier, his decisions always 
fell under the sway of the instinct of survival. The instinct of survival was a 
preeminent factor determining thought. "Survival is number one ... the main 
objective", one veteran recalled. 18 Because a soldier's survival was in fact 
questionable, the ensuing fear of death provoked an underlying dread of the 
possibility of becoming a martyr. 19 Men already in the service at the outset of the 
war were just the first in a long line of men made to accept it was mandatory to 
fight despite fear. These men, mostly federalized National Guardsmen and one-
year draftees, never seriously questioned the issue. Once America was 
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threatened, they "naturally" concluded that to prevent suffering the consequences 
of the Articles of War, they were obligated to enter harms way any time the army 
saw fit. 20 As war progressed military service became so ingrained in the national 
consciousness that the draft was viewed as an "accepted fact", "automatic", or the 
"normal thing to do. "21 
Men obediently reported to induction centers with no substantial objections, 
but this was done only with a sense of "reluctant obedience. "22 This generation 
went off to war with very little "war fever" or dreams of adventure. 23 Raised in an 
isolationist, pacifist era, the majority desired only peace and were aware, in one 
man's words, there was "no glory to war at all. "24 Compounding the apprehensions 
induced by war, the influence of anti-war sentiment following the disillusionment 
of WW I actually created in many an aversion to the concept of war. The following 
statement illustrates the prevalent attitudes when civilians were forced to war. 
I was kind of a pacifist really. After all war is about killing people 
and I think it is a reprehensible activity on the part of the human 
race. I think it should be undertaken only in the case of defense. 25 
Some men chose to take this view one step further and refused service on 
the basis they would not kill even in self-defense. However, only a minuscule 
number of men declared themselves conscientious objectors. 26 Considering the 
consequences of not countering the Axis threat men were forced to view the war 
as a "necessary evil. 27 Men fought in one man's words: "whether we liked it or 
not."28 In addition to defending their nation men felt obligated to uphold the law 
and thus the respect of their fellow citizens. 29 
11 
With all aspects of American life devoted to victory, there was a constant 
personal and communal "urging"30 that all citizens play some "part"31 in the war 
effort. It was socially unacceptable for men to refuse service and those very few 
that did were effectively ostracized. 32 One man had this to say about conscientious 
objectors. "We thought if we had to go, why shouldn't they go too."33 
The underlying reason men knew they "had to go" alludes to another 
constant determining factor of attitudes, individuals' pride in upholding their honor 
and reputation. The interaction of the social imperative of service added great 
pressure to the natural urge to "belong." Men were driven by the desire, "you want 
to belong, you want to succeed, . . . you do not want to fail. "34 Despite their 
reluctance, self-pride compelled men to fulfill the obligations expected of them, 
their future reputation was on the line. 
Due to the enormity of the war effort, all men sampled had friends, relatives, 
and family members who made their own contribution and sacrifices. Therefore, 
the bottom line was the only way men could "belong" was to serve like everyone 
else with whom they were associated. 35 This imparted in individuals a great 
"sense of duty", the traditional American belief that it was merely the citizen's 
obligation to serve in time of crisis. 36 One individual's experience illustrates how 
powerful the need to "belong" actually was. This man decided he would enlist 
because: 
it was just the thing to do. Most of the people that I knew had 
enlisted. At that age [20] you start paying attention, you become a 
little more knowledgeable of what's going on. And you follow the 
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lead of some of your other students, because other guys were doing 
it. Everybody wants to be in the ball game at that age. 37 
This man felt it necessary to enlist so he could keep up his reputation within his 
circle of friends. Peer pressure and the coercive influence of group decisions was 
another constant factor of men's decision making process. 38 
"I knew the draft would get me sooner or later. . . . I didn't go until I had 
to, but I'm proud I went. "39 Considering the imperative of military service, how was 
it possible that the minority enlisted, while the majority stayed out until they were 
drafted like the man above? The reason was American opinion never wavered 
and was always assured of ultimate victory. One individual reflecting the attitude 
of the masses stated: "we went in with the fact that we were going to win the 
damn thing. "40 This allowed men to make the decision they would fight, but only 
when it became absolutely necessary.41 
Fear not only influenced men to stay out of the service, but oddly enough 
it also influenced men to enlist. Figuring the infantry was the most dangerous duty, 
it was not uncommon for single men, being prime candidates for the draft, to enlist 
before they were called up. Men did this reasoning, if they enlisted, it was more 
likely they would obtain a preferable duty in either another arm of the army, or 
another branch of service.42 Men in this situation knew they were going to have 
to serve and in their minds were trying to avoid future danger by avoiding the 
infantry. 
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Nevertheless, the majority decided to sit by and wait for the draft. Those 
with the shortest time to savor civilian life were single men. A major topic of 
discussion by these men was their draft status and when they needed to report for 
duty. It is important to note that when they would go was the main issue, not if 
they would go, or how they could get out of going.43 One individual, twenty-seven 
and single, knew he would serve and even planned on enlisting. This man 
recalled the situation in April 1942. 
I was going to enlist in the navy. I had a friend here in Neoga [IL] 
that told me if I'd enlist in the navy he'd go enlist with me. So I went 
down to Effingham [IL] and took the physical and passed it and I 
came back . . . and said, 'you ready to go, I took my physical.' 
We'd go right away so he said, 'the draft is not but two weeks away, 
we might as well wait now.' So that's what I did too then, I just 
waited for the draft.44 
These two individuals reasoned it was not necessary to jump right into 
uncertainty. This led to the common decision that it was better to enjoy the normal 
life while one still could. True these men only had two weeks to sit out, but that 
was better than going right in. In another case, an eighteen year old college 
student was an "indifferent student" due to the understanding that "you weren't 
going to be around all that long because you were going to be called up." Since 
he knew what was soon to be in store for him, he purposely lived life to the fullest 
which resulted in a less than satisfactory first year of college. "I have to say I was 
partying. 45 This illustrates how men accentuated the positive by enjoying 
themselves and staying out of danger while they still could. 
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As American involvement in the fighting increased during 1943 and 1944 
it was impossible to fill the ranks without drawing on draftees who were husbands 
and fathers. For the most part these men were even more reluctant to fight than 
their predecessors. Nevertheless, these men knew they "had to" serve as well. 
One individual inducted in July of 1943 who was married but had no children 
recalled. 
I knew I would be going in. . . . I didn't know exactly when, but I 
knew I was going. I wasn't particularly thrilled about going, but I 
knew that somebody had to go, and I happened to be one of them. 46 
Apparent in this man's statement is his disfavor and reluctance, 
overpowered by his cognizance of the Nazi threat and sense of obligation. The 
next statement declares the same attitude, but it was possible for this individual 
to stay out until June of 1944 because he was married with one child. 
All you could do was sit back and wait, wait until your turn came up. 
Nobody liked it. . . . it was just something that had to be done. 
Most men didn't want to go as far as that goes, but they knew they 
should go. It was their duty to go. . . . I figured all the other boys 
ahead of me didn't want to go any worse than I. I wasn't going to 
break my neck to get in it, or break my neck to keep out of the war. 
When my turn came I was going to go along and try to make a big 
team of it. . . . I think a lot of the boys were the same way. 47 
The previous individual's judgement was correct when compared to the attitudes 
expressed by others with first hand knowledge.48 This attitude also corresponds 
with that ages contemporary sources. 49 
One veteran's experience, who said "nobody wants to get into it[combat]", 
demonstrates how the social imperative to serve outweighed most any hesitation. 
Due to the great demand for infantry replacements in September of 1944, it was 
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necessary to draft a father of two young children. Moreover, he had lost a 
nineteen year old brother killed fighting the Germans in Italy in April of 1943. 
Rather than going to the trouble of trying to get a deferment he decided it was 
better to accept the necessity of service. "I think I could have stayed out if I'd 
ht ·t I t . ,,50 foug 1 • • . . wen in. 
After a grim acceptance of the facts, there was a collective rationalization 
that it was necessary to fight so as not to be viewed as a cowardly shirker. This 
explains why men fought with great obedience even when so many were "very un-
anxious to go."51 Like the nation itself, most Gls did not fight until it was 
unavoidable, but once they did fight, they fought with the utmost dedication and 
conviction. 
This conviction was based on the quintessential aspect of the collective 
mentality: the desire to get the unwanted task over with, and get back home to 
civilian life with their honor intact. This motivation, as expressed in the soldier's 
letter on page one, was shared by all of his comrades. 52 The next two statements' 
illustrate how despite their displeasure men tried to keep their thoughts on the 
positive side: home. 
All of us were fighting to get the war over with and try to get back 
home to normal life again. . . . That was in all of our minds to go 
out and get it done and get it over with so we could get back to 
normal life. . . . We all hated to do it but it was there. You were 
just a victim of circumstance. 53 
I went in to do my job and I wanted to get it over with .... You just 
had to do it and you hoped to get out of it and get back home. 54 
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Being impossible to send untrained civilians off to war, the army assumed 
the task of preparing men for combat. Fresh recruits soon realized training was 
focused on the same thing they were: survival. The purpose of the 
"transformation" from a civilian into a soldier was to teach men what they needed 
to know to stay alive on the battlefield. 56 Because a soldier was only useful alive, 
the army used all means at its disposal to provide him with realistic preparation. 
One man recalled "through training they try to convey to you what it [combat] is 
going to be like. "57 
To adjust men to the reality of combat drill instructors stressed the fact men 
would be killed. "Some of you boys are going overseas and some of you are 
going to get killed. Some of you will get back, some of you won't. They beat that 
into our heads. "58 Once men contemplated the stakes involved they often 
concluded they could best benefit by learning all they could. 
We were just there to get all the knowledge we could during training. 
They told us right at first what we learned there was going to save 
our life. They were trying to keep us alive. I thought as long as we 
had to go through it we better try to absorb all the information that 
we could for any further use. 59 
The army set out to install in these men certain qualities and abilities which 
were considered essential to produce victory. Therefore, all recruits went through 
a standardized training program. Veterans sampled thought several elements of 
training were useful later in combat while discipline was cited most important by 
the highest number of men.60 One veteran recalled, "one of the main things they 
put into us was discipline. They wanted to make sure we did what they told us. "61 
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Because combat demanded unquestioned obedience to orders any 
insubordination was intolerable. Men were often forced to learn this during training 
the "hard way."62 One statement illustrates how men decided to adjust to their 
situation. 
They didn't want any fussing or talk back from you. . . . I found out 
that that was really the best way to do. To do your best regardless 
of whether you liked it or not. . . . You can make it rough on 
yourself or you can get by in good shape. You belonged to them. 
You just kept your mouth shut and did what you were told. . . . I 
figured that was always the best thing to do. You had no say.63 
Because those who refused to follow orders were "weeded out" most 
unceremoniously, men accepted that it was mandatory to act upon orders without 
question. 64 This was an obvious conclusion considering men did not want to "fail" 
and thus be considered maladjusted and unfit for combat. 65 
When ascertaining how efforts to install teamwork and unity influenced 
men's attitudes, one major distinction appears in the collective experience. This 
distinction was created by the differences between replacements and men in 
original outfits. Regardless of their status all recruits were informed of the 
necessity of teamwork on the battlefield. 66 However, this element of training took 
on an entirely different meaning to the men in an original outfit as compared to 
replacements. The reason being that a replacement went into combat for the first 
time with relative strangers. Conversely original members of a unit went into 
combat with a strong sense of unit spirit. "The unit means a great deal to you," 
one veteran recalled. 67 
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Men in original outfits, with one to three years of training together under 
their belt, learned that peak performance required mutual dependency and 
teamwork. Of course, the development of unity went hand in hand with the 
development of camaraderie between both the men, and the men and their 
officers. "We were all buddy, buddy."68 These bonds translated into great trust 
and respect among men who had grown to know their fellow soldiers capabilities 
and limitations. 69 The following anecdote illustrates the powerful effect of unity and 
group cohesion upon individuals. One man commented that on forced marches 
the men would 
be so wore out we'd just be dragging along you know. Well when 
your coming in everybody would be out there waiting for us. . . . 
'Ok men were coming in' he said [their officer] 'lets show some 
pride.' Well we would all straighten up and walk like we weren't 
even tired. It gives you something down in the heart. 10 
The problem was that replacements who entered combat with no personal ties had 
nothing comparable "down in the heart." 
With soldiers specific purpose being to "destroy the enemy" it was 
mandatory for them to have the military capability to perform this task. This 
involved totally familiarizing men with the different weapons they would use in this 
process. 71 It was also required that men learn modern battlefield tactics. 
One of his [the drill instructor] main objectives was to tell us to learn 
our military tactics. . . . To do what we were supposed to do 
because it wasn't going to be too many months and we were going 
to have to be over there versus the Germans. Then we would have 
to know what we were doing. 72 
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Proficiency in military tactics required soldiers to have the will to pull the trigger in 
combat. With the foresight to realize men might have second thoughts about 
killing, the army equated killing to survival. Instructors stressed to recruits that an 
enemy soldier would be intent on killing them, so therefore they had to either "kill 
or get killed. "73 Determined on staying alive, men realized it was essential to kill 
for self-defense, even if they did not enjoy the fact. 
However, since good soldiers needed to harbor no qualms about killing, 
instructors worked to impart a ruthless aggressive spirit. To introduce a new 
philosophy of life, and to suppress previous modes of fair play, men were 
instructed to follow the antithesis of the Golden Rule. "Do unto others as they 
would do into you, but do it first."74 Instruction in "dirty fighting" provided men with 
advice on how to survive by teaching them the various unscrupulous ways to stay 
alive. 75 Army pamphlets offered Gls information concerning how to "kill quietly with 
an ax" or how to use a club "to crack an enemy's skill. "76 True this seems brutal, 
but these men had to be adjusted to the real facts. Combat is brutal. 
Realistic preparation for combat also included exposing men to specially 
designed live-fire courses. Live-fire under simulated combat conditions provided 
men with their "battle inoculation" meant to acquaint them with the sight, sounds, 
and some of the fear of combat. 77 The next statement exemplifies the general 
attitude towards live-fire training. "I didn't enjoy it, but I did it. "78 Even when they 
knew the bullets inches above their heads were intended to miss them, men 
experiences fear. Regardless recruits never gained an understanding of what it 
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felt like when it was the enemy actually aiming to kill, not instructors aiming to 
miss. 
This introduces one drawback of the army's training program. The Basic 
Field Manual stated the "value derived" from training would "vary directly with the 
realism with which battle conditions are simulated. "79 Training could never entirely 
simulate combat, but realism definitely increased as training procedures evolved. 
This brings to light a distinction in the collective experience between soldiers in 
training before 1943, as compared to men trained in the latter stages of the war. 
A participant in the Louisiana maneuvers in the Fall of 1941 said this about their 
woeful lack of training material. 
We used signs for half-tracks. We used broomsticks for guns. We 
didn't have a thing. . . . It was just like kids out there playing with 
sticks. People don't realize that. . . . We weren't prepared. 80 
On the other hand men had considerable praise for the realistic training aids 
instituted during and after 1943. In addition to having adequate weaponry, these 
men had access to mock village training courses, targets resembling tanks pulled 
on railroad tracks, remote controlled airplanes used for machine gun practice, to 
name just a few of the material advantages. 81 Unfortunately added realism also 
created accidents. Ironically, out of the veterans sampled, the soldier who went 
through training last, and was thus exposed to the greatest realism, was the only 
individual who experienced a live-fire casualty. Casualties were avoided at all 
costs, but sometimes could not be avoided.82 Injury or death was a tragically 
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undesirable outcome of training, although not much more could inject as much 
realism into training. 
The recipients of greater realism after 1943 were more distinct as a group 
because they were predominantly replacements. Replacements benefited from 
advanced training aids and instruction by seasoned combat veterans. 
Replacements repeatedly stressed the importance of the sound advice received 
from instructors with combat experience. "They knew what it was really like," one 
man said. 83 Even so, most men from original outfits considered their instructors 
effective even when they had no combat experience. 84 However, there were also 
those very unhappy with their inexperienced instructors and leaders. "Competent 
officers were guys that had been in battle before and we didn't have any"85 
However, this distinction had little impact upon the attitudes of either group 
upon entering combat. This is true since after training most all men, replacements 
and men from original outfits, believed they were adequately prepared for combat. 
This is considering green troops had no real idea of what might be lacking in their 
training. As far as these soldiers were concerned they had learned a great deal 
about the art of warfare. 
Men also knew they had learned much about themselves; feeling a sense 
of accomplishment upon completing their rigorous training was the norm. Because 
combat was one long "endurance test" training constantly functioned to develop 
physical stamina.86 Rigorous physical performances requirements determined if 
men did, or did not have the will and physical ability to be a combat infantryman. 
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In one man's words, training revealed who could not and who could "keep up with 
us."87 Another man recalled how training not only "physically toughened" soldiers, 
but it also "mentally toughened" them up as well. 88 There is no coincidence in 
what the following two men thought training did for them. One said, "there is 
something about it that makes a man out of you." The other said, "it will make a 
man out of you. I grew up pretty fast. "89 
On a massive scale training had the result of producing competent soldiers 
with the military ability to complete their task. Most all veterans would agree with 
the following statement: "all of us thought we were pretty well trained. 90 Trainings 
greatest success was instilling men with confidence in their ability as soldiers. 
Confidence in the capability to defeat the enemy was an essential factor 
determining the collective mentality. 
No matter how confident and well-trained, the impulse of fear became more 
acute the closer men got to combat. Embarkation and the trip overseas had the 
effect of intensifying this pre-combat "anxiety."91 "That's when you begin to think. 
Where are you going to go? What are you going to do?"92 While anticipating 
combat, men mulled over all sorts of questions, they wondered what "it" was going 
to be like, and when and where this "moment of truth" was going to take place.93 
Soldiers' peace of mind were most troubled by the uncertainty of their situation. 94 
One veteran recalled his feelings, "there is fear there and a sense of anticipation. 
What is going to happen, and will I be able to measure up. "95 Often greater than 
the fear of injury, men had great fears of not "measuring up" to their comrades, 
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thus exposing themselves as cowards. To uphold the respect of their fellow 
soldiers, men were determined to control themselves and pass the test of combat 
as soldiers must.96 This is testimony to the coercive power of wanting to belong. 
Because pre-combat anxiety was such a real issue, the army took a realistic 
approach to help men cope with the problem. Men were taught fear afflicted 
everyone, but it was essential soldiers have the state of mind to act regardless of 
fear. Furthermore, leaders were advised to keep their men busy so they could not 
dwell on their fears. 97 Gls learned to live with their fears, but at the same time 
there were those very few who could not. A desperate man could find a way to 
get out of going overseas if he opted to go AWOL and become a fugitive. 
However, this was not an option for most. One GI, preparing to embark in the fall 
of 1943 had a friend from training say to him: 
'you know I'm not but just a few miles from home.' And he said 
'what would you do? Would you take off to see your folks?' 
Because you knew you were going to be going overseas. I said 'I'm 
not recommending one way or another but I know what I'd do.' He 
said 'I'm going them.' So he did, he left. I'm sure that eventually he 
came over with another outfit. . . . He was like the rest of us. He 
knew we had a job that needed to be done. I'm like him I wanted to 
see my folks before we left because we all knew that somebody was 
going to get killed. 98 
Considering two other men in the sample knew of Gls who "disappeared" 
during embarkation, it was not unusual for there to be AWOL's before men left for 
overseas duty.99 Growing aware that some individuals were finding ways to get 
out of going overseas, the army took measures to prevent this practice. A GI who 
shipped out in August of 1944 remarked that during his stay at an embarkation 
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camp "it was very hard to get out. We were pretty closely watched. They were 
afraid of too many AWOL's. 11100 
The hundreds of thousands of Gls who never went AWOL had long 
accepted the fact they were in "for the duration. "101 The fact ground soldiers had 
no rotation was another major determining factor of the collective mentality. 102 
Stipulated that there was no way out until the enemy was defeated, Gls had one 
obsession: getting the fighting over with so they could get home. It was a 
foregone conclusion the only way this could be accomplished was to do everything 
necessary for survival, no matter how undesirable. Going into their ordeal, men 
understood the necessity of performing up to the high levels combat demanded no 
matter how grueling. Men also understood the need stomach the brutal 
characteristics of war; soldiers could not allow their nasty business trouble them. 
Aware it would be no simple matter to endure, Gls prepared their mettle for 
the challenge of combat. This way of thinking started to develop when men 
determined it was mandatory to accept their mostly unwanted role. "I knew when 
I went in it was a dirty job, but someone had to do it. I was one of those drafted 
to help."103 Similar to all men, this man expected horrible situations ahead and he 
prepared himself for this eventuality. Past experience with living, and even 
thriving, under adverse conditions facilitated men's effort to persevere. On top of 
the Depression's conditioning Gls had gained a taste of how to cope with 
demanding situations during their training. 
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The letter at the beginning of this chapter indicates how all Gls went into 
combat thinking the same thing. "I'll just have to take it, that's all." The same GI 
who wrote those words recalled the mood as his unit got ever closer to the real 
thing. "We knew what was coming. Why you just had to take what was in front 
of you."104 The popular word "take" was appropriately used to describe how men 
planned to rely on determination, sheer guts, and physical toughness to get them 
through. Even the minority who put themselves in the situation by their own will 
made the same rationalization. "I had enlisted that alone already set you up to 
take whatever comes. "105 
The fundamental understanding that it was imperative to endure all combat 
had in store, was an essential facet of the collective way of thinking. To keep up 
with their fellow soldiers men knew they had to be impervious to incredible 
hardships and deprivations. Gls braced themselves for the difficult task by 
securing their faculties with an emotionally defensive posture. The disposition that 
one "take it" helped individuals disregard what was detrimental to their morale, and 
non-essential to their survival. Gls were forced into an emotionally insensitive 
state of mind. As one man described it, "you were numb. "106 
The following scenario perfectly illustrates another facet of the mentality of 
survival: how fear made men stay out of danger when at all possible. This incident 
occurred during training while this soldier was practicing firing a machine gun. 
I talked to somebody before we started shooting it and he said the 
average life of a machine gunner was only seven seconds when 
you're in combat . . . because that's the first one they try to get. I 
thought, boy I don't want to get in on that." While he was shooting 
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he was "really going to town" and "hitting everything." He then 
overheard an officer behind him say "that's going to be our machine 
gunner. When I heard him say that I relaxed . . . whenever you 
shoot, it wants to rise . . . the shell does. Boy, I did that while 
they were around. I didn't want to be a machine gunner. . . . That 
was one way of getting out of it. 11107 
Purposely performing under his potential and thus hoping to better his chances of 
survival, is just another example of how fear made men cautious and self-
protective. This is typical of the collective mentality since most men had no ideas 
of being a hero, but instead desired to take the least risks possible. 108 
Closer to the dangers of combat, despite an all out effort to disregard fear, 
it never disappeared. How soldiers dealt with this illustrates another essential 
facet of the collective mentality. The best way for Gls to mitigate their anxieties, 
and adversity in general, was to avoid dwelling on negative thoughts by 
concentrating on anything and everything positive. To distract oneself from the 
pessimism which was inconsistent with an offensive spirit, one veteran recalled 
how it was essential that "you always have to be optimistic. "109 
To help compensate for the misery Gls knew anything that made them 
laugh and feel better was very special. As a result they learned to make a 
concentrated effort on finding whatever gave them relief and indeed pleasure. 
Men made the best of bad situations; relishing whatever they could enjoy, they had 
to "accentuate the positive."110 The ability to find something positive in the face of 
danger facilitated efforts to cope and persevere. This way of thinking occupied the 
mind at crucial times where, if men had too much time to brood, their will to fight 
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would be unduly effected. As one veteran perceived the situation, "you had to 
take the good with the bad."111 
The epitome of the positive thinking was the conviction one would just go 
fight and do his duty and come home alive. Soldiers' assumption they would 
survive can be described as an "illusion of immortality."112 The feeling that nothing 
bad will ever happen to oneself was most associated with youth, although men of 
all ages held the same belief. As one veteran recalled "at twenty-one you thought 
nothing could stop you."113 Surprisingly enough, men held these attitudes even 
after their combat training emphasized men obviously would be killed. For 
example, one drill instructor, fresh from informing his recruits of this fact, still fell 
under the misperception of wishful thinking. 
I had no question that I'd live through it. . . . You just don't think 
about those things. You don't go into a football game thinking you're 
going to lose. . . . If those things enter your mind why go."114 
True many soldiers went into combat with an illusion of immortality, but men 
also went in with what is more aptly labeled as a delusion of immortality. One 
veteran recalled that "going into a war like that you know good and well you've got 
a chance of getting shot or killed."115 However, this was the very same soldier, 
who, in his letter home to his parents at the start of this chapter, had "no doubt" 
he would survive. This is a prime indication of how men knew there was a 
possibility they could be injured or killed, but they convinced themselves they 
would survive. For instance, one individual on the eve of the Normandy invasion 
knew men in his unit were going to die, but he just "hoped" he would be one of the 
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lucky ones. 116 What has to be stressed is that since soldiers did not dwell on the 
worst possible scenario they were more concerned with last minute preparations 
for survival rather than the possibility of death. 
This entire way of thinking hinged on the fact Gls were, one, assured of 
ultimate victory, and, two, confident of their ability to produce this victory. 
Furthermore, the pride that emanated from knowing they were fighting for a morally 
right and winning cause buoyed men's will to fight. 117 It was also reassuring to 
know the American army had ample war materiel and manpower to support 
individual endeavors. One man remembered his commanding officer's speech to 
his unit before battle. 
Anything that takes one person to do, two are going to go. If it takes 
a squad were going to send two squads. If it takes a company were 
going to send two companies. We are not taking any chances on 
anything. . . That made you feel good to know. 118 
How Gl's attitudes before combat varied according to the time they went in, 
is another distinction of the collective experience. The first distinct group of Gls 
with similar attitudes were those in England trained for amphibious operations 
before June 1944. These men knew they were soon to be required to meet the 
enemy. Contemplating the assault of the formidable German defenses of the 
Atlantic Wall, they prepared themselves for the worst. Because most of these men 
felt that the agonizing wait, which only prolonged the anxiety, was the worst, they 
were resigned to make one decision. That it was better to confront the source of 
their fears and get their job over with. One GI who landed on Omaha Beach with 
the 29th division recalled the mood while waiting for the invasion. "We knew what 
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we had to do. We wondered why we had to wait so long."119 For men who felt 
confident and ready to go whenever ordered, getting on with their task was the 
only way for them to get home. 
Soldiers who had not entered the fray before September and October 1944 
dealt with their situation similarly, even though they had different attitudes. Aware 
that German troops had already been sent reeling in defeat, albeit with a great 
cost, these men had a totally different opinion of Germany's armed might. 
Consumed by their optimism, it was possible for them to question whether they 
would even have to fight. One veteran recalled the general attitude in the 
beginning of October. 
They were moving so fast that we thought we would never see any 
action because Germany would be out of it. . . . There was a lot of 
talk about being home by Christmas. In essence there was a great 
deal of optimism in the air. 120 
Opinions such as this were commonplace among incoming troops until the 
Ardennes offensive suddenly changed the picture. This is seen in a Gl's first letter 
home from the European Theater of Operations on December 15, 1944. It read: 
". . . surely this war situation will clear up this year. They claim politics is all 
that's holding it up now. I don't know. "121 Looking back on the time he wrote these 
words, this man remembered how everyone at the replacement depot thought the 
war could end at any time. 
It seemed like things were moving pretty fast. Of course, you didn't 
know for sure but you always hoped that way. They were fighting for 
six months over there before we went over. We kind of figured that 
the Germans couldn't last much longer. 122 
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Assuming rumors and scuttlebutt mirrored general attitudes, the majority still 
waiting to get into the fight prior to the Battle of the Bulge, continued to hope for 
the best: that the war would be over before they would have to fight. 
All hopes of a quick end to the war vanished as news spread of the German 
advances in the desperate Ardennes fighting. Even if they were disappointed at 
the time, soldiers waiting to enter combat for the first time actually benefitted from 
hearing this news. These men were made to accept the fact that their foe had 
recouped and there was still a war to be fought. Soldiers were no longer 
complacent and overconfident, but were again obliged to put up their guard and 
prepare for the worst. 123 After the Battle of the Bulge Gls realized it was only a 
matter of time before German capitulated, although they always kept in mind that 
last ditch efforts to defend German soil should be expected as bitter 
engagements. 124 Most importantly Germany's military potential was never again 
underestimated. 
It is significant to note that green troops entering combat after December 
of 1944 were predominantly replacements. They largely consisted of married men 
with no unit cohesion and an even greater lack of zeal that their predecessors. 125 
For example, one replacement's personal attitude, "nobody wants to get into it. "126 
However, it must be known there were always exceptions to the norm: some men 
did find something positive about going to war. 
One of these men was a twenty-one year old father of a baby girl who 
before being drafted in August of 1944 had no desire to get into combat. 
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Nevertheless, once caught up in the process of soldiering and war making, he 
found something attractive about his situation. 
You are kind of anxious even though it was dangerous. . . . You 
knew you were ready to get into it. It's like a football player sitting 
on the sidelines, you know he wants to get in the game. You want 
to do your part. 127 
What attracted this man to the fight was the personal conviction that one must 
"belong" and be like everyone else. This was already illustrated by the man who 
enlisted so that he could also be in the "ball game." It was this man who felt 
similarly, "you wanted to get into it. You're all gung ho."128 This is like the scant 
few soldiers who were looking for war to provide them with glory and adventure. 129 
These were men whose ego made it essential they do as much or more than 
everyone else in America's time of need. Not coincidentally these men usually had 
the strongest illusion of immortality. 130 
Men who wanted to get into the fight were definitely the minority but they 
do, in fact, represent the trend in the way of thinking. They made something good 
out of a bad situation they did not want to be in in the first place. Another 
individual's experience again illustrates the powerful attraction of belonging to an 
exclusive group. During the autumn of 1944 when the German army appeared to 
be in a shambles, some men, thinking they would not see any action, actually felt 
somewhat disappointed and cheated. This man, who made it a point to label 
himself "naive", recalled what the men discussed while they waited for decision 
day. The gist of the discussion was, "we wanted to at least be able to say we'd 
been shot at. "131 This speaks for those men who rationalized there would be 
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privileges in being a combat veteran like the hundreds of thousands of other young 
men across the nation. Men put their faith in the assumption they would be 
regarded with respect by civilians who knew they had the moral fiber to stand up 
to combat. 
Considering even those few who wanted to fight did not until they were 
ordered, touches on the real reason men went into combat. Men simply went into 
combat whenever they were ordered to do so, thoughts of not going never 
seriously entered their minds. 132 To illustrate this, one GI preparing for the 
Normandy invasion in England, was convinced after a visit by General Dwight 
Eisenhower, that his 28th Division was to be picked for the initial landings. When 
asked if he wanted to be a part of the invasion he stated succinctly, "not really, 
no."133 The fact is, whether he wanted to go or not, he would have went if his 
division was chosen. This attests to the fact men followed orders sending them 
into combat with a "reluctant obedience."134 
This principle was the same for men in original outfits as it was for 
replacements. A GI who landed on Utah beach with the 4th division of D-day 
recalled: 
you were scared [but] you knew that you had to go. They told us to 
go. So what are you going to do. We had officers with us all the 
time. They told us what to do. 135 
This impression was the same for a replacement who recalled how you 
had a bunch of officers leading you. . . . You more or less had to 
follow them. If they said go down this way, you go that way. 
Whatever it was you followed the officers. It didn't make any 
difference how you felt. ... You belonged to the military, you 
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belonged to the army. You didn't have any say of your own 
anymore. 136 
Nevertheless, obedience to orders and the drive to uphold ones honor had 
a far greater impact on men in original outfits as compared to replacements. 
These men not only took orders from officers they knew and trusted, but also 
loyalty to their unit helped to propel them into combat. The next statement reflects 
the unbending loyalty to one's unit fostered by the new bonds of friendship. 
You were with your unit and you were a part of that unit. Whatever 
it did you did, wherever it went why you went and that's all there was 
to it.137 
The following statement is another example of how a pride in oneself and unit 
overpowered fear. 
You've got a mixed feeling. You are scared to death as far as that 
goes. Anybody that says they weren't scared has something wrong 
with them. . . . But I wouldn't back out. . . . We knew where we 
were going. I don't know of anybody that would back out on it. We 
were all geared up and reared to go. 138 
Men in original units felt reassured knowing they were heading into danger 
with friends who would watch their backs and take extra chances for them, while 
expecting the same in return. Replacements on the other hand, had no unit 
cohesion to fall back on until they came a part of the group and were compelled 
to act primarily out of orders. Replacements did have some support however due 
to the fact they were around veteran soldiers who already knew the ropes and 
could provide them with sound advice. 139 
On the day soldiers made their way into combat for the first time they 
continued to cope with fear in the same manner as always. Not only positive 
34 
thinking helped distract them from thinking of their fears, but focusing on a specific 
chore had the same immediate effect. One example of how, before combat, all 
Gls were preoccupied with soldierly preparations follows. Before one individual 
with the 29th Division hit the beach at Omaha his unit had four days to pass 
onboard a LST. 
Whenever you got that close you didn't take nothing[sic] for granted 
because you knew something was going to happen. . . . Of 
course, you were polishing your gun up and being sure everything 
is working just perfect and all that. 140 
Immediately before combat, replacements, or men in original outfits, whether in a 
ship, truck, train, or on foo were all concentrated on military priorities. Soldiers 
meticulously checked and secured their equipment making sure they were totally 
prepared for action. This included going over and over their objective and their 
individual role in attaining the objective. This occupied soldier's thoughts with 
specific details keeping them from thinking about the dangers ahead. 
No matter how wrapped up with their tactical considerations, men always 
found time for conversations amongst themselves. Staunchly optimistic, these 
discussions were always representative of the collective mentality. A favorite topic 
was home and how soon they could get home. Men also had a passion for 
discussing the women they left behind. For example, the previously mentioned 
individual preparing to land on Omaha beach recalled how men helped pass the 
time when not trying to sleep. 
A lot of people talked about home and showed pictures to each 
other. A lot of them just gambled right there on the boat. 141 
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Gambling is just another example of how interests could be occupied with group 
activities and discussions. Dispelling uncomfortable moments of contemplative 
silence, humorous comments and banter kept the atmosphere lively, even if men 
employed forced bravado. Using an intentional understatement one man said that 
before combat "the humor is sometimes pretty broad to put it mildly."142 Men also 
had the tendency to say a prayer, or write a quick letter home. 143 All this kept 
soldiers interested in things other than their fears. 
Two recollections provide proof of how men in totally different situations 
used the same means to avoid their fears: optimism and humor. One veteran of 
the 4th division remarked on a big debate onboard his LST while waiting to assault 
Utah Beach. The men were caught up with how long it would take to defeat 
Germany so they could get back home. The men concluded that when they 
pushed the Germans back to Paris the Werhmacht would collapse and the war 
would come to an end. They knew they had hard fighting ahead, but confidence 
allowed them to be optimistic. 144 
This same trend in the way of thinking can be seen in the situation of 
replacement getting closer to the front lines in the Ruhr in early April 1945. 
Advancing down a road along with his new company, a fellow replacement said 
to him quite assured, "we'll never see combat." The two neophytes continued to 
discuss the likelihood of seeing action while expressing the desire they would see 
none. After marching for awhile longer they were stunned to hear machine gun 
fire raking the front of the column. The individual relaying the story turned to his 
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newly found buddy and said, "what do you think that is up there?" The other GI 
put up a facade by replying, "oh, they're just up there practicing." As casualties 
were carried back towards the rear, the soldier with a flair for humor and self-
delusion had to admit "well, I guess you're right." Knowing the war could end any 
time, these men convinced themselves of the best, at least it was a comforting 
way to cope at the time. 145 
The experience of one individual who landed on Omaha Beach with the 
29th Division illustrates the primary motivation of all Gls once in combat. Their 
landing craft carried his unit as close to shore as possible and then dropped the 
front ramp, "everybody out" their officer yelled and the journey began to the 
protection afforded by the bluffs overlooking the beach. Once the unit started 
forward "of course you went with the crowd then. "146 Under fire, fear influenced 
soldiers to go forward because the group provided a sense of security and courage 
always came with numbers. This man was then aware, in every engagement with 
the enemy "survival was number one . . . the main objective. "147 
CHAPTER TWO 
The GI previously mentioned, who landed with the 29th Division on Omaha 
Beach, experienced for the first time on that day a common characteristic of 
combat: extreme confusion. After exiting the landing craft he recalled: 
we had to get onshore the best we could. To this day I can't swim 
and I was a block and a half away from shore. I don't know how I 
got to shore, but I got to shore with everything I had on .... You're 
so scared you don't know what you're doing half the time. 1 
The bewilderment all soldiers experienced in the chaotic mayhem of battle is one 
reason this man never retained a fully coherent memory of his first harrowing 
minutes under fire. In their deadly environment, men did not pay attention to 
details, but were only concerned with protecting themselves. The instinct of 
survival controlled one's actions and preoccupied the mind. Fear and intense 
danger incited a mind-numbing excitement where men tried to remain calm and 
rationalize actions, but they more often frantically reacted. In this frenzied state, 
getting out of the perilous situation alive was one's primary aim. This man recalled 
his only objective of the first day: "to keep from dying. We were heading in 
towards the beach that's all I can tell you. "2 
Seeing how other men were being killed around him, this soldier had his 
first shocking exposure to the cruel reality of combat. He recalled a "spooky 
feeling" encountering his first combat fatality, a dead American sailor, while he was 
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still trying to get ashore. 3 Other soldiers of the 17 5th Regiment were likewise 
"spooked" as they witnessed not only casualties in their own unit, but the corpses 
from previous waves. 4 The man recalled what really awaited those who made it 
to the perceived protection of the seawall at the base of the bluffs. 
They were killing us right and left. They were just up above throwing 
hand grenades us you know. That whole place along there was 
bodies, dead bodies everywhere. 5 
This man's baptism of fire was both a shocking and an awakening 
experience. Like the overwhelming majority of Gls, he was forced to realize he 
had no accurate preconception of combat. 
Myself I didn't know how bad it was going to be, but it's worse than 
a person could think. Whenever you see your buddies getting shot 
up all around you, you wonder how come it didn't get you .... It 
makes you wonder how long you're going to stay. . . . It's a scary 
feeling. 6 
In his first experience with enemy fire, he came to the same terrible realization 
most all his fellow soldiers made at one time or another. The realization one could 
be killed at any moment. In the middle of an engagement, this only intensified the 
awareness of one's personal fight for survival. 7 
Another veteran's recollection of his units' baptism of fire depicts a different, 
yet similar situation. In this engagement two companies of infantry were ordered 
across a small river unknowingly walking directly into an ambush. The Germans 
allowed the Gls to cross the river unimpeded, but then laid a "curtain of fire" 
across the river cutting them off from support or retreat. The trapped soldiers took 
heavy shelling before German tanks and infantry stormed their positions. What 
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was even worse for these men was that poor weather prevented air support, or 
effective counter artillery support. The two companies ceased to exist as 
functioning units after the tanks proceeded to fire into individual foxholes. Those 
still alive scattered into isolated groups in the attempt to make it back to American 
lines. A GI who was fortunate to be on the secure side of the river recalled how 
his battalion took "very heavy casualties .... They made mince meat out of us."8 
The veteran relaying this story was a battalion runner who carried up the 
order stipulating the reserve company render assistance. It was after the company 
commander received this order that the captain mysteriously ended up with a 
bullet through his foot. The man recalled the captain must have "felt it was an 
extremely dangerous situation, which it was. . . . Now whether he shot himself, 
or whether it was truly an accident I cannot tell you. I'm not making any 
allegations I can't prove." This man was averse to unjustly condemn his ex-
superior, but in the interview the author could sense a very strong suspicion this 
man believed this was a self-inflicted wound. Considering the circumstance, and 
the suspicion of almost an entire battalion, the reader can make their own 
assumption. 9 
Contemplating the dangers before him, the captain could have come to the 
conclusion that if he permitted himself to go forward with the attack he could, or 
would, be killed. If he could not cope with this actuality of combat, his instinct for 
survival took over and got him out of the situation alive. Men that went to such 
drastic measures to get out of combat rationalized it was better to suffer the injury, 
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and the resulting dishonor, so they at least knew they would survive. 
Even if the men in this battalion did not know for certain whether the captain 
had intentionally shot himself, one thing is for certain: soldiers will most always talk 
contemptuously of whom they deem a slacker. Having one of their leaders betray 
them in such a manner only added to the disillusionment of this battalion's fateful 
baptism of fire. This veteran recalled that "as a result of this I would say there was 
a deterioration in the morale of my battalion. "10 This incident is just one example 
of how the series the "U.S. Army in World War II" misrepresented the situation by 
failing to mention incidents that profoundly influenced soldier's attitudes. In this 
case The Siegfreid Line Campaign discussed the events of the engagement, but 
said nothing of the company commander's injury and its affect on the men. 11 
How the U.S. Army series neglected, to a great extent, the attitudes of the 
soldiers can be seen in another veteran's first encounter with the enemy. As a 
member of the 4th Division his first action came on Utah Beach on June 6, 1944. 
The official view found in Cross-Channel Attack was that the amphibious landing 
went "virtually routine."12 Militarily it might have been "virtually routine", however 
from a soldier's perspective it was nothing of the sort. In the participant's opinion 
it was just plain "rough."13 Considering the shocking effect of one's first combat, 
a green divisions first encounter with the enemy should never be considered 
"virtually routine." 
Every unit's baptism of fire was different and naturally soldiers who had 
different experiences possessed different attitudes. The man above, who landed 
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at Utah beach on D-day, was in a headquarters company that suffered no 
casualties on the first day. "We didn't lose any men."14 This happens to be 
representative of the fighting on Utah, as compared to the much more severe 
fighting on Omaha beach. This individual's experience also differed from his 
counterpart at Omaha considering that rather than first being exposed to the 
dismal sight of dead Americans, he was reassured to see his first enemy fatalities. 
"What helped us out was seeing some dead German soldiers. "15 It is important 
to note that under these conditions this soldier did not make the realization that he 
was in imminent danger of being killed. 
Despite the fact all men had different combat experiences, all were exposed 
to the same general characteristics of war. All soldiers were shocked into facing 
the cruel reality of the confusion, the fear induced fight for survival, and the injury 
and death of fellow soldiers. One individual recalled the thoughts provoked when 
his squad took their first casualties. 
That's when . . . all of it comes together and then you realize what 
it is all about when you see somebody you know get wounded or 
killed. 16 
Men realized combat was about sacrifices, suffering, and sorrow over lost 
comrades, not alone the awful fear of becoming a casualty. One trend in the 
collective experience was for Gls to both come across fatalities from other units, 
and sustain casualties in their own unit, before they ever encountered a German 
soldier in battle. Ten out of twelve veterans sampled cited this experience with the 
literature reflecting the same findings. Out of this majority it was again most 
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common for these losses to be inflicted by German artillery. 17 
An essential aspect of the collective experience was that Gls had no 
accurate preconception of the reality of war. Combat was so incredible worse than 
they ever expected, men were forced to reassess their situation. Men were not 
prepared mentally as they had thought they were. For men who feared making 
the ultimate sacrifice, the specter of death was all too real. Men who never 
wanted to fight in the first place found out for themselves the real reasons why. 
Even the men who felt an attraction to war soon found out they wanted nothing of 
combat. One must recall from Chapter One, the man who stated men in his unit 
"wanted to at least be able to say we'd been shot at." However, in the same 
breath he stipulated that, "after you've been shot at you don't want to be shot at. "18 
Another man made a statement, similar to other veterans, that illustrates how this 
was a collective reassessment. After all his preparation and waiting when he 
actually found out it was time for him to fight he was "reared to go." However, 
once in combat he realized that he had thought wrong. "Well let me tell you, it's 
different when the bullets start flying at you. "19 
Before combat soldiers had considered themselves well trained, but their 
training did not fully prepare them for combat. "We didn't realize what combat was 
really like" was what most all men concluded after their first action. 20 Another 
veteran observed the same. "No matter how much training you have . . . the 
training will not do the job. It's just one of those things."21 However, it must be 
noted that training was beneficial and helped men in combat, but not enough. One 
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individual who said a man would have been a "poor sucker" without training, felt 
he at least "had a better understanding of what to do, at what time."22 Actually in 
many situations it was training that kept men alive. For example, one soldier was 
checking for Germans in a cluster of homes where the "Germans had a lot of 
booby traps." Walking through one of the houses, he caught sight of a Luger 
pistol on top of a table. He wondered to himself, 
who left that there? I stepped inside the door and I stopped and 
thought about some of our training . . [remembering] they 
boobytrap that stuff. I looked real close and there was a fine little 
bitty thin wire. I left that alone.23 
The problem was that combat was "entirely different" than training. 24 
Collectively men were well trained, but combat was so overwhelming that "nothing 
could prepare one for the real thing. "25 Another man, who thought he was well 
trained, recalled, "you just took it as it comes, and tried to take care of yourself."26 
Regardless of their training, green troops had much to learn about combat. The 
recollection of a replacement sergeant, who was a former drill instructor, perfectly 
illustrates this. 
Of course I flinched and ducked the first time I heard it [enemy fire]. 
They [combat veterans] didn't make fun of me or anything because 
they had all been through it too. I noticed the very first time [under 
enemy fire] . . . there wasn't any reaction at all on their part. . . . 
I envied them a little bit because they knew a little more about what 
they were doing than I did, despite the fact that I had been through 
several training sessions both as a student, and as an instructor. 
The game is different than reading it out of a manual. 27 
The only way for green troops to learn the tricks of staying alive was with 
combat experience. Since men often learned at others' expense one veteran 
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appropriately described it as "sheer bloody experience."28 In fact, combat was a 
series of learning experiences, men never quit learning due to constantly 
changing combat conditions. For example, one veteran in combat only ten days 
learned to adjust to, and fight in, several different surroundings. He experienced 
combat against prepared beachhead fortifications, combat in forested areas, in 
hedgerows, and urban fighting where every house and every door presented a 
new problem. 29 This was the same for all soldiers who had to fight in the variety 
of different conditions and terrain. Men learned to be prepared for anything 
because "everyday was out of the ordinary."30 Another veteran similarly stated, 
each day, and each situation, and each area was different and you 
just had to adjust to it. . . . Each thing that happens has to be 
handled differently. If there was only one or two artillery shells, and 
we were in an advance, you're not expected to stop and dig in. You 
go ahead. But when you run into a real barrage common sense will 
tell you 'hey get your head down' and that's what you do. There are 
no cut and dried different rules that you live by. 31 
Considering the confusion of combat and soldier's jittery state of mind, it is 
not surprising that they often gained knowledge through mistakes. One man 
remarked on what happened when his unit took small arms fire during their first 
few days in combat. 
People were shooting at us so we turned right around and sprayed 
it too. We weren't shooting at any one person, but you'd make them 
get down. . . . [They then found out] we were shooting at our own 
people. We hadn't been in there long enough to tell who was who. 
That's the first time I learned how to tell who was shooting who. . 
.. You can tell the sound of an American gun, and you can tell the 
sound of a German gun and it didn't take long to learn that. 32 
Gls learned to improvise and adapt, but most significant was that everything 
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learned was based on safeguarding their life. 
You learned everyday. As the days went by you learned different 
things and how to protect yourself. A person is always trying to stay 
alive.33 
This can be seen in the previous situations where if one is in danger you "get your 
head down" or "get down." Another man said, 
when the bullets start flying you'll find the earth is your best friend . 
. . . There was many a time the Germans would open up on us and 
there would be a little bitty cupped place and you'd jump for that little 
shallow place. It was nothing to find two or three guys hitting the 
same shallow place. 34 
Several men considered the most important thing learned was how to take 
cover under fire. This was not too profound of an adjustment, but it was 
mandatory and effective. One man recalled, 
you adapt certain techniques to survive. One of the things you 
learned of course was how to take cover so you're not so exposed. 
Some of the best cover you can take is something that's been 
destroyed by the artillery. 35 
Another man said "you learn to keep a low profile and try not to be caught out in 
the open."36 Yet another said "it doesn't take you too long to learn how to duck."37 
Because Gls had so much to learn about combat, replacements did have 
some advantages over men from original units, they did not to have to learn 
everything about combat from scratch. Replacements could get advice from 
veteran soldiers who already gained their experience the hard way. One 
replacement, representing the majority, recalled the sense of security he felt from 
getting advice from some of the "old-timers" in his squad. In his opinion, "where 
it meant your life, it's best to take somebody's word that's already been there. "38 
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However, there were sorry cases where replacements were not given advice, but 
actually used as cannon fodder. One man recalled how 
they brought up a bunch of replacements . . . [one) night to be 
distributed. And one of them's name was Joe Shot With Two 
Arrows, obviously an [American) Indian. The only reason I 
remember it, of course, is because when you see a name like that 
you remember it. He went up and he came back dead the next 
morning. Later on I talked to somebody from that company and they 
said 'yeah we just put him up front and made him point.' In other 
words he's somebody we don't know, and we'll save our own as 
much as possible. 39 
Despite instances such as this, most veterans offered advise to 
replacements, even if it was due to a self-centered motive: survival. 40 Several 
veterans commented on how the men in their unit helped out replacements. One 
said a major reason for this was as long as anyone remained inexperienced they 
were "liable to do something wrong and endanger the lives of other people. "41 
Replacements who knew more were less likely to jeopardize the safety of others 
and could help out when the time came. This alludes to how survival depended 
on interdependence and group survival. 
Troublesome situations occurred when replacements entered units with very 
poor training. This was especially true during the critical shortage of replacements 
in the fall of 1944 when some men were rushed very quickly through their 
training. 42 These men were bound to disrupt unit efficiency, therefore veterans felt 
an even greater need to provide them with on the job training. This was the case 
of one individual who was well trained, but due to a glitch in the system ended up 
in a different job for which he had been trained. 
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I was trained as an infantry riflemen ... [but] you get over there and 
they put you wherever they need you. They put me into an anti-tank 
platoon. . . . I hadn't had [sic] any training on that, and I hadn't 
seen one of them guns until then. . . . It was kind of a SNAFU as 
they say. 43 
Another veteran of an anti-tank unit recalled problems that arose due to 
poorly trained replacements. Despite this, with some help from the veterans, and 
combat experience of their own he felt, "they got used to it pretty fast."44 This 
introduces replacement's rapid adjustment to combat, brought about by the 
necessity of interdependence. 45 Supporting this, one replacement made the 
comment "you didn't have to be there very long until you realized you were all one 
unit working together. "46 The following situation illustrates how replacements 
picked up the trade quickly, if they were in combat long enough to learn. 47 A one-
time replacement, with less than one month of experience on the line, noticed a 
new replacement who desperately needed assistance. Aware of this he decided 
to "guide him a little bit and just sorta[sic] keep and eye out for him."48 Another 
replacement's experience illustrates the same principle. 
I know some of the guys that had been there for awhile looked down 
on guys just coming in, but it wasn't long until we were just like the 
rest of them. 49 
This man in particular had to make a rapid adjustment due to the exigencies of 
combat. In less than one week casualties forced him into the role of assistant 
squad leader. Like all soldiers he learned to make do with the situation out of 
necessity. "I felt like I didn't have enough experience yet, but I guessed it didn't 
matter a whole lot. "50 
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One aspect of the collective experience was the fact most men encountered 
combat fatalities before they ever met the enemy on the field of battle. It is 
significant that no matter if they viewed a dead German, or a dead American, 
soldiers often experienced a "revulsion" after seeing such appalling sights for the 
first time in their life. 51 It was even worse the longer the stricken lay, especially in 
the hot summer sun as one man remembered. 
I had never seen nothing like that before you know. You'd never 
smelled anything like it. A human body will stink worse than 
anything.52 
In the freezing cold of the Ardennes winter there was at least no nauseating 
odor, but frozen bodies still had a similar effect. One veteran recalled, 
it sort of upset you to a degree, not seeing anything like that in the 
past. . . . But I tried not to let it bother me because I knew I was 
going to see a lot more of it. So why fret over it so much. 53 
Another man held a similar opinion after he viewed his first dead German soldier. 
"It bothered you at first. The thing that got to me right away was well there is a 
guy that will never get married or have a family ... 54 
As was the case in all situations, men experiencing different circumstances 
held different attitudes. It is necessary to recall what one soldier thought about 
seeing his first enemy fatalities. "What helped us out was seeing some dead 
enemy soldiers."55 This illustrates how Gls could also feel satisfied with seeing 
men that would no longer offer resistance. After all, dead Germans were the 
outcome of an American success, and a prerequisite for victory. Thinking along 
these lines one veteran had this to say about seeing dead enemy soldiers. 
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It didn't bother me too much. I expected it. It was kind of a 
satisfaction. It didn't bother me to see them. 56 
On the other hand, despite the fact they were the enemy, many found it 
difficult to get over the grisly fact that it was a dead man. One veteran reflected, 
"you've got to remember their human beings also. "57 Men who felt this way could 
not help but feel compassion for those who lost their life in such a pitiful way. An 
individual in a rear echelon anti-tank platoon spoke of how his unit always 
discovered Germans previously killed by the rifle companies. 
Its kind of a shock. We'd move up always at night into a town after 
the line companies had cleared it. There would be dead bodies 
laying around in the yards and in the houses. . . . It was kind of 
spooky. I felt sorry for them. 58 
This veteran said he felt at the same time both compassion, and satisfaction at 
seeing dead German soldiers. Mixed emotions were common, men felt 
compassion, but also satisfaction in knowing the enemy was no longer out to kill 
them. 59 
One veteran recalled the first time he observed the horrendous results of 
artillery. This was again experienced before he had any contact with live enemy 
soldiers. He remarked of when he saw where a shell landed right next to a 
German soldier and it 
blew him in two. He was chopped in two. His legs were laying over 
there, and the top torso was laying over there at the other side of the 
hole. . . . Bad. Bad. 60 
What this man thought when he saw this represents what went through most all 
soldier's minds when they first viewed combat fatalities. "Well that old boys gone, 
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and I don't want to have to go that way."61 Such sights naturally stimulated 
thoughts about death. 
Simply stated Gls "hated very bad" coming across dead American soldiers 
on the battlefield. 62 Men not only felt a "revulsion", but experienced a deep sense 
of hurt and loss inside with the sight of a fallen comrade. Even a man who felt 
satisfied to see dead Germans stated "it didn't bother me to see them, but seeing 
our own about made me sick a lot of times. "63 As long as most men were in 
combat, it was difficult for them to ever get over the initial gut feeling. One veteran 
recalled how dead Germans never bothered him at all, however "a GI, I never got 
used to it. I could never be comfortable with that. "64 Men had trouble dealing with 
this aspect because it hit far too close to home. One veteran recalled how his unit 
would see them hauling truckloads back from the front 
and they would have several Germans in there, and 
maybe a GI or two laying on top. That was something 
I could hardly take. . . . It made you think then. 65 
This definitely made men think, think of the reality of life and death. 
Another man recalled his units first exposure to American dead as they made their 
way towards the front. 
Going through St. Lo [France] we saw these army trucks loaded with 
dead Gls. . . . That kind of broke you into combat. I don't know 
whether they did that on purpose, or it just happened to work out 
that way, but you got to see all that before you really got into 
combat. It sobered everybody up pretty fast. 66 
As soldiers learned with time, coming upon the carnage of battle was just 
a common aspect of war. One veteran, like so many others, became aware of this 
as he continued to have encounters with combat fatalities. Sadly, it was the men 
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who fell who often saw some of the heaviest fighting, yet were never able to tell 
their story. Working their way toward German positions in the Ardennes his unit 
found what he described as a "big mess." The men discerned a group of Gls 
made a last stand against an overwhelming number of attacking Germans. 
Judging from the German and American dead, along with clothing and equipment 
strewn all over the area, the battle ended up in hand-to-hand fighting. The man 
relaying this story discovered this scene at night when he stumbled onto a 
dead American boy who had been hit and then he froze. . . . A 
whole bunch of boys must have had a pretty good scrap. . . . There 
was one GI in a foxhole, he was [pause], yeah he was dead. 67 
Reading between the lines, apparently something so awful happened to the dead 
soldier in the foxhole that it could not be told. One can only assume that the 
memory was too disturbing to reveal. 
Several comments confirm scenes of death on the battlefield etched 
indelible imprints in men's minds. 
One place there were two or three tanks that were tore up, tipped 
over on their side and everything. It just looked like to me that 
whoever was inside tried to get out and another bomb or something 
went off. You'd see a leg over here and an arm over there. Oh 
gruesome. I've thought about that a lot.68 
Another man was exposed to much the same actuality of war. 
You could see where the tanks had had a fight along the road and 
guys had burned up. Their heads were about the size of a 
grapefruit. They just shrivelled up. That was weird. And the smell. 
I can't eat barbecued hamburgers yet today, if you let the grease fall 
down on the fire; it reminds me of those dead bodies in the army 
vehicles. 69 
That was a distasteful experience which many veterans can relate. Another man 
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made the statement. "I experienced the odor of burning bodies inside a tank. 
You'll never forget that."70 While another veteran made the mistake of looking 
inside a knocked out tank to his own disgust. After that he decided never to look 
again. 71 
The following two recollections perfectly illustrate the gruesome sights Gls 
had to deal with on a daily basis. If all this seems morbid, it was. One man 
commented on a very discouraging sight he witnessed as he walked closer 
towards his first action in the Ardennes. What were formerly G Is run over by what 
they presumed were German tanks. "If they were in the road, they'd just run over 
them", the man recalled. At first, it was difficult to determine for what army they 
fought, but "you could tell by the helmets" they were Americans. 72 Turning the 
situation around, one veteran actually watched as American tanks ran over dead 
German soldiers laying in the middle of a crossroads. Similar to the German 
tanks, the American tanks made no attempt to go around them but just went right 
over the top of them. 73 
Incidents like this provided all soldiers, these green troops in particular, with 
at least a hint of the brutality and inhumanity commonplace in war. If all this was 
not enough, discovering dead farm animals like cows, horses, pigs, etc., was very 
ordinary. 74 After experiencing these scenes men were becoming aware of how 
indiscriminate death was in the European Theater of Operations in the last year 
of the war. 
All these sights had nothing near the impact on soldiers as when their unit 
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took its first casualties. No one without first hand knowledge can comprehend the 
terrible feeling of seeing a man one actually knows, and is probably close friends 
with, killed in full view. What only can be described with words like terror, rage, 
and sorrow barely represent the kaleidoscope of negative emotions. As far as 
seeing someone mortally wounded one man said, "it's a shock and that's all I'll 
say."75 This man is similar to the majority of veterans sampled. Several men 
refrained from discussing the losses their unit incurred, especially the friends they 
lost, because it was too upsetting to discuss. 76 Veterans that did express their 
feelings relate to how these experiences did, and still do, send them to the depths 
of despair. 77 Another individual's emotions only scratches the surface of the great 
numbers of veterans who never forgot the anguish they felt over the loss of fellow 
soldiers. 
I know I've cried many a day because so many of my buddies were 
killed. [pause] It's hard to talk about some of it. 78 
Another reason it might be difficult to discuss certain aspects of death was 
its violent and grotesque nature. Men who have lived through combat know all too 
well the absurd damage that could be inflicted on human flesh. 79 One man 
became aware of this during an artillery barrage. He recalled soberly how he 
was sitting on the ground there and a guy was sitting on a tree 
stump and he got a direct hit. That was demoralizing.80 
This situation also illustrates how Gls never knew when to expect death or 
serious injury. One might be talking to an individual and seconds later he could 
be hit, abruptly changing the mood for the worst. It was not unheard of for such 
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incidents to be so traumatic that soldiers lost control of their emotions and possibly 
cried, even vomited. 81 This is considering men even had the time to react while 
they fought for their own survival. 
Casualties were inflicted on American forces from a variety of different 
weapons, but there were obvious trends in what weapons Gls most often faced. 
By far the greatest killer, and what the soldiers hated worst was artillery.82 After 
artillery, rifle and machine gun fire was what Gls had to be concerned with most.83 
However, it was only when in close proximity to enemy soldiers were they likely 
to encounter small arms fire. The possibility of confronting an enemy soldier in 
person where a knife, bayonet, or fist might be employed was a truly frightening 
prospect to most men. Accordingly, it was only on rare instances where Gls were 
close enough to the enemy to even be involved in hand- to-hand fighting. Instead, 
whenever in close quarters, men in both armies preferred to use their rifle or 
possibly grenades, unless they were so close they had no choice. 84 
More soldiers had more experiences with artillery bombardments because 
unless they were many miles away from the front, they were never out of artillery 
range. One weapon greatly despised was the "damned big old 88", the German 
88 mm all-purpose artillery piece. 85 Recall the fact artillery most likely inflicted a 
unit's first casualties. This was the case for one replacement who mentioned his 
first experience with artillery which occurred in the Ardennes. His platoon had just 
occupied a barn as the night's billet when he drew first watch on guard duty. 
Standing guard outside the barn it suddenly 
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took a direct hit in the hay loft. It didn't touch two of us down on the 
ground. I don't know how many were killed. That one incident stuck 
with me.86 
The effect of artillery never changed. It was as random and terrifying the first time 
as it was every time after. One veteran, well acquainted with artillery, recalled one 
incident where rounds from an 88 smashed into nearby trees resulting in even 
more lethal treebursts. 
Me and my buddy were right close together, right beside each other, 
laying next to a hedgerow. After about the third shot or so why one 
of them exploded and it hit him right in the back, a big chunk of 
jagged steel about four or five inches long .... It knocked him out, 
but I don't know whether it paralyzed him or not. When an 88 shoots 
up into the trees, boy I'm telling you that's scary. Shrapnel goes 
everywhere, they come right by you and you think, 'boy I'm lucky that 
missed me.'87 
Two other veterans commented on treebursts, while one of them reflected on the 
losses they caused. This man, like his fellow soldier, was brief and to the point 
when he said: "it was demoralizing.''88 One horrifying aspect of artillery was what 
it's explosive power and shrapnel could do to a human body. It was not a 
comforting sight to be in a foxhole and see the man in the next foxhole "blown to 
bits" by a direct hit. 89 
By no means did the GI only have to be concerned with German soldiers 
and German artillery. Any number of weapons might suddenly create casualties 
and strike fear in soldiers' hearts. For example, even with the famed air superiority 
of the Allies, American forces were never immune to air attack. The majority of 
men sampled had encounters with the Luftwaffe. Nevertheless, these encounters 
were indeed rare considering that of the men sampled most experienced only one 
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attack mounted by only a single airplane. 90 However, as men found out, it 
sometimes took only one plane to wreak havoc. One veteran spoke of how an 
entire trainload of replacements had their baptism of fire by a German plane before 
they even reached the replacement depot. They were caught unaware while 
disembarked from the train queued up for food. 
We were strafed while we were having a meal. . . . Some of the 
fellas got killed. 91 
Weapons, like aircraft, with a particularly loud and unusual sound, typically 
aroused even greater fears, especially the first time men experienced them.92 One 
man recalled his experience with a large bomb dropped in his area of the Omaha 
beachhead by "Bed Check Charlie." 
I'm telling you it sounded like that bomb was never going to hit the 
ground. It just whined and screeched. It made you just want to get 
up and run. It felt like it was going to hit me in the back of the 
head.93 
Another veteran mentioned an incident where a single German plane attacked a 
bridge over the Ruhr River. The men near the bridge scattered for cover when 
they heard the startling noise of the plane since they had no idea the plane was 
not after them. 
We thought he was strafing us. It sounds like they're coming at you. You 
make a b-line and get out of the street. 94 
Other men commented on particularly scary moments after being surprised by the 
loud and previously unheard "sound" of the V-1 "Buzz Bomb", and the 
Messerschmidt 262 Jet fighter. 95 
The fact these men were not in any great danger from these two weapons 
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illustrates how the element of fear could be unproportionate to the lethality of 
weapon, primarily due to its sound. Take two forms of artillery other than the 88, 
the "Screaming Meemee" and the mortar. The extreme whining sound of the 
"Screaming Meemee" made at least one unit refer to it as the "morale breaker. "96 
Although as men became more experienced with these weapons in comparison 
with mortars, they realized they were not as accurate and were more bark than 
bite. Mortars were more dangerous because they were more common, more 
accurate, and the fact they usually could not be heard before they hit and 
exploded. If soldiers had even one second of a warning of an incoming shell they 
at least had the opportunity to jump for cover. Mortars usually gave no warning, 
"Screaming Meemees", at least, always did. For these reasons mortars 
themselves were "particularly dreaded."97 
A veteran with extensive experience with a totally different weapon referred 
to anti-personnel mines as the 
most frightening weapon of the war, the one that made us almost 
sick with fear. . . . They churned our guts. 98 
This is true for those men who experienced mines, but judging from the those 
sampled, exposure to injuries due to mines was not near as widespread as with 
other weapons. 99 In reality Gls feared every weapon they faced, whatever 
happened to be inflicting casualties at the time. Veterans did not comment on any 
great fear of gas attacks, but one who experienced what he thought was a gas 
attack knew it could incite fear just the same. What proved to be a false alarm 
was nevertheless a real threat at the time. 
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We thought we had a gas attack. Somebody hollered 'gas!'. Of 
course, I was all fingers. I couldn't get the gas mask out and all that. 
It scared me really .... I tried to hold my breath. My buddies were 
the same way, they were scared too. 100 
Infantrymen never knew what to expect because as one veteran correctly 
stated, they had "infinite small threats."101 Gls never knew when they could be 
surprised by any weapon, like the real threat of a German tank, or a sniper. 102 
Uncertainty could even be associated with what soldiers were well experienced 
with: artillery. One man recalled how on patrol his squad suddenly took casualties 
from an artillery barrage. 
We lost the guy in front of me, and I was alright. The guy in back of 
me was alright, but the fourth one back [was hit]. Now those two 
guys were hit, and the two of us in between were not hit and there 
was no way of telling whether it was a short round from us, or an 
incoming round. We talked about it a lot and we didn't know. There 
was no way of telling. 103 
This introduces how Gls not only had to watch out for the enemy, but Allied 
weapons as well. Friendly fire (short artillery rounds, small arms fire, and friendly 
air attacks) was not at all uncommon. 104 One man said it was just the "law of 
averages" to have men killed and injured by their fellow soldiers when they 
possessed so much firepower. 105 
If all this was not enough, soldiers even had to be watchful for objects 
falling from the sky. One man mentioned what few would know if they themselves 
did not experience it; how it was necessary to contend with falling "belly tanks" 
dropped by Allied fighters. "You didn't know where those things were going to 
land. You thought they were going to land on you."106 There were similar 
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incidents throughout the war ranging from close encounters, all the way to death, 
due to falling flak from anti-aircraft fire. There were even situations where men 
had to scatter to avoid .50 caliber shell casings falling from dogfights above. 107 
Death and injury was so random that in one man's words those who were 
hit "just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time."108 Men who 
continuously saw others hit around them could not help realize luck was a 
common attribute of the living. The reader should have sensed a pattern of luck 
in this chapter, especially with artillery. The men who lived through these 
experiences definitely picked up on this fact. For example, what one man thought 
when he saw a friend severely wounded by shrapnel directly next to him. "Boy, 
am I lucky that missed me. "109 There were countless other near misses by 
artillery. One veteran recalled an instance when shrapnel missed his head by only 
inches. "I could have been dead as easily as that."110 Another example originates 
with a man who in his first few days in combat had as of then never seen a live 
German or fired his weapon. In the process of digging a foxhole a mortar round 
exploded and shrapnel clipped his shovel handle in half. Looking back on the 
incident he said "I'm damn glad it was the handle on that shovel and not a hole in 
my leg_ .. 111 
Luck was a common fact of the collective experience, considering all men 
sampled had times when they knew they could have been injured or killed. 112 
Soldiers had near misses in all different situations which were not at all limited to 
artillery. As one man said, "it's all luck or chance as far as that goes."113 For 
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example, one man was shot at by a sniper in his first day of combat, but was 
fortunate to be able to say, "if he'd been a good shot I wouldn't have been here 
today." 114 Fighting in the Normandy campaign this same individual had several 
instances of luck during his combat career. This man, like all those who survived 
the war, had one experience with luck after another. Another veteran, a man who 
landed on Utah beach on D-Day and made it through the entire war unharmed, 
reflected on his ordeal: "I'm wondering why I'm still here."115 Another man felt the 
same way. When asked if he had experiences with luck he replied, 
I had a lot of them .... [When] I could hear those bullet's whistling, 
I felt like I was pretty lucky then. I guess I was just one of the lucky 
ones. There were a lot that weren't so lucky. 116 
This same man spoke of "one time in particular" he experienced a close call 
in his month and a half in combat. While his unit was capturing a German town 
he needed to run across a street from the cover of a brick wall to the another wall 
across the street. 
I got to the end of that brick wall and I took off running as fast as I 
could. I happened to stop right in front of a tank [an American 
Sherman]. The tank fired into a house and the muzzle blast from 
that gun knocked me down. I never knew a muzzle blast could be 
so strong, but it knocked me flat. ... I could hardly hear anything 
for two or three days, but I got over it alright. 117 
This illustrates again how men had to watch out for all the different dangers that 
could inflict harm. It also illustrates how cases of blast concussion often 
accounted for close calls. This was very much the case for another lucky 
individual. "I was in combat for about seven months and was only knocked out 
twice, but I never suffered any flesh wounds." 118 The first time this man was 
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knocked unconscious was due to an artillery round that demolished a house he 
occupied. The second time was after a German threw a concussion grenade 
inside the room of a house he was in. Recalling that incident he said, "I was 
stunned all right. It killed one guy there, but I was fortunate. "119 Another man 
remarked on the time he was shaken up when an aerial bomb landed close to his 
foxhole. When the bomb hit 
it was just like somebody just picked me up and threw me down. 
just jarred on the ground. . . . The ground just shook like an 
earthquake. 120 
The explosion covered his foxhole with dirt and debris and deafened him for a 
period of days. He later recovered most of his hearing, but a punctured eardrum 
has plagued his hearing since. 121 Anytime an artillery shell exploded close by, 
even when the shrapnel missed them, soldiers physically felt the shock waves of 
the blast. One veteran, like countless others, had several incidents where shells 
exploded close enough for him to feel the effect of the concussion. In one 
instance a shell exploded on the roof of a factory and the heat and pressure of the 
blast knocked him and his buddy down and nearly out. After the two made it back 
on their feet and brushed themselves off it still took a few minutes for them to 
collect their senses. 122 
In many cases luck and brushes with death forced soldiers into coming to 
grips with the unforgiving reality. They could no longer continue to believe with 
any confidence they would survive and no harm could come to them. Seeing in 
at least one situation how they could have been killed, everything clicked in their 
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minds. It was a frightening realization when men finally became cognizant of the 
fact it was wholly possible for them to be killed at any moment. This was a 
traumatic experiences for some, like one veteran's experience. In the process of 
occupying a small town his unit ran into the resistance of a machine gun. Trying 
to locate the gun, the man knew he had to cross a street which might possible 
expose him to the machine gun's line of fire. Contemplating the dangers of 
crossing, he hesitated next to a rose bush on the side of the street. He finally 
gained the nerve to cross the street when 
all of a sudden that machine gun cut lose and that rose bush just 
looked like somebody cut it with a knife. I was just off to the side of 
it. . . . After that happened I stood there against that building and 
pissed my pants. I was shaking like a leaf ready to fall off a tree. 
If I would have been a foot to my right I would have got my legs cut 
out from under me. 123 
This is the collective realization the majority went through in combat: they 
were not special and could be killed just as easily as anyone else. One veteran-
historian ascribed three stages in this process he described as a "slowly dawning 
and dreadful realization." Upon entering combat the first stage being the belief for 
most that they would survive, and "can't" be killed. In combat men normally 
reached the second stage where they felt it was possible that it "can" happen, they 
could be killed. The third stage concluded with the conviction that one "will" 
eventually be killed or injured, it's just a matter of when. 124 
One veteran who felt very self-assured before combat about his prospects 
for survival is an example of this collective realization. "I had no question that I'd 
live through it, until I got into combat, and then there were several times I of 
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course questioned whether I would or not."125 Findings from this sample and the 
literature concur that most soldiers thought sometime in their combat career that 
"it was just a matter of time" before they were either wounded or killed. 126 
Most men went through the different stages of this realization as they slowly 
became familiar with the ubiquity of death. The process started as they came 
across those who had fallen in battle. Then, the more they experienced combat, 
and the resulting loss of life, they started to think more and more about their own 
chances of death. Due to the misfortune of others, and close calls of their own, 
men became aware of how indiscriminate death was on the battlefield. Men 
realized they could be hit anytime, it was just a matter of good luck or bad luck. 
One man who agreed with this realization process recalled, 
after a little while you know you'd escaped so far chiefly by luck. 
. . You finally got the feeling that your luck was going to run out 
someday. 127 
Another veteran's experience again illustrates this realization process. 
Fighting to expand the Omaha beachhead he knew his first day in combat he 
could be killed. As he went on this turned into a feeling that he would be hit. 
You could see a tracer bullet and you know there is five to seven 
more bullets. You can just realize how many more are shot at you. 
Whenever you see so many of your buddies killed right there beside 
you, you know your times a comin'[sic]. You think it is coming. I 
knew it would happen to me. 128 
How this man believed he could and then would be hit in his first few days 
of combat illustrates how the realization process was not only "slowly dawning", 
some men were thrown into such intense combat they made this realization 
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instantly. 129 However, there were always variations to the norm. Some men, albeit 
a very low percentage, never made this realization. In their eternal optimism they 
could not, or would not believe that they could be killed. 130 
Most unnerving to soldier's peace of mind was the uncertainty of life and 
death. One veteran made a common statement, "you didn't know from one minute 
to the next technically . . . if you'd be there the next day. "131 So not to affect their 
ability to soldier on men could not allow this realization to unduly affect them, it 
was just something they had to endure. 
Yes there are times when you think that it is possible you might get 
hit . . . [but] you didn't dwell on that sort of thing. 132 
Like so many other of his comrades this man distracted himself from thinking 
about the worst possible scenario by being optimistic. This individual recalled how 
he tried to make himself believe he would survive, convincing himself "no it can't 
happen to me. "133 Another individual knew he could be killed, but he also felt "you 
couldn't dwell on it." He said one might be aware they could be killed, but one had 
to go on doing their job everyday "hoping that your turn wouldn't show up."134 
Many times men could no longer make themselves believe they would not 
be harmed, therefore self-delusion was not enough. Because these men believed 
they would be hit, they channeled their thoughts in a different direction. They 
looked on the bright side, and hoped for what they called the "million dollar 
wound."135 A wound that was not bad enough to debilitate them for life, but severe 
enough to get them out of combat and possibly send them home. 
It speaks for how bad the situation was and how desperate men were when 
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they would hope for a wound just so they could get out alive. One veteran spoke 
of a man he knew who was actually relieved when wounded. "I was right beside 
a guy one day when he got hit in the leg with shrapnel." The first thing the 
wounded man said was, "boys I've got a million dollar wound. "136 The same man 
who witnessed this often thought about getting the same kind of wound. 
Yes, I thought about that a lot. Yes, there were times I was almost 
wishing for that [the million dollar wound]. It was a topic of 
discussion. 137 
After a "sober appraisal of the facts" the majority of men sampled contemplated 
receiving the "million dollar wound" so they could at least make it out of combat 
alive. The phrase was so commonplace that it was obviously a collective 
sentiment. 136 It should not be surprising, however, that some men never hoped for 
the "million dollar wound." Like one veteran who said, "I didn't want to get hit. 
That never entered my mind."139 
A salient aspect of the collective mentality was that men went into combat 
cautious. After realizing how easily they could be harmed they made an effort to 
be even more protective. However, in the reality of combat there was a huge 
conflict with this intention. Being predominantly on the offensive, Gls had to take 
risks everyday to win territory from the enemy. Like one veteran stated, "we had 
to get out and show ourselves. "140 When taking risks they did not really want to 
take, men learned to go out of their way to "stay out of trouble."141 
A perfect example of this is the way of thinking and actions of the following 
individual. "You do what you have to do, but there is an old saying in the military: 
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don't volunteer for anything."142 Accordingly, this veteran was formerly a battalion 
runner but he made the confession he did not always run. "I wouldn't say that I 
ran, walked is a better word. You're supposed to run, but walk is a better word. "143 
This revelation is very similar to another veteran who told the whole story about 
what occurred on patrols in the winter stalemate in Italy in 1944-45. 
Now it can be told I suppose. We'd go out as far as you want to go 
and sit down and lay around a little while and come back and say we 
didn't see anything. That happened a lot I'm sure, and we did our 
share of it. 144 
Considering this man was a sergeant who often led the patrols, how was 
it possible for soldiers to go against orders and let their safety be the foremost 
concern? The answer is in most Gls' opinion, if the situation allowed it, it was 
totally acceptable to hold back in the name of survival. These men felt it was an 
unnecessary risk to possibly stumble into danger. They knew the German 
positions, and thought for certain the weather conditions and mountainous terrain 
prevented any German counteroffensive. However, the man added if they really 
thought it was important for them to gain information on the enemy, they would 
truly have patrolled. 
The following situation illustrates how Gls always thought about avoiding 
unnecessary danger. One veteran's unit had to cross a creek bed and since it 
was most convenient to walk across the railroad bridge some of the Gls started 
across the it. But this soldier always being smart and watchful of the situation, 
noticed he would be more exposed and prone to enemy fire on the bridge. He 
therefore decided to walk a little out of his way and get his pant legs wet just to 
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be safe. 
My buddies they just walked across that railroad track, but not me. 
I went down and walked through the water. They were on their way 
across when the shells started flying, but I wouldn't get up that high 
because you're a target up there. 145 
To see how the mentality of survival and the aversion to taking unnecessary risks 
saved one man's life, see Appendix C. 
In some situations men were forced to take extra risks to ensure their 
survival. A good example is an occasion when one soldier saw another man "pick 
up a grenade and throw it back at 'em. When one landed up beside you, you've 
got to do something," he reasoned. 146 Correct something had to be done: in reality 
one of two things. One could either cower away and pay the price, or one could 
react and get the grenade away from one's body. Therefore, it was not 
necessarily all bravery that motivated the soldier to throw the grenade back, but 
fear and the instinct of survival was the primary motivation. 
Another reason Gls took extra risks was to rescue and assist wounded 
soldiers, especially close friends. In all situations there were "superhuman efforts 
to evacuate wounded fellows."147 The following situation illustrates this, in addition 
to the fact it was not only a soldier's obligation to help out friends, but orders to 
assist a high ranking officers motivated them just the same. One veteran recalled 
one incident in particular he had to put himself at higher risk. 
Our battalion commander . . . went up on the front for some reason 
or another and got wounded. And it was me, and I think three other 
guys that went up there with a litter and brought him back to the 
medics who were busy. It was a pretty hot day that day fire wise. 148 
68 
Nevertheless, orders were the most common reason men took risks. In one 
situation a soldier's unit was taking deadly accurate artillery fire from a concealed 
88 in the hedgerows north of St. Lo. France. This individual happened to be one 
of a select group ordered to locate and silence the German gun. For his part in 
this dangerous mission into enemy territory in broad daylight, he was awarded the 
Bronze Star for "bravery above and beyond the call of duty." However this man 
did not equate this experience with bravery. Like all Gls, after orders got him into 
the perilous situation, survival was his motivation. 
You're not brave over there, you're fighting for your own life. As far 
as bravery goes, I was the biggest coward there. I was just fighting 
for my life. . . . It was not heroism or anything, it was just because 
I was there and that's it. 149 
Unfortunately, risks are always associated with wounds and death. This 
man became aware of this during the attempt to locate the German 88. For he 
was not only awarded the Bronze Star after this incident, but also the Purple 
Heart. Running alongside a hedgerow getting closer to the 88 he noticed the men 
in the patrol 
were getting pretty close together. I knew the Germans liked to 
open up on a bunch of us with machine guns. So I stopped and fell 
over against a hedgerow. I laid there and watched my buddy get 
away from me about twenty yards or so. Then I just stepped out 
and . about the time I stepped out, wham! Boy he shot me. [A 
German sniper shot him in the right arm]. . . . Of course it knocked 
me for a loop. . . . It threw my arm clear around and it was laying 
over my shoulder here [right arm twisted behind his head laying on 
his left shoulder]. I pushed it [his arm] around and worked it around 
and got it around in front of me. Of course I laid there like I was 
dead. . . . My Sergeant, he came running by with the other boys 
heading back toward the lines. Sarge said, 'we'll be back after you 
Breeze.' So I laid there I don't know how long .... I knew my arm 
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was broken, but I didn't know what all had happened. 150 
The rest of the patrol took cover from the enemy fire, but they never forgot 
their buddy. Behind the protection of a hedgerow they called for their wounded 
buddy to make his way back to them as they provided cover fire. 
I kicked off my helmet and left my gun there and hand grenades .. 
. . I crawled back to the hedgerow, and all that time I was crawling 
they were shooting over top of me. . . . Finally I got back to the 
hedgerow, and the hedgerow was four or five feet thick, and I 
couldn't get up over it. It had shrubbery and trees of top of it . . . 
[so the] engineers came in and they dug a hole through there and 
pulled me through it and got me on the other side. 151 
He then thought he was relatively out of danger, but he soon found out 
differently. He experienced even more harrowing time under fire getting to the rear 
as medics had to scoot his litter across an exposed crossroad as the medics 
themselves crawled. When the three finally reached an ambulance, out of small 
arms range, he was informed by the ambulance drivers he was still in for a rough 
ride. They told him every time they went down the nearby road they were fired on 
by German artillery. Since they had no choice they started down the road and as 
usual the Germans 
opened up with an 88 or something. Boy I could feel the jar on the 
road. Then he [the driver] slowed down real slow, and pretty soon 
another shot. Boy it hit right behind us. Then the next time he really 
took off and when they took the third shot, the third shot is supposed 
to get you too, but it hit behind us. 152 
All this man went through he was extremely lucky just to make it to the field 
hospital located on Omaha Beach. One would expect to be safe once resting in 
a hospital cot, but that was impossible in a war zone. That night air raid sirens 
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sounded, soon followed by the sound of Allied anti-aircraft fire from shore batteries 
and ships at sea. Laying in his cot he began to "see big slits in the tent . . . as 
shrapnel hit."153 Many of the lesser wounded men crawled under their cots hoping 
to avoid the falling lead, but as terrified as he was, the wound and the morphine 
prevented him from moving. Fortunately no men were wounded again, but it could 
have easily happened. This man was not completely out of danger until he was 
flown to England and then the U.S. to start a new chapter in his life: 
rehabilitation. 154 
Rehabilitation was a part of the collective experience for all Gls who 
became casualties, or were injured in some form or another. In this sample alone 
almost half, five of twelve men, sustained an injury severe enough to force them 
out of combat and require hospitalization (see Appendix D). Men were wounded 
in all different situations, but they all tell a similar story. One thing they all had in 
common was the fact they were overjoyed to get out of combat alive. 
Fighting in the Huertgen Forest in November of 1944 one individual suffered 
a shrapnel wound during an artillery barrage. Others around him were killed, but 
fortunately he only took shrapnel in the elbow and the side of his back. He felt 
"lucky" when hit considering his gas mask deflected the biggest piece of shrapnel 
that would otherwise have tore into his hip. Most men had discarded the 
burdensome gas mask, but since he never knew what to expect he had kept his. 
All veterans know luck works in mysterious ways. 155 The man shot in the arm 
also illustrates this luck. After a series of operations he found out how truly 
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"fortunate" he was. "They told me . . if this had been back in World War I they 
would have just cut my arm off. "156 
The man who received the shrapnel wounds left his old friends, the ones 
still alive, but he said, "to be honest I was kind of glad to be out of there. "157 The 
man shot in the arm thought exactly the same way. At the hospital in England he 
said to his doctor, half seriously and half jokingly, "don't get me well, because I 
ain't going back over there again." This was more like a joke because a "well 
disciplined soldier" like himself would have fought again if his wound allowed it, 
and he had orders to do so. 158 If able he would have returned to his unit like all 
other casualties who recovered and did so. 159 
One distinction in the collective experience must be posited between men 
in rifle companies, as compared to men in rear-echelon units (such as anti-tank 
companies, headquarters companies, and medical companies). A soldier in a rifle 
company had a much greater chance of becoming a statistic on a casualty sheet 
than a soldier in a rear echelon unit. Rear echelon units in infantry divisions were 
never immune to casualties, but see Appendix E for proof of how life in a rifle 
company was far more dangerous with a much higher rate of attrition. 
Coming from a peaceful civilian background it is plausible to ask how 
soldiers justified taking the life of other human beings; even given the sanction of 
war. One thing is for certain, Gls were not motivated by hatred on a large scale. 160 
The man wounded in the arm in the Normandy hedgrerows was asked throughout 
his life if he would talk to the German who shot him. He said he never felt hatred 
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towards the sniper, and always replied he would talk to him. He reasoned the 
German soldier was 
out there fighting for his life just like I was. They have their orders, 
and we have ours. If I'd meet him on the street to this day I wouldn't 
be mad at him. Because he was trying to save his life, and we were 
trying to save ours. 161 
This attitude reflects that common to the collective experience. Men often 
did not hate the German soldier who was in the same predicament as them, but 
they did hate Hitler and the Nazi regime that started the war. One man said he 
hated Hitler and everything Nazism represented, but felt no hatred "against the 
solder, not against the guy across the line from you. He's your enemy, but there 
is no hatred there."162 This sentiment was echoed by another individual. 
You didn't hold it against the German army, the Werhmacht . . . 
they were just like we were you know. Of course the SS, and Hitler 
and the top guys were the ones you didn't like. 163 
The prior statement also alludes to the reason why there was no great 
hatred, in his words "they were just like we were you know." In most veteran's 
opinion the average German soldier did not want to fight, but had to follow orders 
or they would be shot. This attitude can be seen in several statements. 
I really didn't feel a hatred toward them because I knew they were 
in for the same reason we were. . . . They were in the same fix 
we were. 164 
"They were just doing their job, and we were doing ours."165 Yet another veteran 
thought 
they were the same as we were. They didn't want to fight. . . . But 
I didn't shake hands with any of them as far as that's concerned. 166 
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However, there were always those men that hated the German soldier with a 
passion, but they were the minority. The only man sampled who commented on 
feeling a hatred towards the German soldier said, 
you have to hate them to justify firing at them. The German soldier 
comes to in essence personify Adolf Hitler and in essence the whole 
Nazi regime. At any rate he's firing at you. 167 
Like the previous individual illustrated, men might have hatred, but this 
hatred was still due to the fact an enemy soldier was out to kill American soldiers. 
Hatred or no hatred, obviously in a situation where someone is trying to kill you 
and your fellow soldiers, and has in the past succeeded, their would be no love 
lost. One man said they did not hate them, but it was also true "we didn't like 
them at all."168 When it meant life or death, killing was just a dirty job soldiers 
knew had to be done to survive. This is like one individual who held no great 
hatred but thought "still he was our enemy, and we were trying to get rid of him."169 
In combat men justified killing the enemy along the lines of the popular 
phrase "kill or get killed." Like so many others, three veterans look back on their 
experience in light of self-defense. "Back then it was either them or you."170 "It 
was something that had to be done. If you didn't they were going to get you." 171 
The first man that I shot and knew that I killed. The first thing that 
came to mind was that I felt sorry for his family. I didn't feel guilty, 
but I felt sorry that I had to do it. . . . I wasn't mad at him. The 
reason I shot him was because he was shooting at me: self-defense. 
But I got over it pretty quick. I didn't have time to dwell on it. 172 
In combat soldiers could notlet themselves be concerned by thoughts of the 
enemy. Any hesitation over pulling the trigger could prove to be one's last 
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mistake. However, distanced from the life or death combat environment, veterans 
are sometimes bothered by these thoughts. 
Because it is so distressing, many veterans are reluctant to discuss this 
aspect of their experience. 173 The following comment illustrates this. 
That's something you don't like to talk about. You know every time 
I shot I always said somebody else's shell got there first. That's 
something you ask God to forgive you for. He's forgiven me. 174 
When men revealed more information about their experiences, they definitely did 
no bragging. 
I pulled down on three German boys over there and one of them I 
don't know whether it was the next guy, or whether I got him. I 
never thought too much good about it. . . . I'm glad that I didn't 
have to fire on any more than that, I'm glad it was that few of men. 
Even though they were Germans, they were human like we were. 175 
This introduces how it was common for soldiers not to know who shot a 
particular enemy soldier because several Gls shot at him at the same time. Many 
times men never knew if it was their bullet that hit its mark or another soldiers. 
This was how it was possible for men to allay upsetting thoughts about their 
actions like the man who said "you know every time I shot I always said somebody 
else's shell got there first. "176 The following statements illustrate how it was often 
impossible to tell exactly who shot an enemy soldier. 
We'd see a guy crawl out of his hole at dusk on the other side a 
couple of hundred yards away, out to take a crap or something, and 
there would be a dozen guys that would see him at the same time 
and they'd all shoot at him and the guy drops. Now who is going to 
cut a notch in the stock of their rifle. 177 
Another man knew he shot many rounds, but never really knew for certain if he 
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ever hit anyone. This is something most would like not to know. 
I never could tell. I mean a lot of times you couldn't tell who did the 
shooting. I mean we'd shoot where they were and we'd see a few 
of them killed, but we didn't know who got 'em. 178 
This was the same for another veteran who also could never tell for sure. "I don't 
[pause] yeah I think I might have shot one. It was pretty close." 179 
One reason for this was Gls could often never see the enemy, they only 
knew where he should be. Three recollections illustrate this. 
We'd just start shooting back in the direction it came from[the enemy 
fire]. A lot of times we could never see any of the enemy. 
Sometimes we did and a lot of times we didn't. We started firing 
back where we thought they were. 180 
Another man said how they were, 
not necessarily shooting at a target all the time, we were spraying it 
out there too. Somebody shoots at you and you don't know exactly 
where that machine gut nest was, but you know the vicinity and you 
shoot that way. . . . You can't see them all the time, sometimes 
you can. A lot of the times you can't 181 
Yet another veteran recalled, 
we fired a number of times over in the general direction they were 
at. The squad leader one time said, 'men they're in there, just fire 
at will. '182 
What is not well known in the popular history of the war is instances of Gls 
attempting to fire their weapon, but having it malfunction. Nevertheless, men had 
to overcome this reality if it happened to them, and they never knew when it might. 
One individual's experience with dud bazooka rounds entirely changed his combat 
career. The following incident occurred in the Ardennes and was this 
replacements first time firing his weapon, in his first engagement with the enemy. 
76 
The only thing that I can remember was standing next to the 
lieutenant and he was giving the orders when to fire and what to fire 
at. He had me firing into this machine gun nest from behind some 
trees. The lieutenant was standing beside me, giving the orders, I 
fired three duds. Of course they could see the flash of the missile. 
They opened up on us with machine gun fire and the lieutenant was 
killed right there beside me. It didn't touch me. After they opened 
fire on us, some of our men ran around the side and got them with 
hand grenades. It was awful quiet after the explosion of the hand 
grenades. 183 
Having one's officer and leader killed in one's first action due to problems 
with a weapon was definitely a disillusioning and demoralizing experience. This 
man always wondered why the three rounds failed to detonate upon hitting the 
targeted pillbox. They either could have been manufactured with defects, or there 
is a possibility the another replacement, the loader of the bazooka on the spot, did 
not arm the projectiles correctly. 
I don't know if they were wired up right or wrong, or what happened. 
I've often wondered whether the loader was connecting the wires just 
right.184 
It is very probable the loader could have played some part in the missiles 
malfunction, considering three successive rounds should not have been 
defective. 185 
However, the next situation illustrates how it is impossible to pass judgment 
in the previous situation. Another veteran recalled an episode when he fired three 
dud rounds from his rocket propelled anti-tank grenade that he knew for a fact 
were defective, and not the cause of failing to properly arm the projectiles. This 
occurred when he attempted to blast some Germans out of a house from which 
they were firing. 
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I pulled the pin out [of the grenade to arm the 
warhead) and I shot up there and tried to hit where 
there was a big door. . . . The anti-tank grenade just 
hit and dropped down. I did that about three times and 
boy my sergeant got so mad at me. He said 'pull them 
pins, pull them pins.' You've got a pin you've got to 
pull before they detonate. So I scratched around there 
and I found those pins and I handed them to him, of 
course after it was over with. 186 
Nobody was killed or injured because of these duds, but the Germans did get 
away to fight another day. This situation, like the other man's experience with dud 
bazooka rounds, illustrates how duds could change the course of battle. The man 
who experienced the dud bazooka round reflected "if we would have got that 
pillbox with that bazooka, no telling what would have happened after that. "187 
Experiences with duds alludes to an even greater problem that Gls in anti-
tank companies had to surmount; a relatively ineffective weapon, their towed 57 
mm anti-tank gun. Similar to the soldier who fired three duds from his bazooka, 
one man became familiar with the 57's shortcomings when his first experience in 
firing the weapon proved to be a disheartening failure. He was a sergeant in 
charge of a gun crew called up to the front to counter the breakthrough of German 
tanks. The crew had no real idea of what to expect, and before they knew it, one 
of the tanks surprised them. The gun crew managed to fire one head-on shot at 
the tank, but the armor piercing shell harmlessly glanced off the tank's frontal 
armor. Recalling with much dismay the inferior firepower of the 57 he said with 
exasperation: 
Oh that 57 mm gun! On a head on encounter with a Panther, or a 
Tiger tank there was no chance. Our shells just bounced off. 188 
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As a result of the direct hit, that did nothing, the German tank fired back 
destroying the 57. Not being a good memory he did not discuss the event in any 
great detail. In a reserved manner he said, "we lost that encounter." When asked 
if it was frustrating to have such an experience he replied, "yes, it was deadly 
frustrating. "189 
Another veteran's experience with the 57 mm perfectly illustrates how what 
men experienced determined their attitudes, possibly creating polar opposites in 
the process. He was a member of a gun crew who in four months of combat 
never fired their weapon at German tanks, they had no need. Gls who were 
members of anti-tank companies would not find this surprising since tank 
encounters were infrequent, but gravely serious when they did occur (see 
Appendix E). His crew fired their weapon on only one occasion, for target 
practice. This was only after an officer came to the bright conclusion it might be 
good to have some of the replacements fire the weapon at least once before they 
ever might need to in combat. After demolishing some upper stories of houses in 
the city of Frankfurt, this individual was impressed with the guns firepower and 
accuracy. He enthusiastically described the 57 mm as a "deadly weapon .. 
Boy it was wicked."190 
This was quite different than the veteran with experience firing on German 
tanks who knew what the gun was really like. True it was "deadly", but more along 
the lines of "deadly frustrating." There is ample proof that if the soldier without 
experience would have actually encountered an enemy tank he probably would 
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have thought differently. The 57 truly lacked the firepower to stop most German 
tanks by penetrating there frontal armor. 191 
When it meant their survival Gls always adapted to overcome the problems 
before them and the 57 mm is a good example. The veteran who experienced the 
disastrous first engagement with a German tank, learned his lesson the hard way. 
On that occasion they fired the gun head on but he said, 
that happened to us only once. We never tried a face to face 
encounter again. . . . What we learned is the only way you could 
get those tanks was from the side, or from the back where the armor 
is thin. 192 
This was similar to another veteran of an anti-tank unit who also had occasions to 
fire the 57 at enemy tanks and learned with experience to use the gun's one 
strong point, its accuracy, to best advantage. Therefore, his crew always aimed 
"at the tracks" with the intention of immobilizing the enemy tank. 193 German tanks 
could be defeated by the 57 mm if crews could get a good angle to shoot, which 
usually called for superior numbers of American guns. Another way anti-tank 
companies compensated for their weapon was liberally placing ant-tank mines 
roads they expected the German tanks to traverse. 194 
The history of the 57 mm is another example of how the series, the "U.S. 
Army in World War II", failed to properly represent the true circumstances of the 
war. The book in the series specifically devoted to weapons, Ordnance: On the 
Beachhead and Battlefront, mysteriously made no mention of the 57 mm, as if it 
never existed. This is most likely an oversight and not intentional, but those who 
used the weapon will never forget it. 195 
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The lack of adequate firepower was not the only downfall of the 57 mm. 
Being a heavy towed weapon it also suffered from lack of mobility. One GI 
discovered how burdensome it was to move as his crew entrenched their weapon 
covering a Belgian crossroads in the Ardennes. He recalled after they unhitched 
the gun from the truck how difficult it was to put it in proper location in the deep 
snow. 
We got a hold of that damned heavy thing .... It was the hardest, 
gruntenest, thing we ever had to do in our life to pull that damned 
gun, quiet, in the dark, through that damned snow, while freezing to 
death. 196 
After they dug in their gun, and dug their own personal foxholes, the men 
settled in for the night; with fifty percent of the them on guard duty. They were 
awakened at daybreak when they heard the rumble of a German tank or armored 
vehicle "back down in the forest. . . . It wasn't any time at all until we heard small 
arms fire." The twelve men of the gun crew came to the conclusion that a German 
patrol located their position that night since machine gun and rifle fire immediately 
started to fly through their area, ripping off branches and chipping the bark off the 
trees. 
In the early morning fog the Germans could not be seen, but the Gls could 
tell by the intensity of fire they were outnumbered and the Germans were "getting 
closer and closer." Their squad leader was an experienced soldier who knew that 
being isolated from the other gun crews of the company by a mix up of 
communications, and being outgunned, it was better to retire to the rear to prevent 
being killed or captured. Obviously, the immobility of the gun ruled out taking it 
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with them, so they pulled the firing pin and started towards the rear. In this man's 
words they "started a little bit of a fast run to get back farther. We didn't waste 
any time." In their withdrawal they passed a company of riflemen dug in the forest 
and continued west almost two miles, finally locating their unit defending 
Livarchamps, Belgium. 197 
This engagement was a small part of the action mentioned by General 
George S. Patton, in his autobiography, War As I knew It, between the 35th 
Division and remnants of the 1st German SS Division the first week of January 
1945. However, Patton knew a war much different than what the common soldier 
knew. The attack this veteran's unit experienced was part of what Patton 
described as "probably the biggest co-ordinated counterattack that troops under 
my command have ever experienced. We were successful at all points. "198 One 
would wonder what Patton would have said if he knew of the "fast run" towards the 
rear as they abandoned their weapon after never firing it. With this under 
consideration, Patton's troops were "successful at all points" (all points that really 
mattered), because there were enough men in arms that, if needed, Gls could fall 
back to a stronger line of resistance. Another fact that illustrates how American 
soldiers could almost always depend on superior numbers of men and materiel 
was that this unit received a new 57 mm with "amazing" speed. "They brought us 
up a new gun just within a day or so. "199 
How it was greater numbers that saved the day in this situation brings to 
light the contention that veterans from this sample tend to agree with; that on a 
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one on one basis the German soldier was not only as good, but often better than 
the Gl. 200 The majority of men sampled recalled how their wily and competent foe 
demanded respect in combat. In the typical fashion of veteran understatement 
one comment illustrates the prevalent attitude. "We respected them. They were 
good. 11201 Another man held the strong opinion that the German soldier was in fact 
better than the GI and stated quite assuredly, "I want to point something out. We 
were not the best army in Europe." This critic of American qualitative superiority 
stressed the real reason the Allies were victorious, quantitative superiority. He 
stipulated the Allies won due their "preponderance of war material", and also one 
must not forget Hitler's often irrational leadership. 202 
One of the reasons some men thought the typical German soldier was 
better than the typical GI is that the Werhmacht often had better weapons than the 
American Army. German weapons like the 88 mm stand out as superior, while in 
cases like the 57 mm and the more will known Sherman tank, American equipment 
had serous deficiencies. The second reason was the German soldier was often 
better at operating his chosen weapon, such as mortars and artillery; due to either 
good training, combat experience or both. Two men made specific statements 
which support this, which is also reinforced in several sources. 
The German soldier was very well trained. He had good weapons 
and he knew how to use them, better than we knew ours. 203 
The Germans on the whole had better equipment than we had .... 
The 88 was awfully accurate. They were pretty accurate with their 
mortars too, a lot more accurate that we were with ours. 204 
However, there were always those men who belong to the minority who believe 
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German soldiers were "second rate" in comparison. 205 It should be known these 
attitudes are often associated with the latter stages of the war when Germany was 
fielding lesser trained young and old men that could not match the top of the line 
soldiers already lost. The fact remains sheer numbers of soldiers in all Allied 
armies, wore down and destroyed the German war machine. 
We had too much of a superior striking force and manpower. 
Germany had fifty percent of her forces over fighting on the other 
front. . . . However, we would have had an awfully hard time 
whipping those jokers if they hadn't been fighting over there on that 
other front. It they would have put everything going this way [west] 
why then I don't know. I don't have any idea about what would have 
happened. 206 
Not only did Germany have to fight in the east, but they also had to tie down 
precious men and material in Italy. One veteran's unique experience illustrates 
how German manpower was stretched far too thin after their irreplaceable losses 
in six years of war. Commenting on the young, old, and poorly trained men 
encountered in the last months of the war this mans said, 
in fact, around the end of the war we ran into women who had been 
manning some anti-aircraft guns they were using against the 
infantry. 201 
The Werhmacht was at its best against American forces in the early stages 
of the Battle of the Bulge. The misperception of Germany's capabilities before the 
Bulge bred complacency and overconfidence in American troops convinced of a 
quick impending victory. However, Gls were in for a rude reawakening when they 
were forced to re-evaluate German's war making potential. One statement 
illustrates the surprise that abruptly brought about this change on December 16, 
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1944. The man recalled how, separated from the Germans by a river in his sector 
of the Ardennes line, both sides were more inclined to coexist rather than provoke 
fire from the other. 
We wouldn't fire at them and they wouldn't fire at us. We'd wave to 
each other. So when they attacked at six o'clock in the morning we 
didn't know what happened. We weren't prepared for it. 208 
The resilience and recuperative striking power of Werhmacht in the Ardennes 
offensive was a shock to all. Gls never again underestimated the German army 
and from then on even had the proclivity to overestimate German defensive 
capabilities. Proof of this is found in two letters a GI wrote to his parents over a 
two month span. His attitude in a letter dated December 15, 1944 was quite 
optimistic, but he was obviously unaware of the true situation. "Surely this war 
situation will clear up this year. They claim politics is all that's holding it up now. 
I don't know. "209 In another letter of February 16, 1945 his experiences had altered 
his judgement. After living through the fighting in the Bulge, this man also fell 
sway to the myth of the German mountain fortress. 
Germany's last page is being written Dad, just a question of time 
now. However, we never know, they might hold out in the mountains 
until fall [of 1945]. Mountain and forest fighting is tough, I know. 
Belgium was H---.210 
This change in attitude came in a large part to the ferocity of the fighting in 
the Ardennes. The battle that is characteristic of the most brutal fighting of the war 
for Americans in Europe, is often symbolized by the infamous Malmedy Massacre. 
However, it cannot be denied this German atrocity sparked an even greater 
atrocity committed by an even larger number of American troops. News of the 
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incident at Malmedy spread rapidly throughout the different American divisions 
along the entire American line with the aid of rumors, and the U.S. army 
newspaper, "Stars and Stripes", which gave the story top priority. The story 
became common knowledge for those who were alarmed and craving information 
about the German advance. One time there was a great hatred for the Germans 
was after the Malmedy Massacre. This news incited a rage and determination to 
gain revenge in the process of pushing back the German gains. 211 
Vengeful attitudes resulted in situations where individual unit commanders 
gave specific orders stipulating their troops not to accept German prisoners. One 
veteran, who openly commented on such orders, was convinced his unit 
committed atrocities in the Ardennes. He recalled this was carried out in 
"retaliation" for German actions at Malmedy. 
Orders were passed down. I didn't participate, but I saw some of it. 
. . . Personally I didn't like the way some of the German prisoners 
were being treated. . . . I didn't help take any prisoners, but I did 
see them take prisoners and take them back behind the line. They 
shot some of them. I saw them taking them back, but I never did 
see them execute any. . . . They finally put a stop to it. . . . We 
weren't thinking too well. 212 
Since the soldier did not actually see any executions take place, there is always 
the possibility the German prisoners were not executed, but this individual close 
to the scene wholeheartedly believed war crimes occurred. 
While this soldier was helping to reduce the northern salient of the Bulge, 
another soldier fighting miles away in the southern salient received similar orders. 
Word came down to us to hate the Germans more and not to take 
any prisoners. The word came down to all of us over there. We 
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were madder than hell about that [Malmedy). . . . Word came 
down not to take any prisoners. Along the whole line all the different 
divisions and outfits knew what happened. Chances are the word 
came down to them as it did to us. You don't have any love for the 
German soldier when they did that. 213 
Despite orders, this veteran's unit did not shoot any prisoners; they never had the 
opportunity to take prisoners. His anti-tank company was never in close combat 
where Germans wished to surrender. However, like the previous individual, he 
believed his battalion's rifle companies were not taking prisoners. This man also 
thought it was morally wrong to execute enemy soldiers that properly attempted 
to surrender. 
If he comes out with his hands up, you have no business shooting 
him. He's given himself up, and you're supposed to abide by the 
Geneva Convention laws and he's a prisoner. 214 
Nevertheless, there were all types of soldiers out there, and there were always 
some who did not care about the rules of war and were focused on hatred and 
revenge. As this man commented, treatment of prisoners often rested with who 
controlled the situation. If those that desired revenge had the power of authority 
it would likely be carried out. If they did not wish revenge, it was likely prisoners 
would be treated appropriately. 
It just depends on what the situation is, and who is in charge of it. 
Now it might be such a thing as they could have been shot, and it 
might be they could have been taken prisoner. You just don't know 
in a case like that. Every case is a little bit different. 215 
Judging from personal recollections in the literature and findings from the veteran's 
sampled, there were many more orders not to accept prisoners, in addition to 
unofficial executions, than as portrayed in the "U.S. Army in World War II" series 
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covering the Battle of the Bulge. The author of The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge 
declared: 
there were American commanders who orally expressed the opinion 
that all SS troops should be killed on sight and there is some 
indication that in isolated case express orders for this were given.216 
Not only were SS soldiers much less likely to be taken prisoner, but the chances 
of being taken captive dwindled for all German soldiers. All evidence in oral 
histories and personal recollections confirm that reciprocal American atrocities 
were more widespread than one would be led to believe in the official statement. 217 
The Malmedy Massacre was one reason so many Gls were determined on 
not accepting prisoners, however it was always likely contributing factors were 
involved. This was the case for one battalion that not only went into combat irate 
about German atrocities at Malmedy, but an isolated incident of German brutality 
added to this unit's anger. In a sharp German counterattack, two rifle companies 
of this battalion were overwhelmed and destroyed by stronger forces. No 
prisoners were taken, all were killed when the Germans used flamethrowers on 
those remaining in cellars of a group of houses. When the Germans were pushed 
back out of the town, the battalion discovered the aftermath. In response to this 
act, the battalion's divisional history stated this "was a blow the division vowed to 
avenge." The first two weeks of January, 1945, a battle of attrition raged in the 
Belgian forest as these Gls battered the Germans back onto the defensive. In the 
ruthless fighting that ensued both sides at times took no prisoners. The divisional 
history stated "neither side gave quarter. "218 
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In the Battle of the Bulge there were numerous occasions where the 
German actions at Malmedy, along with other isolated German atrocities 
committed on innocent civilians, and American soldiers, provoked Gls into not 
accepting prisoners in reprisal. An even greater chance of retaliation existed when 
soldiers had positive proof the enemy soldiers opposite were guilty of committing 
the atrocities. 219 The Ardennes reached such a brutal stage of fighting that some 
soldiers became consumed in a vicious cycle of retribution. Common sense says 
when soldiers became aware of the possibility, no matter how accurate, they might 
meet a brutal death rather than be taken captive, men of both armies would 
definitely be disinclined to surrender. 
Accordingly, Gls found themselves in a life or death struggle where there 
were few or no rules, even when they technically existed. All actions were 
sanctioned by survival, which meant anything goes and ruthlessness and violence 
often prevailed. Gls also were aware, many from first hand experience, there were 
German soldiers who would rather fight to the bitter end than surrender. One 
veteran recalled how the SS were especially known to possess that trait. 
They[the SS] were rough. They wouldn't give up. There was only 
one way to do it. And that's to go get 'em[sic]. 220 
In this type of combat situation there were times when the enemy soldier 
would be shot and killed on first sight, in the "heat of combat", rather than being 
taken captive. 221 The following statement represents the classical "heat of combat" 
justification. 
I didn't see any German prisoners killed. But there is a moment 
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when they start to surrender and you keep firing. There are at least 
two reasons. You don't trust them and you are so hyped up on 
killing someone before they kill you that you just keep firing. 222 
The collective mentality provides not a defense, but an explanation why the 
incident described above was not a purely malicious act, but occurred for the sake 
of survival. Men were by nature cautious and had been taught since training to 
"never give your enemy a chance. "223 Aware of the German soldier's stereotype 
of ruthlessness, it was only natural for Gls to espouse the attitude one man held. 
You were in a position there that you couldn't trust them at all. You 
never took any chances. 224 
Holding no trust whatsoever in the enemy, men were presented with a life 
threatening problem every time they saw an enemy soldier. They could never 
know the enemy's true intentions; as far as they knew he might have a trick up his 
sleeve. This meant in the confusion of combat, when one merely reacted more 
that thought, it was always possible for a soldier to be absorbed in the fury of the 
moment and shoot and kill an enemy soldier before giving him a chance to 
surrender, given he even wished to surrender. Under these circumstances, "heat 
of combat" incidents should not be classified as an "atrocity" in the same light as 
shooting unarmed men, after the fact, for revenge. 
When focusing on the atrocities and brutalities of war, it is too easy to 
overlook the fact thousands of German soldiers were taken prisoner in the 
Ardennes; there were also those who treated prisoners with due regard. For 
example, even in the case of the 35th Division that "vowed to avenge" German 
actions, the division took over one thousand prisoners in a little over two weeks 
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of fighting. 225 
Most likely Germans who wished to surrender, and did so in large groups, 
had the greatest chance of being treated properly. One reason being that in one 
on one situations individual soldiers were more prone to become victims of "heat 
of combat" incidents. Also there are a few documented cases where large 
concentrations of German troops were herded up and gunned down after 
surrender; however, such examples do exist. 226 When committing atrocities in 
reprisal soldiers failed to recognize, and prevent, the inherent contradiction and 
injustice of their actions. This illustrates how one man's observation describes the 
collective experience. When talking of atrocities he made the comment, "we 
weren't thinking too well. "227 
As veterans with combat experience in other places than the Battle of the 
Bulge confirm, what constitutes war crimes can occur any time enemy soldiers 
meet in combat. Most all soldiers came to determine that "dirty fighting . . . was 
actually a general characteristic of war. "228 Accordingly, there were always 
situations when captured enemy soldiers might be treated contrary to regulations. 
When a German sniper, who had possibly wounded or killed Gls, tried to 
surrender, counting on instant clemency was one scenario when this mistreatment 
was likely to take place. For a soldier who had lost a friend at a sniper's expense 
not taking his anger out on the culprit was sometimes impossible. 229 One 
statement illustrates how snipers were common targets for immediate retribution. 
"A sniper. We wouldn't take him. He'd be shot right up there in the tree."230 This 
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same individual recalled how one sniper was lucky just to be physically abused. 
There was one German sniper who wounded two or three of our 
guys. We finally got him and knocked him down out of the tree .. 
. . [Later he saw the German and someone had] kind of beat him up 
a I ittle bit. 231 
Personal recollections confirm there were situations when Gls allowed their anger 
carry the situation and they committed atrocities in the wicked name of revenge. 232 
One veteran spoke of men looking the other way allowing others to gain revenge 
when the issue did not concern them. One such incident occurred during the 
liberation of Nazi prisoner and concentration camps. One man recalled, 
I forget if it was a Ukrainian or a Pole or whoever he was but he took 
this German out and he killed him while he was trying to escape. 
The official story. 233 
The following reference to the improper treatment of a German prisoner is 
just one example of how group standards set the quality of conduct. One veteran 
commented on a "cocky" soldier new to his squad that 
went over to this German standing there and he spit in his face. 
That made me mad! I said, captured man or not . . . don't do 
anything like that. I went and got him [the GI] by the shoulder, and 
I shook him up a little bit. . . . I said, 'that's the last of that. What 
in the hell are they going to think of you. . . . By God don't ever 
do anything like that again. Leave them alone. Don't touch them.' 
That just sort of got under my skin. . . . All the rest of the guys 
were with me. 234 
There were also instances when soldiers with reputations for mistreating prisoners 
were barred from transporting prisoners to the rear by those that insisted on 
treatment according to regulations. 235 
The following incident is a manifestation of the collective mentality and the 
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bizarre situations of combat; where Gls took no unnecessary chances and went 
to drastic extremes to survive. This occurred in the first week of the Normandy 
campaign while this veteran's unit was surrounded behind German lines. Deciding 
to divulge this story the man prefaced it by saying, "it ain't a very good story." 
When we were behind the lines for three days . . . we had dead 
Germans all around, in the ditches and along the road. . . . We 
were standing there beside the road in a ditch talking when a 
German on the other side of the road, who was wounded, just sat up 
and looked around. Of course he didn't have a gun or anything with 
him, but there he was. They got to talking [those in charge] about 
'what are we going to do with him? Tonight we are going to slip 
through the lines and go back home. We leave him here he's going 
to tell the other Germans about us. What are we going to do, we 
can't take him with us?' And -----, he says: 'Aw don't worry about it' 
or something to that effect and he took his rifle and pointed it that 
way and blew his brains out right there. Now that's terrible to say 
about our American people, but he did that really to save our lives. 
But that's terrible! He did it so fast and everything I don't know what 
I would have done. I couldn't see anybody doing that even though 
he was our enemy. Things like that, oh that disturbs a guy .... A 
guy should be put in jail for something like that. 236 
This man could barely reconcile himself to this "terrible" act, but at the same time 
he realized this was done for group survival. They were in a predicament where 
they could not be bothered by caring for the wounded German; they were totally 
engrossed with keeping themselves alive. Therefore, the man in the group with 
the personality least hampered by concern for the enemy, took control and solved 
the problem the quick and easy way. 
Another veteran's recollection again illustrates the total lack of regard for 
German life when American life was threatened. This incident, which occurred at 
the Anzio beachhead, Italy, also illustrates the different type of personalities that 
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existed among Gls. This man felt no remorse over the story, in contrast to the 
man above who strongly disagreed with the act of his fellow soldier. On a cold 
rainy night this individual, being a staff sergeant, was the ranking man in his anti-
tank squad. Deep in his foxhole another soldier came up to him with two German 
prisoners asking what should be done with them. He recalled his response to this 
question. 
I said, 'do you want to take them back?' He said, 'hell no. I ain't 
going to f--- with them.' And I said, 'dispose of them.' And he shot 
'em.231 
Obviously these prisoners were not important enough to make these men put 
themselves at higher risk by transferring them to safety. They would have to leave 
their foxholes and dodge shelling to take them back and then come back to the 
front still under fire, while leaving their squad shorthanded. This man used a 
rough analogy as an explanation for this incident. 
You do what you have to do. . . . All right, let me ask you. If you 
were just fighting to beat hell and got Germans all around you, and 
say you got a hundred men . . . and maybe five hundred men 
surround you and somebody wants to surrender. What are you 
going to do with them? You shoot them. 238 
The situation and numbers are purely hypothetical, but the concept of survival at 
all costs is essentially correct. There is proof that in small scale platoon or squad 
size engagements, enemy soldiers that otherwise would have been prisoners were 
shot when they could not be effectively kept under guard. This happened because 
watching over prisoners instead of using every man to fight jeopardized group 
survival which soldiers found intolerable. 239 Not that this is good or just, but 
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evidence indicates placing rules on survival in combat is impractical and expecting 
men to be too docile in their fight for life. 
The problem of retaining prisoners under guard in combat situations relates 
to an issue covered up by some sources, but recently brought into the open by 
oral histories. 240 During the Normandy Invasion, some shock troops had orders not 
to take prisoners in the initial stages of the assault. Statements of soldiers from 
the 29th Infantry Division and 101 st Airborne Division attest that various units did 
have these specific orders. 241 Like German troops at Malmedy, Gls could not let 
prisoners slow them down or impede successful operations. However, not all units 
had orders stipulating Germans would be shot rather than be taken prisoner. One 
man who hit Omaha Beach with the 175th Regiment of the 29th Division recalled 
quite clearly his orders. 
There for the first two or three days . . . they told us 'if you take a 
prisoner you're responsible for him.' That's what they said. They 
didn't say shoot him, or get rid of him, or nothing. Coming in off the 
beachhead there's no place to put them. The MPs don't come in 
until you've got a toehold. That was what they told us. They didn't 
say shoot them or anything, but they said if you take prisoners you 
take care of them, you are responsible for them. 242 
In this statement there exists no direct orders either way, and it appears soldiers 
had an impled option. If a soldier wanted to take the responsibility of a prisoner 
he could. But apparently, if he did not wish to be bothered, their responsibility 
could have been to eliminate the problem. 
Some soldiers would be unwilling to take the added responsibility, however 
there were always those willing to accept prisoners. It was after the first three 
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days of the invasion, but nevertheless, the soldier from the 29th Division captured 
a prisoner. After his unit overran a small village he saw a lone unsuspecting 
German soldier walk out of a house with his rifle slung over his shoulder. The 
man recalled the sequence of events. 
I saw him coming and . . . I guess he saw me about the same time, 
but I was a little faster than him .... When he saw that I had the 
drop on him before he could get one on me he just kicked his rifle 
off his shoulder. He put his hands up and came walking right 
towards me. He was hollering 'kamerad, kamerad, kamerad. '243 
After fully disarming his prisoner and sending him back to the rear under the guard 
of MPs, he felt good thinking how he did the German soldier a "favor." He was 
glad he did not have to kill the man, and yet he took him out of the action. This 
was just one small victory without a loss. 244 
Like the German soldier in the situation above, many Germans would rather 
give up and survive, than attempt to fight when it was a hopelessly lost cause. 
Like most any man, even if they were in possession of the enemy, they were 
sincerely happy to be alive. As one veteran said, "when it became obvious they 
were going to lose, the proclivity to surrender increased. "245 For this reason 
interaction with prisoners became an even more common part of the collective 
experience as the war came to an end in the spring of 1945. 
Most veterans expressed how their fears never totally disappeared in 
combat. One recalled, "there is always a constant fear you're going to be hit. "246 
Soldiers learned they could never know exactly when something bad was going 
to happen, surprises were the norm. 
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One of the things you learn when you're in battle is that the 
unexpected is the most expected thing. We ran into an ambush one 
day and the lieutenant disappeared. I still don't know what 
happened to him to this day. I really think he was probably wounded, 
but I don't know where he went. 247 
Never knowing what was going to happen the next week, the next day, even 
the next minute, soldiers were constantly plagued with uncertainty. The real 
mental torture came from knowing you could be killed, but never knowing when or 
how it would happen. As far as death or injury, one man said, "it was just one of 
those deals that just happened and that's it. You could never tell when it 
would."248 Another man who dreaded the uncertainty of combat recalled, 
you never knew when or what direction it was going to come from 
really. That was the scary part . . . you never knew. 249 
Veterans commented on how this ever-present uncertainly produced their worst 
"apprehension" or "anxiety. "250 
This fear was worse in situations which were more dangerous and had a 
higher degree of uncertainty than the normal everyday routine. All soldiers that 
went on forays into enemy lines can relate to patrols "nerve wracking suspense. "251 
One man who despised going on patrols stated, 
you had no idea of what your enemy had been doing before. Maybe 
they had time to put down some mines or one thing or another. I 
hated that. 252 
Another circumstance that made patrols so bad was that they often took place at 
night, when it was almost impossible to see anything in the pitch dark. Several 
men commented on the terrors of night patrol while one in particular said, 
of course you had terrible things to endure everyday, but the worst 
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was night patrolling, you didn't know whether you were going to 
come back or not. I think I went all together three times on night 
patrol which came out pretty good.253 
Gls not only hated night patrols, but they hated the night in general. The uneasy 
feeling of not knowing where the enemy was and what he was up to was always 
worse in the dark. 
Another situation which challenged soldier's nerves and patience was 
fighting in areas where they could not see the enemy unless they were at short 
range, like urban areas and densely wooded areas. One man spoke of the 
scattered and confused small scale firefights that took place when enemy soldiers 
bumped into each other in the Huertgen Forest. The man who fought through all 
the major campaigns in Western Europe, recalled how scary it was fighting in the 
thick forest. "You couldn't see them .... Oh it was terrible. That was one of the 
worst battles of the war."254 Another individual commented on the same 
experience in the Ardennes forest. Combing through the woods for Germans, the 
men in his unit never knew what they might find, so they were ready with fixed 
bayonets. 
You never knew how many men you were going to encounter. 
That's another thing I hated. Going through somewhere where you 
couldn't see. 256 
Because it was so widespread and affected so many men, the stimulus 
which provoked the worst fear on the greatest scale was artillery. Every artillery 
barrage always had a large element of uncertainty. Soldiers never knew exactly 
where the shells were going to hit and it was a terrible feeling waiting the 
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agonizing seconds before barrages ceased and the last shell exploded. "You 
never knew when they were going to hit. The closer they hit the harder it was on 
you. It would shake you to death."258 One man, like so many, recalled his worst 
fear and uncertainty came from artillery. Other than hope the shell did not land 
close enough to hurt them, there was really nothing soldiers could do to defend 
themselves from this impersonal weapon. 
I felt that I could take care of myself, but outside of digging deeper 
in a hole, you had no defense against artillery. . . . You worried 
more than anything else about whether a kraut was going to zero in 
close to you. It used to get kind of scary when they started perhaps 
a mile on your right and they started walking it over [the shellfire] 
and you wondered if they were going to stop before they got to 
you.251 
Anxiety, fear, and uncertainty could be so severe for certain individuals they 
could not cope. For those who could not accept the fact they could be killed at 
any moment, they were ways to get out of combat. One choice was to shoot or 
injure oneself in some manner, but only one man in this sample knew of what was 
possibly a self-inflicted wound. There were those who selected this option, but 
rumors were much more abundant than actual cases. 258 Another way soldiers 
could purposely get out of combat was to find a devious way to go AWOL. This, 
like a self-inflicted wound, was also uncommon. Only one man sampled knew of 
a case where a GI deserted in combat. The rest had no personal experiences with 
deserters after they reached the combat zone. 
The man who talked about his experience with a deserter recalled he was 
a replacement who only had been in his unit one day. The man relaying this story 
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was a sergeant who "made the rounds" that night finding the soldier's foxhole 
empty. 
We didn't know whether the krauts had snuck in and captured him, 
or whether he'd been blown to bits by artillery. We didn't know. . . 
. I found out later that he had taken off . . . from a man that had 
come back to us after a wound. . That's the only time I 
remember anybody taking off. 259 
Desertion could call for execution by firing squad, but the stark reality of 
combat could influence men to take this chance. Actually it was a good chance 
to take considering only one soldier was executed for desertion during the entire 
war. Before his death, this hapless GI, Eddie Slavik, stated why he could not 
control his fear. His reason for deserting was the uncertainty of knowing that 
death could come at any moment. 
Up there on the line you never know when it's coming, and it's that 
uncertainty that gets you. I guess that's what I couldn't take-that 
uncertainty.260 
Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority continued to fight until their 
services were no longer required, or they were no longer physically able. The all 
important question is: why men continued to put their lives on the line when they 
knew they could be killed? The answer to this is the collective mentality. With no 
rotation policy, the quintessential aspect of the collective mentality was the 
determination to keep going until the undesirable task was over, so one could go 
home with one's honor intact. Gls went into combat thinking they had to "take" or 
endure all adversity and hardships they would face in combat and they had to fall 
back on this understanding when the going was at its toughest. One man recalled 
100 
his mind set in combat. 
You had to realize the fact that you had to be over there, and you 
had to do the best you could until we got it over with. 261 
Another man stated the same reason why he kept going; notice the phrase "had 
to." "You just had to do it, and you hoped to get out of it and get back home."262 
Another statement illustrates the collective rationalization. "You hate it . . . but 
you know you have to do it. "263 
The problem was that possessing even the stubbornest determination to 
stick it out it, was totally different than actually doing it. When trying to keep going 
soldiers were forced to withstand tremendous accumulative and combined 
pressures of both the emotional stress and physical fatigue of combat. One must 
first consider that G Is had to abide with some of the most abysmal living conditions 
imaginable. This was made worse during times of inclement weather, like the 
severe European winter of 1944-45. All men who experienced it complained of the 
problems due to the below-zero cold, specifically in the Ardennes. 264 Because 
nothing could be done about the weather, it too was something soldiers had to 
suffer through and endure. As one man said, "you just had to tough it out."265 
Nevertheless, as will be later illustrated, it was sometimes impossible to physically 
endure all mother nature could dish out. 
If it only were contending with the living conditions, combat would be 
formidable enough. However, constantly keeping on their feet, to either counter 
the enemy, or to make an offensive thrust of their own, Gls had to keep pace with 
combat's rigorous physical demands. On the move for extended periods of time, 
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while frequently experiencing periods of sleep deprivation, physical exertion often 
resulted in physical exhaustion. Soldiers also had to keep a vigilant eye for any 
sign of danger which worked to wear them down. Accordingly, one veteran said 
people without combat experience can never "visualize the stress and 
responsibility" of a soldier. 266 With the omnipresent dread of the unknown, combat 
was not only physically exhausting, but, as one veteran said, it was also 
"emotionally exhausting. "267 
These conditions presented a constant challenge to an individual's will and 
ability to persevere. One man recalled, "it gets to your nerves worse than 
anything. . . . It would get to you, just the strain."268 The central aspect of the 
collective experience is also illustrated by the following statement. 
It was hard on everybody. Even though you're a young fella [sic) 
that should take it, it is sure hard of a fellas [sic] constitution. It 
effected everybody. 269 
True, everyone was affected, but some soldiers definitely had it worse. This was 
because of the distinction between rifle companies and rear echelon units, with the 
former possessing a much higher level of danger along with requiring greater 
physical demands. One member of an anti-tank unit knew from experience that 
riflemen "suffered the worst" from the debilitating stress of combat. 270 
Trying to meet the grueling demands of combat soldiers were pushed to the 
limits of their physical and emotional endurance. When the stress and strain of 
combat became unbearable some men exceeded their limit of endurance. There 
was always the possibility that a GI could emotionally and physically collapse. The 
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common and repeated use in several sources of the term "breaking point" is 
positive proof that one exists for all men.271 Breaking down and losing the ability 
to cope with the rigors of combat is usually referred to as "battle fatigue", but this 
is an amorphous term susceptible to different interpretations. 272 No matter if a 
breakdown was due to mental trauma or physical exhaustion, the fact is combat 
was so severe it could prove to be the downfall of any man. 
In war it is not just the weak soldiers, or the sensitive ones, or the 
highly imaginative ones or cowardly ones, who will breakdown. 
Inevitable, all will breakdown if in combat long enough.273 
Breakdown on the battlefield is the end result of all the madness and should be 
regarded as just another wound with no stigma attached. Even the strongest 
motivation could never indefinitely sustain an individual in combat. 274 
CHAPTER THREE 
The experiences of the next four veterans illustrate how it was impossible, 
even for those who thought and acted in accordance with the collective mentality, 
to continue in their quest to soldier on. One example is a soldier motivated in the 
same way as all his counterparts. To begin with, he would have been "ashamed" 
not to stay up with the close friends in his unit. This determination to uphold the 
respect of his buddies was a prerequisite quality of any successful soldier. This 
drive was so strong that, regardless of the dangers, he yearned to get back to his 
unit after recovering from with his second wound, suffered in Metz, France in the 
fall of 1944.1 
Another constant motivating factor for this man, like all Gls, was the 
determination to get the fighting over, and get back home to normal civilian life: 
essentially survival. He recalled his unit's attitude in March 1945 while anticipating 
the impending Rhine River crossing. "We knew that when we crossed the Rhine 
we would get to come home."2 If they had made it that far, Gls knew there was 
nothing else they could do but fight until the end. The fact he had never seen his 
first born son, in person, intensified his desire to get home. He married a women 
he met on leave in New York City in 1941 and had not been back to see her, or 
his child since. Within days of the successful Rhine crossing this man finally got 
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his wish of making it home to see his new family. The problem was, what 
happened was not how he wanted to get home. 
Getting in a few precious moments of rest while waiting to move out he 
recalled how 
all of a sudden shells started coming over, 88s. We jumped into a 
hole, three of us, and a shell came right in with us. It blew us out of 
the hole and killed the other two guys. I got wounded in flank. That 
sent men home. 3 
Such an unsuspecting incident is an example of what was most unnerving: 
never knowing when death and injury would come. It also represents the 
thousands of Gls who were killed, having all their similar aspirations so tragically 
snuffed. These men would have loved the chance to tough it out like the rest. 
Therefore, he was fortunate to survive this situation, notwithstanding the pain and 
suffering he went through. Nearly killed in the deadly explosion he spent nine 
months in a hospital recuperating. 
Another man's experience also illustrates how men had to be physically able 
to fight on, even when possessing the will to persevere. This was the soldier 
whose letter at the beginning of Chapter One illustrates the collective mentality. 
He always held the understanding it was mandatory he "had to" keep fighting. 
Another letter, dated February 16, 1945, shows how soldiers always concentrated 
on finishing their job, even when they hated what they were doing. 
I suppose my letters sound like I'm having a good time, but I'm 
certainly not. ... But since I'm over here, I want to see it through. 
It can't last forever. 4 
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However, six weeks later this man was unable to "see it through", as a 
nagging knee injury forced him to seek medical treatment. He suffered this injury 
in the Ardennes when he jumped off an army truck and slipped on an ice-packed 
road. The injury occurred in early January, but being a minor injury, he just 
toughed it out and kept going with the hope it would recover. That is what this 
determined soldier did for two months, "I had been going on it, limping a little bit."5 
Without proper care, and the wear and agitation from the rigors of combat, the 
swelling and stiffness grew worse instead of better. Removal from the line for 
medical care finally became unavoidable. Aware of the problem for some time his 
lieutenant closely inspected his knee in late March and sent him back to an aid 
station. Getting out of combat alive, he was nevertheless let down about not 
keeping up with the rest. In a letter written from a hospital bed in Belgium, he 
wrote with a sense of dejection: "it looks like I never did make it over the Rhine."6 
Like the man above, it was common for soldiers to sustain injuries officially 
referred to as non-battle casualties. These injuries were not wounds inflicted by 
enemy weapons, but nevertheless still directly related to the hardships of combat. 
This is illustrated by another veteran's experience, a man who valued the exact 
same things in life as all other men. So he could get home to his wife and two 
children, he was "looking forward to getting out. "7 This is the continued story of 
the soldier who lost his lieutenant after three successive bazooka rounds failed to 
detonate. That experience was during his first day in combat, and it turned out he 
was only in combat a total of three days. 
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Continuing towards their objective on the first afternoon his unit started to 
receive heavy shellfire that compelled them to dig in. Throughout the rest of that 
day, and into the night, they were confined to two man foxholes; two man foxholes 
in the attempt to conserve body heat. The men not only had to contend with 
shelling, but also the danger of the excruciating cold of the severe Ardennes 
winter. He recalled his first night in the foxhole, with his new buddy. 
It was survival. . . . We'd take our boots off and massage each 
other's feet for circulation .... You have to talk, to keep awake, to 
keep from freezing to death.8 
As the shelling continued into the second day, and then into the second 
night, the men remained in their foxholes. "They had us pinned down", he 
explained. The shelling was so severe that in the confused fighting they were also 
cut off from re-supply. By the second night the men had run out of rations, water, 
and even cigarettes. As a result, the second night in the foxhole was much worse, 
their resilience had weakened considerable. The morning after the second night, 
the two men took their boots off for circulation, only to have their feet painfully 
swell up. "I didn't have any feeling down by my feet." Having problems getting 
their boots back on, they knew something had to be done. Frostbite had set in 
during the night, in their agony they tried to escape their problems by getting a few 
hours of sleep. When asked if it was then that someone took them back for 
treatment he replied, 
they didn't take us back we went back .... There was seven of us. 
We got an officers jeep, it must have been an officers jeep. Seven 
of us dodged artillery fire from our front lines, back to our aid 
station. 9 
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If this unit's lieutenant had been present, most likely the other demoralized 
and leaderless soldiers who commandeered the jeep, would not have found their 
way out of the situation as they did. The two with frostbite had to get medical 
attention some way, and without positive leadership of their lieutenant, the 
negative leadership of cold and hungry men took over. Upon reaching the aid 
station, those able eventually went back to action, but the two with frostbite 
received immediate care. Flown to England for hospitalization his feet partially 
recovered and the doctors only were forced to remove three toes. Since he 
happened to be on the bottom of the foxhole, he was the lucky one of the two. 
The soldier more exposed to the cold subsequently lost both legs. Both of these 
replacements saw little fighting, but still made life long sacrifices. 
To show how the collective mentality allowed Gls to continue to fight and 
withstand the horrible actuality of combat, one must start with orders. Several 
veterans made repeated use of the common phrase, "orders came down", when 
explaining why they moved forward. 10 This relates to the sense of obedience to 
authority conditioned into Gls since training. One veteran recalled, "you had to 
follow orders whenever they came out, day or night. When they say go, you go."11 
Two other veterans made similar comments which speak for the collective 
mentality. 
You always had a bunch of officers leading .... You more or less 
had to follow them. If they said go down this way, you did it. That's 
all there was to it. It made no difference how you felt. . . . You 
belonged to the military. You didn't have any say of you own 
anymore. For your own good you'd better do just what you're told. 
You didn't argue about it, you just did it. 12 
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When an officer told you to do something you had to do it, or else . 
. . . When they say 'this is an order', while you better do it. You'd 
stand a court martial if you didn't. 13 
One man commented on the effect of orders. "Every GI knew for the whole 
day where they were going, and what they were going to do, and what to 
expect. "14 Significant in this statement was how orders defined each individual's 
unit objective. Soldiers entered combat with a set objective and once in the fight 
they all experienced the same motivation: the fear induced fight for survival. 15 Two 
men spoke of why they had to keep fighting once they were in an engagement, or 
"in the thick of it" so to speak. 16 "There's no escape. "17 "There was no escape. "18 
Once in an engagement, the only way to survive was to fight to get out of danger, 
destroy the enemy and accomplish the objective. Men could also turn and run, but 
that was not an option most seriously considered. 
Nevertheless, it often took more than only orders to make soldiers go 
forward and take extra risks. A battalion commander who observed how soldiers 
acted under fire knew they had to be "coerced to courage. "19 This was done by 
those type of men that had the ability to lead others, and initiate forward 
movement. The type of men that one veteran described as the stereotypical "born 
soldier. "20 These were the men who "could get people up and get them to move 
when they didn't want to go."21 Often these men had gained their proper place as 
company, platoon, or squad leaders, although a private's de facto leadership was 
not uncommon. Combat motivation was dependent upon the positive leadership 
of these pivotal men, once the group started to move forward, or backward as the 
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case may be, individuals followed. One veteran's statement illustrates this. "You 
wouldn't want your buddies to go off and leave you somewhere. "22 
One veteran said he "just happened to have a very good platoon leader." 
The type of leader that did "extra things" for motivational purposes. 23 However, it 
did not just happen to be that this man had a good leader. Another veteran's 
recollection illustrates how men who took control of the situation were an essential 
part of every good unit. This man felt it was a "wonder" that his squad leader did 
not get shot because he gave the enemy so many chances. 
If I ever saw a man that liked to get in there and scrap. He was one 
of them. He was a good leader .... [However], he took too many 
chances .... He stuck his neck out when he shouldn't have. When 
he should have been down crawling, he was up walking. He made 
himself a known target too many times when he didn't have to, even 
though he had some men under him. 24 
Why he thought his squad leader took too many chances was he dreaded the 
thought of his sergeant getting himself hurt. When good leaders were killed in the 
act of physical leadership, it was sometimes devastating on the men who would 
have followed. 25 
Another man recalled an incident where his company commander rendered 
inspired leadership. Best result always came when men led by example. 
The Germans opened up on us one time and shot him [their captain] 
in the leg. Our own medics wrapped him up and took care of him. 
He could hobble around and he cut a stick for a cane and he went 
right along with us .... Two days later while we were going across 
a big open field, of course we were all scattered out, and the 
Germans opened up on us and they hit him in the elbow. . .. He 
wouldn't go back with that wound in his leg, he wouldn't let them 
send him back to the rear .... Of course when he got shot in the 
arm he had to be sent back. . . . It looked like to me that it [the 
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bullet] tore his arm off. It hit him in the elbow and just traveled down 
his arm, and came out around his wrist. 26 
Unselfish leaders like this, always demanded respect and admiration and were 
likewise beneficial to unit cohesion and confidence. 27 The same veteran who told 
this story, had another experience which is a classic example of combat leadership 
and Gl's "reluctant obedience." This occurred when his unit, Company C, 175th 
Regiment, 29th Division, was cut off and surrounded behind enemy lines north of 
the Vire River in Normandy. Two companies of the 175th, Company C and 
Company I, crossed the river on a "reconnaissance in force" on June 12 to secure 
the link up between Omaha and Utah Beach. The mission was so important the 
Brigadier General of the 29th Division, General Norman Cota, went across the river 
with Company I to observe. After crossing the river into German territory, both 
companies were ambushed and dispersed with heavy American losses. Split into 
small isolated groups, survivors from both companies soon filtered back together 
to form a small force of over one-hundred men strong. 29 
In the confused melee, General Cota took control of the men to the best of 
his abilities. After being cut off for two days, General Cota decided to lead the 
group back to American lines. One GI at the scene recalled how the general 
intended for the group to cross an open field, a field this soldier was convinced the 
Germans had covered with deadly machine gun fire. 
We had a general with us. I don't know who he was, but he was a 
general. I don't know his name, or nothing, but he was with us 
there, and he said, 'well let's all of us get up, and scatter out now. 
We are going to cross this field and get over to that other road over 
there.' I said, 'not me.' [The general said], 'you will to soldier!' Of 
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course everybody was getting up and crawling over there, and he 
said, 'come on get going.' I said, "I don't know how long you've been 
here, but I'm not going to cross that open field.' [Looking at the stern 
face of the general he began to change his mind.] 'If you go across 
that field I'll go with you.' He said, 'come on.' He crawled out there, 
and of course I did too. . . . Boy he climbed right up over that 
hedgerow and jumped down there and 'let's go,' he said. He 
sounded like a pretty good Joe .... We went across the field, and 
that's when they opened on us. I don't know what ever happened to 
him after that. 29 
A self-proclaimed "ideal serviceman", this man did provide a defense for 
his actions. 
There were things that I've done, or said, in the service that maybe 
I shouldn't have. But sometimes it was agitating. 30 
It is not surprising men might lose their temper considering the stress of 
having one's life in the balance, day after day. It must have been incredibly 
"agitating" knowing full well that in the upcoming action one's life could be violently 
brought to an end, but nevertheless one had to go on. It was only natural for men 
to be verbally expressive at frustrating times. In fact griping about the situation, 
but nevertheless doing what was required, was a common way Gls coped. Griping 
and complaining while performing the task made time go a little quicker, while 
getting the unwanted job over with. Three statements illustrate how soldiers us~d 
gripes to make the best of bad situations. "There was just a lot of gripes, but then 
that's common. "32 "They'd always say, you're not American unless you're griping 
about something. "33 
Griping was normal, but actual disobedience to direct orders, with Gls 
refusing to go forward, was very rare. On the other hand, it was fairly common for 
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soldiers to let the instinct of survival influence them into ignoring minor regulations 
that were not feasible, or tolerable, in combat situations (see Appendix G). Men 
knew it was acceptable to gripe, but realizing the consequences of actually 
disobeying orders, they knew orders had to be followed. 
It was just something to do, you just had to do it. ... It was a job, 
you didn't think to much about it. You hated going back up on the 
line when you were away from it, but you just did it. ... We weren't 
anxious to move on into combat, and we weren't anxious to avoid 
our responsibilities. It was just a day by day robot type of thing. You 
hate it, but you know you have to do it. 34 
Accordingly, the collective mentality gave Gls the resolve to keep fighting, and 
obey disliked orders, always in the face of death. As it was in all situations, orders 
and physical leadership got soldiers into combat, and then the fight for survival 
began. Thus, combat was a series of engagements punctuated by irregular lulls 
where if a soldier survived one engagement, and orders set another objective, the 
process started all over. 
Being physically able to fight on also meant being physically sustained with 
food and the commodities of war. The human element in warfare always had to 
be appropriately dealt with. One veteran correctly stated, "if you can't keep a full 
stomach you're going to lose the war."35 There were some problems keeping Gls 
supplied in intense fighting (like Normandy), and intense weather (like the 
Ardennes), but Gls did have access to the abundance of "American supply."36 Gls 
might rarely have been without certain items, and thus griped about their supply, 
but they unquestionable had the best. The least American soldiers had to be 
concerned with was keeping supplied with the bare necessities of life.37 
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What is furthermore essential to sustained combat performance, is the most 
complex issue. As well as being physically sustained, Gls had to be mentally 
sustained. Soldiers had to maintain the will to fight, a winning offensive spirit. 
Several miscellaneous motivations worked in conjunction with the collective 
mentality in maintaining this fighting spirit. For example, severe winter weather in 
the Ardennes provided men with a unique incentive to fight: the desire to win 
control of villages for the shelter and warmth of houses. "We fought like all Hades 
to get into those small villages."38 A different motivation, the liberation of those 
oppressed and brutalized by the Nazis, had an effect on one veteran similar to 
most all Gls who experienced the obscenities of the Nazi concentration camps. 
The man saw hundred of Jews tossed in a mass grave. 
They marched all of us guys by there to see them. To see what 
Hitler was doing to the Jews .... That's kind of sad. That kind of 
egged you on though to get in there to free them from the camps. 
That was an awful thing, pitiful. 39 
A sense of hatred or revenge, similar to the situation above, or something like the 
loss of a close friend, could also bring on the temporary motivation of rage. 40 
These motivations were all secondary to the motivation, and sustaining 
power, of what both experts and veterans posit as fundamental in combat 
motivation: camaraderie and the Gls desire to uphold the respect of his buddies. 41 
One of the first benefits of camaraderie was soldiers took orders from men they 
most often knew and trusted. In every combat unit, especially in rifle companies, 
despite their differences in rank, all men, from the captain down to the private, 
were exposed to much the same predicament. Therefore, one man recalled rank 
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did not necessarily determine all friendships; the ability to carry one's fair share 
was a much better gauge of men. "Rank didn't make much difference in our 
situation."42 One man recalled the close relationship with, and admirable 
personality of, his company's captain. "He was right there with each and everyone 
of us. He was just like a buddy. One of us."43 Orders were more meaningful 
when they came from a friend and integral member of the group who actually did 
the leading, rather than an impersonal order from someone in the rear. 
Camaraderie also afforded the individual what can never be underestimated: 
the sustenance of a friend and the group. Once in the service, young men 
suddenly became, in the language of the day, new "buddies" with men from all 
different parts of the nation. Despite their differences, these men soon found out 
how much they really had in common. Two statements illustrate how men 
transformed their unit into their new family away from home. One veteran fondly 
recollected, 
your buddies. You lived with them, slept with them, ate with them . 
. . . They talked about their families and you talked about yours. 
You get to become a family. 44 
Another man felt even more adamant about the kinship and brotherhood among 
his new buddies. 
I'd have to admit they were better friends than family. We lived 
together, fought together, trained together, drank beer together, 
chased women together. Why we were better friends than family. 45 
One veteran, formerly an original unit member, recalled how the living under the 
incredible demands of combat, the pre-existing bonds of friendships could not help 
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but intensify. "The longer you are in, and the harder the fighting, the closer the 
ties."46 
Replacements predominantly went into combat with total strangers, however 
they rapidly developed friendships and camaraderie within their new unit. One 
soldier who served as a replacement commented on this. 
You made friends pretty quick .... Everybody talked and visited 
together whenever they had a chance, just like they'd known each 
other all their life. 47 
Another replacement remembered how a sense of camaraderie was always 
present, regardless of how long soldiers knew each other. "You did feel that 
[camaraderie] whether you had known a guy who had only came up to you that 
day, or if he'd been with you a few weeks."48 In combat, it did not matter who the 
man was, but if individuals were beside each other, they were buddies. This is 
how one man felt, as an original member of the 29th Division, who in only ten days 
of combat had so many replacements come into his unit he never had a chance 
to learn their names. "You didn't know who was around you. All you know is that 
he's a buddy no matter who he is. "49 A replacement that experienced similar 
situations of his own recalled, 
your friend was the guy next to you and that was it. You didn't know 
from one minute to the next technically if he'd be there, or if you'd be 
there the next day. . . . But as long as he is wearing the same 
uniform that is all that is necessary. 50 
What one veteran said about the dynamics of combat relationships, "the 
longer you are in, and the harder the fighting, the close the ties", was true for all 
soldiers. Accordingly, one former replacement spoke of the strong bonds that 
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developed in his unit as time went by. "They were a pretty good bunch of boys. 
You got pretty close to them."51 An original member of an outfit felt similarly, and 
used the same adjective to describe the feeling. "We got kinda close. "52 Relying 
on each other for survival, soldiers in all units developed unequaled friendships 
during their ordeal. Most veterans were convinced the men they were associated 
with in combat were of the best quality existing. They were essentially correct, 
considering all units were filled with capable men. One veteran spoke with pride 
of the fine men in his unit. "We had been together since we formed the 4th 
Infantry [1941]. We had a pretty solid outfit. "53 Close friendships were the source 
of a great feeling of unit pride. One veteran's opinion illustrates a very common 
sentiment. "I was thoroughly imbued with the spirit common among all infantrymen 
that my outfit was the best damned outfit in the whole damned army."54 
The great need for camaraderie in combat was one reason all sorts of 
divergent men created their most intense friendships of life. Camaraderie was 
essential where men depended upon the support of the cohesive unit. Moreover, 
the best way to mitigate the horrors was to make the best of the situation with the 
help of one's buddies. Even the development of camaraderie reflects the way of 
thinking of the collective mentality. Men had to learn in training that a team effort, 
which was essential in combat, required toleration. Camaraderie cannot exist if 
the different types of men could not get along. One veteran recalled how men 
had to adjust once in demanding situations of training. 
You all went to bed at the same time, you all got up at the same 
time, you all reported to revelry at the same time, you all went to 
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breakfast at the same time. You did everything together so you had 
to get along .... You were with a group of men from all walks of life. 
You had to get along or you were just defeating yourself, because 
you were all in the same boat.55 
In combat the need for toleration was naturally intensified. Soldiers could 
not allow potentially divisive problems to effect unit performance. Indicative of the 
collective mentality, with something men could not change, like the choice of fellow 
soldiers, they had to endure or tolerate whatever, or whomever, they may dislike. 
You had to get along with everybody the best you could. I got along 
with about anybody ... [but] some of them you didn't like. You had 
to put up with stuff like that you know, like some little smartaleck 
guy.5s 
With such a great diversity of men in uniform, another individual recalled 
learned the necessity of "getting along with the other guys." This man went into 
the army at age thirty, a college graduate with junior college teaching experience, 
and a feeling he was better than many of the younger, less educated men. His 
attitude changed once in combat. 
You've got all kinds in the army. Some of them were practically 
illiterate, some of them were from the back woods and so forth. I 
went in with pretty much of a superiority complex. That vanished, 
particularly after you got into combat. I learned the important things 
were not how much education you had or what your background in 
civilian life was .... There are some very decent fellows who are ill-
educated. 57 
Another man felt similarly, stating the past meant nothing in combat, it was 
"immaterial." "If you thought you were any better because you had a Cadillac, you 
soon learned differently."58 In combat soldiers were judged by ability and accepted 
if they had the merit. 59 
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Along with tolerating what they could not change, the corresponding facet 
of the collective mentality also played its part in the development of unequaled 
wartime friendships. The fact that to mitigate adversity, men had the to tendency 
to "accentuate the positive. "60 Soldiers made the best of the available friendships, 
becoming great friends with whomever they were put into a unit with. Nothing is 
comparable to the trust and affection soldiers have for each other when they 
depend of one another for survival. One veteran commented, "you depended on 
them, you had to. You had to trust one another. They were behind you, and you 
were behind them."61 Another recalled, "you're fighting for his life [your buddy], 
and he'd be fighting for your life. "62 With so much on the line bonds of 
brotherhood became incredibly strong. 
One veteran's experience exemplifies the development of soldier's greatest 
friendships. Similar to all men, he became "good buddies" with a group of men 
he met entirely by chance. Presumably, if it would have been an entirely different 
group of men, the friendships would have been much the same. The story 
surrounding his experience is especially interesting considering his friendships 
were determined by the alphabet. Soldiers were needed to bring a squad up to 
full complement, and the list was filled with men whose last name started with the 
letter B. "In our unit a lot of the men's last names began with a B. Brownwell, 
Burnett, Bidwell, Baudino, Brady, Boyer, Breeze." Even more, his "best buddy", 
in his days in combat, and then later in civilian life, was the man he happened to 
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share his pup tent with in training. 63 There is no telling the thousands of 
friendships that originated in a similar manner. 
As a result of camaraderie, great friendships, and unit pride men developed 
a profound sense of "small unit loyalty."64 Each individual knew others counted on 
him for survival, and they had to uphold their part of the bargain. One veteran 
stated his motivation, which was the collective motivation. "You don't want to let 
down your friends for the sake of pride."65 Three-fourths of the veterans sampled 
cited this motivation, over all others, as what kept them going each day. This is 
further reinforced by the literature of this subject. 66 
The key word in the previous statement, "pride", was the underlying reason 
men continued to fight. A fierce sense of pride in one's self and unit gave soldiers 
the courage and tenacity to keep up with their unit. Three veterans' recollections 
illustrate this aspect of the collective experience. Driven by the desire to "belong" 
and not to "fail" soldiers had a greater "fear of shame."68 
I was scared as hell, but I kept going because I didn't want to be 
called chicken by the rest of the men. 69 You especially did not want 
to disgrace yourself. I frequently felt this pressure. 70 I lacked the 
guts to take being thought a coward. 71 
With these considerations determining thought, one veteran made a statement 
which illustrates the collective rationalization. 
I figured, 'well if the other guys can do it, I guess I can too. If he can 
keep going, I can too.' That's the way I looked at it. I felt like I could 
do anything anybody else could, if I set my mind to it. 72 
Another recollection also illustrates the coercive influence of friends and the 
unit on soldiers' actions. It also illustrates how one's desire to uphold their honor 
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and reputation could be intensified with seniority in rank, and a man's ancestral 
history soldiers in the family. When asked what kept him going one man 
responded, 
the main thing was pride. I was in command as a sergeant. I would 
have been ashamed to let those men know that I was afraid .... I 
wasn't brave, now don't get me wrong. I was scared to death a lot 
of times. But, I wanted to finish my job. I would have been ashamed 
to come home with a dishonorable discharge. Because my great 
grandfather was in the Civil War, my grandfather was in World War 
I. I had the history of the family. The Kingery name, I had to uphold 
it. 73 
Like all men who were determined to fight it out, this man possessed a quality that 
made him value his friends and reputation over his own life. 
Gls had the prerequisite will to fight on, but at that point all soldiers had to 
rely on their own stamina and inner determination to keep going. 74 Sustained 
performance hinged upon the individual's ability to withstand the pressures of 
combat. Illustrating the collective experience, one man stated that underlying all 
motivations, he depended upon his own "hard-headedness" to persevere. 75 
Several other factors contributed to Gls will and ability to persevere. Sleep 
was not only a physical need, but it was another form of mental sustenance. One 
man recalled the panacea of sleep when off the line, in a secure area. 
That was the best sleep in the world, at least your fears were 
diminished if not completely gone .... Your mind was free and 
unincumbered. 76 
Besides the physical benefits, sleep had the effect of rejuvenating battle weary 
soldier's vigor and determination. Accordingly, because it came so seldom and 
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irregularly, soldiers learned to find sleep anytime, anywhere possible (see 
Appendix H). 
Also aiding soldiers' inner determination to keep going was religion. Faith 
in religion helped men tolerate and cope through their own personal manner. Two 
letters from one soldier illustrates how religion was used in conjunction with all 
previous motivations. One of his letters home read, "yes, the Bible and God will 
bring me through. He has the strongest power overall." Another letter to his wife 
closed with the words, "maybe I can see you before long, let's pray so. "77 Soldiers 
commonly used prayers as a crutch to allay fear and worry. One man remarked, 
"when you're in an artillery barrage, or moving up you get real religious, because 
again you don't know what's going to happen." He continued by saying that in 
trying situations it was normal to recite "every prayer you ever heard. "78 Because 
of the uncertainty over life and death it was common for men to place a greater 
reliance on the salvation of religion. The common use of the phrase "foxhole 
Christian" alludes to this fact (see Appendix I). 
In combat certain situations had the resulting effect of fostering a positive 
offensive spirit. In GI slang this was a "boost to morale", however this phrase 
encompasses several meanings. 79 One veteran commented upon this. 
Morale is something nobody can explain. What is morale? ... You'd 
be in combat and something would happen that happened to be 
funny. I don't know if that would be a boost to morale. Or there 
would be a town ... and that would be an objective. After we took 
a town well you'd say 'hey we got another. '80 
122 
A "boost to morale' was anything raising soldiers' spirit and confidence. This 
was often the outcome of a successful completion of a mission's objective. 
Capturing territory from the enemy, men saw for themselves the progress of their 
efforts. They were beating the enemy, winning the war, and getting closer to 
home.81 One individual involved in reducing the Ruhr pocket in April, 1945 
recalled with pride one of his unit's greatest achievements: a motorized advance 
of 33 miles in one day. This veteran, like several others, recalled the positive 
attitudes due to the "good news" printed in the Army newspaper Stars and Stripes 
in the spring of 1945. News describing how successes were being replicated in 
all units, while the Germans surrendered in mass and the Red Army closed in on 
Berlin.82 
The support of other arms, such as tanks, airplanes, or artillery also raised 
soldier's confidence. "What helped you the most was when your own tanks would 
go on past you .... You felt good then."83 A man who landed on Omaha Beach 
on D+1 recalled a similar feeling watching P-38's strafing the bluffs while the navy 
bombarded. "You knew you had company."84 The sound of outgoing artillery was 
one of the Gls most favorite and appreciated sounds. One veteran observed the 
emotional response to a preparatory artillery barrage fired on the day's objective. 
He described the men as "ecstatic with an elation born with excitement. "85 All this 
coincided with victory, and gave soldiers greater resilience to compete against the 
challenges of combat. 
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However, positive morale was by no means so limited in scope, "morale 
was a lot of little things."86 One must always consider the powerful sustenance of 
camaraderie. Specifically, the lifeblood of camaraderie, the humor between fellow 
soldiers. It was this "delight in comradeship" that one veteran regarded as one of 
the "secret attractions of war. "87 Without question men lived in the misery of fear 
and uncertainty, however two statements illustrate how men did delight in 
friendships and humor. "We had a lot of good times too. "88 "We had a lot of funny 
times too."89 At first one might ask how men had the state of mind to find humor 
in their terrible predicament. The truth is men had to use humor to cope. Humor 
allowed soldiers to enjoy bad situations while helping them to forget and suppress 
their problems. In fact, the army advised soldiers the best way to cope with fear 
was by "laughing it off. "90 
One man recalled the common joke between the men in his unit as they 
went forward into action. One of them always said, "I don't want to go up there. 
A guy could get hurt up there."91 He gave his reasoning as to why the men made 
use of humor. 
It kind of breaks up the seriousness which is really good. You 
couldn't be that serious all the time. We had to have our humor. 92 
Humor was used by men in all units. Another veteran recalled, 
we'd joke around as much as we could .... There would always be 
somebody cracking jokes no matter how bad it got. 93 
Topics of humor were always representative of the collective mentality. One 
example originates with unit pride. Being members of an exclusive group, those 
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with the mettle to withstand the hell of combat, soldiers favorite target of humor 
and derision were men in rear-echelon units. One veteran spoke of the jokes that 
circulated about how many men it took to keep those at the front supplied. 
We used to joke about that. ... No, it doesn't take that many. Let 
me go back, and I'll do two or three of their jobs. 94 
It was also the norm for young men, in grievous positions, to find ways to integrate 
obscenities and vulgar language into humor. A mild example of this is the 
contemptuous term often applied to those in the rear area, "rear-echelon 
bastards."95 Vulgar language was one way Gls could constructively express their 
displeasure to which they felt they had a right. 
The following joke was voiced as a unit walked down a road, "talking about 
some brave deed somebody did." At the end of the group discussion somebody 
said, "I'd rather be a live coward, than a dead hero." This drew a big laugh at the 
time, and also when the man retold it. The joke was for the most part true, but 
what made it humorous was the sarcasm. Despite how much they hated to, men 
went to great lengths to avoid being viewed a coward. 96 The next example of 
humor illustrates what soldiers always had their minds concentrated on: getting 
home. The 29th Division had a slogan the ranking officer always shouted as the 
men moved out; "Twenty-nine, let's go." Every time this occurred, some soldier 
would take it upon himself to quip, "home." The slogan then became "Twenty-nine, 
let's go home. "97 
Another veteran spoke of how soldiers made a practice of 
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making fun of things that in essence are not that funny. In other 
words somebody get's shot in the behind. Big hee haw! Because 
it isn't really all that dangerous of a wound if it's through the fleshy 
part of the buttocks. But nevertheless, you get a good laugh out of 
it. . . . What was he doing to be shot in the behind?98 
Gls needed humor to cope, but it is worthwhile to ask how they found anything 
humorous about a fellow GI being shot? The answer is in combat soldiers 
experienced what can be described as a transient moral ethical lapse. This was 
an adjustment that was a natural outcome of the way of thinking deeming it 
mandatory to endure, or "take", all the horrors of combat. This facet of the 
collective mentality, soldiers' emotionally defensive posture, allowed Gls to make 
this change and find humor in what was not funny. To help themselves cope 
soldiers had to learn to accept things, and do things, previously unthinkable in 
civilian life. One veteran recalled this aspect of the collective experience. "You 
had to acclimate yourself to it ... you had to, otherwise you'd go crazy."99 
Soldiers went into combat knowing they could not be affected by the death 
and destruction, however combat was so severe they nevertheless were affected. 
It is necessary to recall what one veteran said of his first shocking exposure to the 
carnage of battle. 
At first it sort of upset you .... But I tried not to let it bother me 
because I knew I was going to see a lot more of it. So why fret over 
it so much. 100 
Knowing what they had to expect in the future, soldiers felt the need for an even 
greater lack of concern for what they could not change. As men suppressed and 
tried to ignore what otherwise would have been harmful to their sanity, a stoical 
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insensitivity developed. The following is an example of when one man finally 
realized he, and his unit, had "really became accustomed to combat." This 
occurred when his anti-tank company occupied a small town, previously cleared 
of the enemy by the rifle companies. Towing their 57-mm behind their truck, his 
squad pulled behind a barn to set in for the night. "We noticed that when we 
backed in, we had run over some kind of object." In the morning light the men 
found out what the object was. They had ran over a dead German soldier. When 
the men discovered this, they happened to be eating breakfast, but they all went 
out to take a look at the body while continuing to eat their rations. 
That was when I realized I had become accustomed, or callused. 
Back in civilian life that would have been repulsive, but I just took it 
in stride. 101 
Four veterans' statements illustrate the collective adjustment that helped 
soldiers cope with the horrors of war. 
Finally it got to be a routine. You learn to live with it. You had to 
learn to live with it, that's all. The next day there was going to be 
some more. 102 After a while it didn't bother me so much seeing it, 
because it was just everyday anyway. We just got so where we 
didn't care. 103 We became immuned to it ... callused. 104 It was just 
routine. 105 
No matter how men described it, they all felt the same way. Men could only be 
concerned with what was essential for their survival, which the dead were not. 
Two other recollections illustrate the attitudes resulting from the mentality of 
survival. 
You get used to it. It's just kind of an atmosphere that is new, but 
you get used to it, and don't think too much about it. You just save 
your own life. 106 After we were at the front lines for awhile a lot of 
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things just naturally fell our way as far as looking at dead Germans, 
burning buildings, and explosions, and so forth. We just took it for 
granted everyday. We just had to do what we could do to try to 
save our own neck, and keep going at the same time .... No, after 
awhile it didn't bother me any to see them killed, shot, or burned. It 
was just another phase of the operation. 107 
Because Gls fought and died in such a brutal environment, the better 
soldiers were ones more insensitive and more brutal. Take an example from a 
soldier in the 4th Division who participated in the liberation of Paris with the Free 
French Forces. He recalled how the French went after German snipers with a 
previously unseen wrath of vengeance and brutality. 
Those Free French men, I tell you, they would get them [German 
snipers], they were rough on them. That Free French was a pretty 
good outfit. They were with us quite a bit. 108 
The Free French were a "pretty good outfit" because in war one wants a mean and 
tough unit, or comrade, by his side. It was reassuring to know somebody was 
there to help out in a bad situation. 
Indicative of this forced insensitivity is the nickname applied to the German 
soldier. If a GI shot, or saw a dead German, he was not referred to as German 
soldier, he was a "kraut." Kraut replaced German soldier in the Gls' vocabulary, 
they had to dehumanize their enemy. 109 Gls could not be bothered by the fact 
their enemy was human; they had to kill or be killed, any hesitancy could be fatal. 
Thus one veteran recalled how there developed a complete lack of regard for 
enemy life. After clearing out a set of woods, killing several of the enemy, his unit 
sat around and discussed how they accomplished this success. 
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It was just like going out and hunting for squirrels. You'd see one 
way over there so you'd shoot him, and he falls down. Back then it 
was nothing to just talk about it. You were right there and it had to 
be done and you did it. Now to me today it is cruel, but back then 
you were fighting for your own life so you didn't care who, what, or 
where .... It was just like you were shooting squirrels out of a tree. 
That's just the way it was. You just cocked back and pulled back. 
Nothing to it you know. It's bad .... When you were over there 
fighting, it didn't cross your mind so much, until you got out of it. 110 
Men definitely thought differently in combat. For example, taking no 
unnecessary chances for their survival, it was not unheard of for soldiers worried 
about German soldier's playing dead to "waste a round to be sure."111 Bayonets 
were even used to check the dead. 112 As far as most Gls were concerned, "the 
only good kraut was a dead kraut."113 One veteran commented on the change that 
allowed soldiers to think and act as they did. 
A soldier exists in war on two emotional levels: On one 
level, he kills and destroys; the other level, carefully 
insulated from the first, is his rational self, lying 
dormant until it can with some safety reassert itself. It 
is a self induced schizophrenia, essential to emotional 
survival. 114 
Gls also had to be insensitive to losses they themselves suffered. As much 
as they hated it, men did all they could to deal with the death of fellow soldiers. 
Because this was so difficult a task, the easy way to cope was to remove the dead 
to the rear as soon as possible. The less one had to seen them, the easier it was 
to forget. 115 There were also times the necessities of combat demanded front line 
troops to go on fighting, leaving the dead for graves registration. One veteran 
recalled a solemn incident that occurred under machine gun fire in a wooded area 
in Normandy. 
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The Germans just scattered rounds all over the woods. I had a 
buddy there, and he got killed right by me. Of course they just took 
his blanket and laid it across him, and took his rifle and put a 
bayonet on it, and stuck it on the ground beside him and put his 
helmet on it, and we went on. 116 
In situations such as this, soldiers were too busy to do anything else, they did all 
they could and they had their own survival to think about. 
Gls always had tremendous concern and loyalty towards their comrades, 
but in their insensitive state of mind, their pre-eminent consideration was getting 
their job done in the safest, easiest way possible. In doing this soldiers often 
sacrificed the concern for civilians, especially German civilians. Efforts to find 
billets is one example of how manners fell to the wayside as soldiers ignored civil 
property rights, and the normal conventions of peaceful daily life. In war men 
found themselves in extraordinary situations where the world was turned upside 
down and right was wrong and little could be done to change it. In the war zone 
whether houses were occupied, or unoccupied by the owners, Gls had no second 
thoughts about "taking them. "117 That is if they were fortunate enough even to find 
the shelter of a house, if not a barn or any shelter would suffice over a foxhole. 118 
The following situation occurred as a rifle company entered an undefended 
town on the German-Holland border on a cold rainy night in early March of 1945. 
Intent on finding a dry place to rest, the tired soldiers were even more enthusiastic 
about finding a house since the town was completely free of damage. The squad 
of the man who told of this incident picked the closest house and barged in the 
front door. The men had all of their weapons, were very muddy and wet and with 
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over a week's growth of a beard. "We looked like a bunch of men from Mars", the 
man laughed. His unit was surprised to find the upper class house still had 
electricity, a working telephone, and nice furnishings. 
We opened the door and went right on in on their good rug and on 
their good furniture. We hadn't been in there two minutes until a 
lady came up out of the basement area somewhere ... and she 
didn't even know we were in there. A lot of the guys had already 
flopped on the couch and the lounge chairs and so forth to take it 
easy. This lady came up, and she was about thirty-five to forty. She 
came in and saw us in there and she just went crazy. Oh my god, 
she started cussing us in German. You never heard such carrying 
on in your whole life. She got a hold of one of the guys and started 
beating on him. 119 
The men tried to diffuse the situation, but the lady continued to "raise hell." 
"Finally one of the lieutenants came up, after he saw what was going on .... He 
tried to get a hold of her and calm her down, but she wouldn't calm down." The 
men were not going back out into the rain, or compete with other soldiers for 
another house, so the lieutenant had some of the men take her outside, and tie 
her to a streetlight. That is where she stayed until the Gls left the next morning. 
This was a crude act, but the soldiers could then get their desired rest. In their 
situation, the men and the impatient lieutenant, had no feelings for the lady. 
Fortunately she was not seriously harmed. 120 This again illustrates what one 
veteran said about Gls in combat. "We weren't thinking too well."121 
Similar to being immune to the feelings of German civilians, where soldiers 
had to be immune to death, bizarre events often occurred. In the Ardennes in 
January, 1945 an anti-tank company spent close to one week in a war ravaged 
farm house. On the first day, they had problems getting into the house, since an 
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artillery blast had blown away the front porch and steps. "We had a hell of a time 
getting in the door, it was up so high." A soldier with a jeep gained the squads 
attention saying: "will you help me a little bit, I've got a good idea." The men 
proceeded to use the jeep to drag a dead frozen horse into position at the 
doorway. They decided the frozen horse made a good temporary step. 
We used that old mare there for a step for a number of days. When 
we left there all the hair was wore off that horse ... where we had 
stepped on it. 122 
Just as Gls became inured to death, all people exposed to combat 
experienced this same change. The following is just one example of how the 
German soldier also let the instinct of survival prevail over squeamishness. One 
man saw instances of German prisoners taking loaves of bread from the packs of 
their dead comrades. They knew they were the ones that needed it. 123 After years 
of exposure to war, civilians also became insensitive, in this case a spiteful Belgian 
farmer. One veteran recalled a sight he witnessed in the Ardennes in January 
1945. 
I saw this Belgian man ... coming down this hill with a horse behind 
him .... When he got down a little closer why I looked and thought 
'what's he got back behind that old mare.' I thought, 'well I'll just stall 
here just for a second and see what he's got.' ... He had wrapped 
a chain around a dead German that was up on his property .... He 
stopped right there in front of the pig pen. I waved at him and he 
said something and waved back .... He loosened the chain and put 
his hands underneath that dead frozen German and rolled him in the 
pig pen. He just rolled him in the pig pen and then brushed his 
hands off .... Well he done that two or three times. I think it was 
three dead guys that were up there next to the trees back on the hill 
of his place .... He rolled them in there and just acted like he said 
'good riddance' and brushed his hands off. Like the pigs well eat 
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them up, the pigs like it. The pigs did like them. Oh they'd get a 
hold of them and they'd push and pull on those frozen bodies. When 
we left there that place was a mess. Ah [sigh of disgust]. That's just 
one of the bad things of the war. 124 
As terrible as this all was men got to a point where they had enough of all 
the gore. Like one individual said, "you never like it, but you became accustomed 
to it."125 There came a time when Gls went out of their way to avoid seeing the 
disgusting. Some soldiers, who had witnessed the awful results of tanks grinding 
over dead bodies, including dead Germans, began to move them out of the tanks 
path. 
Why a lot of us guys would get a hold of their arms [of the German 
dead] and pull them over toward the ditch, to get them out of the 
road because the tanks were coming through. 126 
As much insensitivity as one could build up it was never enough, Gls 
always had problems suppressing negative thoughts. It is necessary to recall how 
men were always afflicted by the fear and uncertainty of death. Similarly, as hard 
as they tried to forget, men still had problems forgetting the sorrow over lost 
friends. An excerpt from a soldier's wartime journal illustrates this. His close 
friend had been killed weeks earlier, and he still thought of him when he had time 
to reflect. 
He's still much on my mind and it depresses me to think he's gone . 
. . . I've got to quit thinking about him, too. It doesn't bring him back 
and it doesn't do me any good. 127 
This GI realized it was troublesome to think about depressing matters, so 
he tried even harder to forget. Keeping their mind occupied with different thoughts 
was what helped soldiers forget their problems. Officers were advised to keep 
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their men occupied with anything providing a "distraction", anything to make them 
"think about something else. "128 Several veterans agree, "the secret of getting 
through combat is having a purpose and keeping busy. "129 Before going into 
combat, when apprehensions were at there highest, thoughts of the danger ahead 
were distracted in the same way as always: by preparing their equipment and 
double checking their buddies', making sure they were all "ready to go" before 
"jumping off."130 Once in an engagement soldiers were usually "too busy" to think 
of anything but survival. 131 One statement illustrates how soldier's minds were 
preoccupied in combat, but it was when they had too much time to think that they 
had difficulties controlling their problems and worries. 
When one of your people fell it didn't bother you immediately 
because you had other things to do. Like going after the guy that 
got him, or digging deeper in the ground, or trying to save your own 
skin. It was later on, when you had to go back and get his dog tags 
or whatever that you thought too much about it. 132 
Other veterans commented on this same phenomenon of combat. One man 
felt the same way about the losses his unit sustained. "You didn't have time to 
mourn and cry you know. You were moving and you had to get your stuff 
done."132 Similarly, another man remembered instances he thought he could be 
hit by enemy fire but he said, "you couldn't dwell on it. They didn't let you have 
too much idle time, that was probably one of the reasons why you didn't think 
about it."134 It appears his officers knew the advantage of keeping their men busy. 




killed, was fortunate for his own well-being to say, "I got over it pretty quick. 
didn't have time to dwell on it. "135 
There were even times when Gls had to make their own distractions under 
fire. Humor was one way this was often done, but anything that occupied a 
soldier's mind worked just as effectively; like what one man did to cope with his 
fear. 
When you're pinned down and you can't move, can't shoot, and 
you're scared to death while you're laying down there with bullets 
going over you, you pull out that little Testament and read. 136 
This man was referring to the pocket sized Bible the army provided to every GI. 
Soldiers did odd things under fire, and accordingly, any number of things could 
allow them to concentrate on other things than their fears. What the same man 
did in another situation illustrates this, and also the extreme absurdity of combat. 
I remember one time they opened up on us, and I hit the dirt and 
there was old cow pile there, and I just laid there [sic], with my eyes 
looking right at that cow pile counting the grains of corn that weren't 
digested. 137 
Primarily, it was when soldiers had too much time to think that they were 
most affected by their problems. As it was, Gls were not always in the midst of 
combat, there were always lull periods. Times when exhausted soldiers had to 
rest, and time spent waiting for orders and the ensuing offensive preparations 
before again moving into battle. "You might sit around for two or three days without 
anything to do."138 It was common to rush to a location, and then sit around 
waiting with nothing to do. This is where soldiers coined the common wartime 
phrase "hurry up and wait. "139 
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During these times, when they had too much time to think, soldiers had to 
avoid negative thinking. Men could not "sit and brood", they had to have 
distractions. 140 When there was nothing to do but wait, there were several aspects 
of the collective experience that occupied thought and action. So they did not 
have to think at all, soldiers learned to take advantage of the temporary escape 
and refreshment of a nap. They also consumed their time with cleaning weapons, 
making sure they were fully operationable. One statement illustrates how this was 
a very important chore to many. 
You had to keep your weapon in good shape, ready to go. You lived 
by that weapon that you were carrying. You had to keep it in good 
shape. You'd clean it every time you got a chance. You'd be 
surprised at how many men really took that to heart. 141 
Three statements reveal some of the other common ways men occupied their 
thoughts, and actions, in their spare time. "You play cards, write letters, you play 
cards hour after hour, after hour, after hour."142 "You had reading material, and 
you'd just sit around and shoot the bull. "143 "There wasn't anything to do but look 
at one another and shoot the breeze, and light a cigarette .... Every other man 
had a deck of cards. You could at least play rummy to pass the time. A deck of 
cards would do it every time."144 
Reading was one popular escape. With the time and opportunity Gls 
enjoyed the army publications Stars and Stripes and Yank in addition to the 
"reading material" provided to them by the army, or whatever they received from 
home. "You did a lot of reading. About everybody carried something to read. A 
pocketbook, or you would read letters, whatever."145 Letter reading, and writing, 
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was another very popular pastime when combat allowed. "You wrote a lot of 
letters, and read the ones that had been sent up to you. There was a lot of 
that."146 Letters from home were very important to one's personal spirit as they 
were the only attachment to home, unless one was fortunate to have a coveted 
picture of those left behind. One comment illustrates the collective experience, 
"you always felt better when you got a letter from home. "147 
Similar to correspondence with loved ones, distractions were best when they 
were pleasurable. For example, the atmosphere created with camaraderie and 
humor surrounding a card game. When combat permitted, Gls played cards in 
one veteran's words, "every stop. "148 Men also enjoyed their friendships while they 
shot the "breeze" or the "bull." Men often discussed the situation at hand, but 
other popular topics were "wild stories" about home, often concerning past exploits 
with women. 149 "You kid around, and talk about your girlfriends."150 Rumors were 
another popular topic of group discussions. One veteran fondly recalled, "some 
guys specialized in rumors for kicks, inventing real wild ones. It was entertaining 
in a way."151 When asked about rumors, one veteran laughed and replied, "you 
name it you got it. It keeps you thinking about various eccentric things. "152 This 
was the best thing for Gls to be doing in their situation; concentrating on 
something other than the horrors of combat they experienced, or expected to 
experience. 
One veteran spoke of the peculiar nature of some distractions. "It was 
amazing how the guys would entertain themselves. It didn't take too much to 
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entertain you. "153 One good example of the "amazing" ways men entertained 
themselves concerned a jeep load of Gls trying to dodge artillery fire, while from 
a safe distance other soldiers made bets as to whether the jeep would be hit. The 
jeep made it to safety, but as a result, some GI lost his bet that the jeep would be 
hit. 154 In their insensitive state of mind, where they needed humor to cope, 
soldiers could not help but experience this moral and ethical lapse. 155 One veteran 
who observed this change said, "the hell of it was, in that war we forgot to 
remember what was right and what was wrong. "156 
The moral lapse soldiers experienced in combat was actually magnified by 
the realization that one could be killed at any moment. This is one reason why "it 
didn't take much to entertain" most Gls. Aware they could have been killed in the 
past, men were overjoyed just to be alive. This powerful feeling intensified 
everything about life, and every moment men continued to live they reveled in the 
vibrance of life. A soldier's letter to his parents illustrates how life took on a new 
meaning and the simple things became luxuries. Occupying a totally destroyed 
German town, he wrote that the men "live and sleep in this stuff [the rubble], but 
like it though."157 
Obviously they "like it" because they were still living. Knowing their lives 
could be cut short so suddenly, soldiers made a concentrated effort to accentuate 
life. One veteran noticed how his unit learned "to live with uncertainty, savoring 
whatever good came our way."157 Soldiers knew they could die at any moment, 
so they were intent on making the best of life while it lasted. 158 In their situation 
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very little mattered except the present; men lived for the moment enjoying all that 
pleased them. This gave Gls the ability to think in ways inconceivable to an 
outsider. 
This change is illustrated by the humorous distraction that occurred after 
one veteran's unit occupied a knocked out German pillbox in the Battle of the 
Bulge. Their sergeant told the men, "we're going to have to have extra guard duty 
tonight. We're right up here where close. There's going to be a lot of patrols 
coming through." Waiting around with only time to kill, the soldiers noticed three 
dead German soldiers close by. With their warped sense of humor they got a 
good idea, the frozen corpses would make good sentries and not complain about 
it. 
We went around and got three dead Germans that were laying 
around there in the snow and got a hold of them and dragged them 
up there to the pillbox. We got a hold of them and leaned them up 
against the pillbox, and put their helmets back on them, and their 
rifles over their shoulders. They were dead and froze like a railway 
tie. . . . We had to have some humor along with damned deal. 
When we left, those old boys were still leaning up against it [the 
pillbox]. 160 
These men found this humorous at the time and since they stayed at that spot for 
a number of days, others also found it humorous. When soldiers from other units 
passed by, the bodies adorning the pillbox walls were an amusing conversation 
piece. Even in combat situations, soldiers might have nothing to do, and this was 
one of the "amazing" ways they were distracted. Instead of sitting around in the 
freezing cold dejected about their predicament the men stayed active occupying 
their time with something they found entertaining. 
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Other veterans commented on this change in humor. One recalled, "it 
turned to macabre type humor after awhile, there is no question about that. "161 
Another veteran agreed. "It's a gallows humor. "162 Another example of how humor 
changed was revealed when the author asked one veteran if there was anything 
about the war that he knew of, that most people are not aware of. He replied, "I 
think I have proof, right here, of something you maybe never heard about. You 
look at that picture. "163 The picture this man was referring to, was an original 
picture of General Patton in the process of urinating into the Rhine River off a 
temporary bridge. 
The man who took the picture, recalled how this created a hilarious uproar 
in his unit. As a member of an anti-tank company with the 5th Infantry Division 
that made this river crossing, he happened to be at the scene with a camera he 
had taken from a dead German. His unit had placed their guns on the east side 
... 
of the river, protecting the bridgehead from any possible counterattack. 164 The 
men were in a state of mind where a normal bodily function, with the right actor 
in the right situation, could be hilarious. However, since pristine civilians might not 
think this was funny or proper, Patton cleaned up the story in his autobiography. 
In, War As I Knew It, Patton gave his story of the incident, "I crossed the Rhine 
at Oppenheim, stopping to spit in the river."165 From what was apparent in the 
picture, Patton obviously did more that spit. Again the entire story was not told in 




How the man who took this picture had a camera, that he had taken off a 
dead German, introduces a historical tradition of war: collecting booty. Searching 
for "souvenirs" was a "principle occupation" when the circumstances of combat 
allowed it. 166 This aspect of the collective experience provided Gls with a major 
distraction in time and thought. This activity gave soldiers something to do they 
actually wanted to do, and even found pleasure in. Moreover, the word souvenir 
has a meaning which assumes the possessor would survive, and one would have 
something to show for his experience. This is what one soldier thought when he 
took an ornamental Nazi dagger off a German soldier he captured. Seeing the 
dagger he instantly thought "I'm going to take that back home with me."167 Gls had 
to think this way, they had to keep up their confidence they would survive. 
Another soldier found a movie camera on a dead German officer in the Battle of 
the Bulge, with the film still intact. He quickly tucked the camera into his 
dufflebag, however when later requiring medical care he never saw the dufflebag, 
or camera again. "I'd like to have kept it, and had the film developed. . . . 
Somebody snagged it I'm sure. "168 
The most popular and desired object in the hunt for souvenirs was a 
German pistol. Like one individual, "about all I wanted was a German Luger."169 
Eight of the twelve men in this paper had possession of a German pistol at one 
time in their combat career. 170 A veteran of a rear-echelon headquarters company, 
who had more time to search for such items, took home three pistols, which was 
the limit. "You're allowed three pistols, and I had three." He also sent two 
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German rifles home in the mail. Captured German weapons were so prevalent in 
his unit, like most all rear-echelon units, that they sold them for profit to those even 
farther in the rear. He said they gave the confiscated weapons to their "mailman 
and he'd take them back and sell them for us. We'd get a hundred dollars a piece 
for them."171 Black market activity was a common and lucrative distraction for 
many in rear-echelon units. 
As one soldier's letter to his parents indicates, the word "souvenir" took on 
an expanded meaning in combat. The letter was written on March 12, 1945 in the 
German Rhineland . 
. . . speaking of mischief, I've really been in it. Looting these kraut 
homes after they flee. Souvenirs galore .... The fellahs [sic] take 
everything valuable they can. 172 
More than the legitimate spoils of war established by the army, which was anything 
of Nazi origin, men made a common practice of "looting" anything catching their 
fancy, obviously with no regard for civil property. This again illustrates soldiers' 
moral and ethical change. Because the man who wrote the letter had been 
involved in "mischief', he knew what was occurring was basically wrong, but it was 
totally acceptable in the abnormal world of combat. Accordingly, there was nothing 
wrong with partaking in the looting, and then even telling his parents about it. 
Because Gls own interests were supreme, and they in essence set the 
standards of behavior, anything they wanted they took, as long as they could 
feasible care for it. In their state of mind, their conscience did not stop them from 
looting, and in most situations, neither did their officers who often had the same 
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intention. 173 "The guys would go through houses and take anything they wanted. 
There wasn't anything said about it. "174 Another veteran experienced the same. 
"We all stold[sic]. In general, everything that was German was free game."175 
Although, looting was not only confined to Germany; looting occurred most 
anywhere Gls fought, even in Allied countries. 176 However there were times when 
soldiers were deterred from looting, booby traps always made men leery. "It was 
hard telling what you'd find. You had to be careful for booby traps." 177 This was 
similar to what another veteran said, "you might roll a guy over and try to rob his 
wallet, or wrist watch. Then they would blow up on you."178 There were also times 
when there was nothing left to loot. 
You've got to remember that a house that's had Germans in it, and 
then Allies in it, and then Germans in it, and then Allies in it, and 
then its been hit with artillery and bombs. There's just not much 
left. 179 
Nevertheless, for an example of how powerful the attraction of collecting war 
booty actually was, see Appendix J. 
Another distraction, similar in nature to looting souvenirs, was looting 
consumables, "scavenging" for food and drink. 180 Official rations typically provided 
soldiers with adequate nourishment, but it was never good enough in quality, or 
quantity. "We were always hungry."181 Accordingly, Gls always supplemented their 
rations. In doing so they had an insatiable appetite for anything different, anything 
"for a change."182 When not in an engagement, but nevertheless still at the front, 
men were obsessed with searching, even hunting, for food. One recollection 
illustrates the collective experience, chickens and eggs were a favorite. 
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Guys would check the chicken houses for eggs all the time .... We 
butchered a chicken once in a while too, when we would get the 
time. 183 
Two other veterans spoke of fishing by throwing hand grenades into the water 
then collecting the dead fish after the explosion. 184 It also was not unheard of for 
men to kill deer, cattle, or pigs and then butcher them for food. 185 
In many situations it was the civilian who had little or no food, and it was the 
GI that gave them food, if they had it to spare and were permitted. 186 One veteran 
recalled, "the fact is, most of those people didn't have any food."187 However, in 
some situations when civilians did have food, no matter how little or even when 
hidden, this did not stop Gls from devouring it. A soldier's letter from the 
Rhineland on February 16, 1945 illustrates this. 
I found a half a bushel of apples in a farmer's tool shed. They didn't 
last long after we got through them. Also took care of his turnips 
and onions too. Ha! On German soil so why not. 188 
Never knowing if they would live to eat another day, Gls binged and gorged 
themselves whenever they had the opportunity, which is one manifestation of their 
hedonistic impulses. Supplementing food functioned as a distraction that satisfied 
Gls physical needs, and also some of their wants. 189 
Another want of the GI was alcohol, accordingly soldiers spent considerable 
amounts of free time looking for it. One veteran recalled looking for food, and 
looking for alcohol, was "about half and half."190 Another man commented on this 
common distraction. 
144 
When we were on the move, there were a lot of old boozers in there, 
jokers always looking for liquor. Every house we went into, the first 
thing they did was pull the cabinet doors open looking for liquor. 191 
Another man recalled, "if they could find anything they would [drink it]." This same 
man remembered how his unit learned to look in the attics for hidden bottles of 
liquor that would normally have been found in cellars. 192 The search for alcohol 
was a distraction that often had positive results. One veteran held the opinion the 
"most rewarding diversion was the search for booze. "193 Alcohol could act as an 
anodyne, aiding men in enjoying themselves and enabling them to temporarily 
forget their problems. 194 However, most Gls were not drunkards, with survival the 
foremost concern the majority knew alcohol was permissible in moderation, but as 
always, not in excess. Several men were dead set against drinking alcohol in 
combat situations, it was too dangerous when life depended on constant vigilance. 
One man said they drank alcohol when near the rear, but "not on the line. "195 
Another man recalled, "we were smart enough .... We didn't want to be out there 
fighting and be half drunk."196 Another man held the same attitude. 
You didn't want to go out there with people shooting at you, and you 
be drunk. I figured that was the wrong place to have any kind of 
liquor. The fact is, I was afraid of it. I never wanted to touch any of 
the damned stuff. A lot of the guys got sick. 197 
Similar to bad alcohol, there were always problems associated with 
overindulgence. Intoxication was noted as the largest contributing factor to crime 
and misbehavior in the ET0. 198 It was also a contributing factor to accidents, 
alcohol in excess always had the tendency to be dangerous. One man recalled 
an instance were two soldiers were killed by a nervous sentry. The two were "out 
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boozing" and forgot the password, and when questioned made the fatal mistake 
of running. 199 
An anodyne that typically accompanied alcohol, but used to an even greater 
extent, was cigarette smoking. Almost all Gls smoked cigarettes during the war. 
"About all of us smoked."200 Only one man in this sample did not smoke, and he 
knew he was a rarity. "I never ever smoked cigarettes."201 In an age when 
smoking was glorified and a sign of true grit; young men belonged when they 
smoked. Even if the health risks were readily known, it would not have been a big 
concern for men in their situation, they enjoyed smoking too much. Several men 
spoke of relaxing and passing the time with a cigarette. Even smoking afforded 
Gls with a temporary respite and distraction from the fight. Like one veteran 
thought, "it seemed like a smoke calmed your nerves .... I don't know if it did, but 
it gave us something to do."202 Accordingly, cigarettes were an essential 
component of good morale. When one veteran's unit ran out, they almost rioted 
before they were re-supplied. 203 
Another valuable source of distractions for the GI was the often elusive, but 
the always pleasing "joys of fraternization."204 Soldiers lucky enough to be 
involved in the liberation of Allied lands were often swept away in the jubilant 
celebrations that followed. However, even these high spirited moments were 
fleeting as the GI always moved on. 205 It was nothing near the fashion of meetings 
in Allied countries, but despite being prohibited, Gls never stopped fraternizing with 
German civilians. 206 It must be noted that contact with German civilians took place 
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on no great scale until after the Rhine crossings in March, 1945. Before this time 
many German civilians had evacuated from the west bank of the Rhine, but 
afterwards there was no place to flee, and it was also necessary to deal with the 
exodus from the east escaping the Soviets. As a result, most fraternization 
occurred in the latter stages of the war when Gls were commonly billeting in 
German houses. 
What one man experienced illustrates how fraternization could allow men 
to enjoy the finer pleasures of life in the middle of war. Billeted in a house of a 
German family (a medical doctor, his wife, and two teen-age daughters) a friend 
approached the man and said the daughters were 
'going on about how un-cultured American soldiers are. Why don't 
you go over and play the piano for them.' So I went over and played 
the piano for them. Here I am with a Tommy gun across my back, 
and hand grenades in my pockets, playing piano for these two pretty 
women. We had a very pleasant time. . . . I was playing some 
classical music for them. It's one of those incongruous things that 
happens only in war. 207 
It was the unusual things like this that Gls needed and always thrived on. 
Obviously distractions from the misery were the best when pleasurable, and there 
was little else better than female companionship. One veteran experienced a 
situation enjoyable in civilian life and heaven in a combat zone. Occupying a 
German home late in the war with a group of young German women, his unit 
made themselves a party. With no young German men around the women were 
excited about the Gls, along with their cigarettes and rations. At the same time 
the men were enthralled at the sight of women, and thus decided to break out their 
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alcohol to lighten things up even more. With a chance to live out their youth, the 
young men and women spent the rest of the evening drinking, smoking, dancing, 
and flirting. "You could communicate, and have a good time." However, 
disappointing for the men who had more than that on their minds, all they did was 
communicate. 208 
What these soldiers had on their minds, was what all Gls were obsessed 
with: sex, but more aptly the lack of sex. Sex was one thing that was more 
pleasurable than mere female companionship, however it was also rarer. None 
of the infantrymen in this paper spoke of personal sexual encounters in their time 
in combat. This was also consistent with the majority of veterans' personal 
biographies. 209 One man recalled, in most situations, "you didn't see any women 
in the first place. "210 However, towards the war's end there were more women to 
be found, especially in the larger German cities. Other than after the war, most 
likely if a GI was fortunate to find a consenting women, this was time. Not only 
were German women were available, but also the multitudes of displaced women. 
These hungry, deprived women were hardly averse to prostitution. "The slave labor 
women ... would do anything for food. They would give their bodies for food, for 
clothing, for anything."211 Nevertheless, sexual deprivation was the norm the 
overwhelming majority of time. The individual whose squad smoked and drank 
with the young German women, came the closest to having sex, as far as the men 
in this sample revealed. It turned out this man was even stymied. 
One night I had a little gal in bed and she was wrapped ... with 
some kind of cloth all over down there so you couldn't get anywhere 
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near close to her .... She did that on purpose. She kind of outwitted 
me.212 
Another time men had a better opportunity for contact with women was on 
rest and recuperation. However, R&R was another thing most usually went 
without. If men were fortunate to survive long enough, they might have had a day 
or two rest off the line in a rest area every month or two. 213 From the twelve men 
in this sample, only one was sent on R&R to an exotic location. This man said he 
"lucked out", and won a raffle giving him and a few other's in his unit three days 
leave in Paris while the rest of their unit stayed on the line. However, other than 
sightseeing, his biggest adventure was having his new combat jacket stolen. 214 
For those few that had the opportunity, R&R was a valuable distraction. Men were 
relatively out of danger, and with this respite from fear soldiers could let down their 
guard and totally relax, possibly partaking in the previously described pleasures 
of fraternization. Although in the real life of an infantryman, R&R was mostly an 
unanswered wish. 
Already established, this was often the same for sex, and this fact 
sometimes caused problems. The man who said he was in bed with a women, 
knew what he wanted but did not push the issue when the woman did not agree. 
However, some soldiers did push women against their will and resort to rape. Two 
men referred to instances where they knew cases of rape occurred. One knew 
some of the men in his company had committed the crime. 
I have known a couple of guys that committed rape over there. It did 
happen a few times where I was. I really don't think there was a lot 
of it, but there was some I know. 215 
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How some soldiers could not control themselves is also part of the reality of the 
collective experience. For the criminal element always present in the ranks, rape 
might satisfy their unfulfilled urges. Alcohol could also play a large role in this type 
of misbehavior. This was the case for what one man experienced making his way 
into a German town while under artillery fire. While running and then ducking in 
between shellbursts, a distressed middle-aged German man gained his attention 
by frantically motioning for him to look inside his home. Looking inside the house 
he saw another GI trying to rape a women. 
He had this guy's wife down on the couch. He was drinking, he was 
about two-thirds looped . . . and trying to tear the clothes off this 
lady. After I saw what the situation was, I saw the 35th Division 
patch on his shoulder, I said, 'soldier, what the hells a matter with 
you.' He started to rattle something off about the woman .... I said, 
'you can't do that, now get the hell out of here and leave these 
people alone. 216 
This soldier pushed the other out the door to the gratitude of the smiling man and 
crying woman, "danke, danke", the man repeated as the soldier went on his way. 
After the fact rapes were often swept under the rug by the culprit's fellows, but if 
they could be stopped in progress they sometimes were. 217 
More common than the slight possibility of consensual sex, Gls found 
pleasure and were distracted from worry in several more significant ways. One 
way was through what is described as one of the "secret attractions of war": Gls 
"delight with seeing.''218 In their bizarre surroundings soldiers were intrigued, even 
excited, with the previously unseen, the outlandish things they could never see in 
civilian life. Veterans know war offers plenty as a "spectacle. "219 Seeking out the 
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unusual and unexplored broke up the monotony, while satisfying inquisitive minds. 
For example, two men said they looked inside knocked out tanks. After that they 
never looked again, but they still had the initial desire to look. One man gave the 
reason why his unit stopped what they were doing, climbed on up the tank, and 
peered inside. "You wanted to see what was going on, curiosity."220 
What two other veterans did illustrates how insensitivity helped men satisfy 
their curiosities. The two said as soldiers they were interested with finding out 
more about certain items of the German soldiers' uniform and equipment. They 
discovered it easiest to find out what they wanted to know by checking out 
German corpses. One veteran remembered how 
the Germans had a backpack that had a fur piece on the back of it, 
and I don't know what it was for. Whether it zipped up over their 
head or what. ... I reached down one time to take a better look at 
that pack .... I don't know why guys pick things up. 221 The German 
soldier always had a funny looking water or coffee container. They 
had a funny looking round one that looked something like a juice 
can, and it looked to me like it had two lids on it. I had to investigate 
one of them one time .... I wondered 'how in the hell do they get 
that drink out of there.' ... We had to check all that stuff out. 222 
The word "we" indicates that checking out German equipment was a group activity. 
After winning an engagement Gls had to make sure the enemy was truly dead, 
which was a good time to look over their former foe and study and rate them. 
One veteran's experience is a prime example of how spectacles could 
distract attention away from combat's reality: death. Clearing mines from the 
roadway before a German town which his unit, and a unit of tanks, planned on 
entering a German sniper shot and killed one of the men. 
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There was a guy out there looking around, and all of a sudden he 
just, ugh, fell over dead. One of the guys in the tank said: 'that 
church steeple!' [The shot came from the church steeple.] ... They 
just blew hell out of that church steeple and it was funny .... The 
bell started ringing gong, gong, gong, while the church was coming 
down .... It was kind of funny to be standing there watching that 
church fall down, and all the time the church was coming down the 
bell was ringing .... I laughed about that bell ringing. Now why 
that's so funny I don't know. 223 
Why this man, and the rest of his unit, thought this was funny was not only 
a result of their "delight in seeing" the spectacles, but also another "secret 
attraction of war", the "delight in destruction."224 Soldiers often found it thrilling to 
see the damage they could inflict, another thing they could never see or do as 
civilians. The fact their target was a church compounded this; in their mixed up 
world, the more bizarre the better, it was too surreal to be taken seriously. 
Significant about this is how this sight and the sound of the bell overshadowed the 
death of the GI, therefore this memory is associated with humor, not sorrow. 
Other veteran's experiences illustrate this "delight in destruction." The first 
example is the individual in the anti-tank squad that used their 57 mm gun once, 
for target practice in Frankfurt. He thought "it was exciting" to see the destructive 
firepower of their weapon when his squad scored hits on their targets. At the time 
it made no difference the targets were civilian homes. How they could delight in 
this, like the destruction of the church, again shows Gls' moral lapse. These men 
had to enjoy their shots that hit on target, they were doing their job well. They 
could not and did not concern themselves with the homes they destroyed, or the 
civilians they might have injured or killed. 225 
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Three other men commented on this same feeling of exhilaration with 
firepower and destruction. For one man it came when his squad spotted a 
German ammo truck on an open stretch of road and opened fire with their M-1 
rifles using armor piercing rounds. When hit the ammunition onboard ignited 
causing a brilliant explosion. His squad was impressed with the results after they 
inspected the burning vehicle. "That's the first time I saw what those armor 
piercing shells could do. "226 Another veteran's experience also originated with the 
57 mm anti-tank gun. He used the same adjective as his counterpart in another 
anti-tank unit, "exciting", to explain the feeling of destroying German observation 
posts. 227 Why it was "exciting", and not scary or terrifying, was in these situations 
they were doing their job in relative safety. Houses and observation posts do not 
shoot back. Another soldier had the opportunity to enjoy shooting an object that 
offered no resistance. In the Ardennes his squad had bazooka target practice on 
a knocked-out German Tiger tank. Each soldier had two shots and always making 
the situation amusing, they made it a contest to see who was the best shot. "We 
got a big kick out of that. "228 
"Delight with destruction" also came in the form of deliberate destruction of 
property. One veteran seeing such instances could only describe his fellow 
soldiers who participated as "berserkers and mad destroyers. "229 Two veterans in 
this sample used the term, "wanton destruction", to characterize soldier's actions 
when they got out of line, and purposely destroyed objects. 230 One said, 
there was quite a bit of destruction, a wanton destruction . . . 
unnecessarily destroying property, mostly in Germany. That's 
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something I saw several times. I remember going by a house in 
Germany ... and some Gls must have ransacked the house and 
just thrown everything, practically everything out of the house. I 
picked up a book there and brought it along because it was 
something very unusual. I still have it. 231 
This man only saw examples of wanton destruction, but another veteran 
spoke of a situation where he, and other men in his squad, lost control of their 
tempers and participated in "wanton destruction" of their own. Their company had 
just captured a town, but they also took casualties in the process. Saying the men 
were mad is an understatement. The individual said they were all "ornery" while 
checking houses for hiding Germans. In their outrage, many of the soldiers 
released their anger with destruction. One of the men noticed a telephone still 
intact so he pulled it out of the wall, shouting the people would never again talk to 
Adolph. In a fit of rage the soldier telling the story threw a clay bust of Hitler into 
a nice Grandfather clock, smashing both items. 232 Actions like this were often 
ignited by casualties, the anger and frustration over the loss of buddies. As one 
veteran described it, men were "blinded by rage to destroy."233 This was both a 
distraction and a way for soldiers to cope; it gave them something else to think 
about other than their losses, and it blew off steam. 
Another veteran spoke of an example of "wanton destruction", but on a 
much greater scale. This occurred after his unit had sustained casualties during 
a battalion size engagement over a small German town. The town changed hands 
several times in the early morning hours in what the man called a "hard fought 
battle." Once the battalion finally secured the town, soldiers did whatever they 
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could to try to live with their losses. Suddenly, this individual, who was standing 
in the street, saw a piece of furniture fall out of a building's third floor window 
crashing onto the street. The first piece was followed by another, and then 
another, and then several more pieces of furniture came crashing down. A crowd 
quickly gathered; with their delight in seeing the spectacles, soldiers had to get 
an eyeful. The man recalled his emotions at the time. 
I was in great glee just watching it happen . . . it was rather 
interesting. Pretty soon guys were carrying furniture up to the third 
floor to drop out. At first it was just dropping the furniture that was 
on the third floor. And then the second floor, and then the first floor. 
And then they were bringing furniture up just to see it drop. 234 
Once these Gls cleaned out the building, they denuded the nearby houses of their 
furniture to be used as playthings. The men only stopped when they became 
exhausted from carrying all the furniture up the stairs. This is a prime example of 
both "wanton destruction" and "delight with destruction." 
Taking place in a battalion area, and since it lasted about thirty minutes, 
one may ask why senior officers, especially a major or captain, did not stop this 
flagrant display of misconduct. When asked what the officers in charge did about 
this, the man said the officers had the attitude of "so what. They're not hurting 
anybody."235 Another veteran, a former sergeant in charge of eleven men, recalled 
the same attitude in similar situations. "Things get a little crazy at times. You 
overlook a lot of it. "236 Men in charge realized it was not advantageous to try to 
stop the majority if they were bent on destruction, it would deny them their 
pleasure. This previous incident most likely started with soldiers' rage, but 
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snowballed into a mischievous prank, combat style. The individual looked at the 
incident this way. "It was a way to pass the time, and sort of a vengeance I 
assume on the town. . . . The German people were living in a glass house 
weren't they. "237 
Looking back on this incident, this man now must also look at this from the 
other side. He had to admit, "it doesn't speak well for us does it. ... If it was my 
furniture today I would have been upset."238 How this occurred, and then how it 
was allowed, is testimony to the change of men in combat. Men had no concern 
for German possessions, or for how they would be viewed by history. The 
immediate present was all that mattered. Incidents like this, the malicious ways 
men passed their time, are another part of the war not told by the U.S. Army 
series. The book, The Siegfried Line Campaign, portrayed the events of the battle 
for the town, but made no mention of the delight in "wanton destruction."239 
Another aspect of Gls' "delight with destruction" needs to be addressed. 
One source asserted the "ultimate destruction is killing another human being. "240 
One situation where men might experience the feeling of delight was when an 
active enemy sniper would be rooted out and shot. Men often felt satisfied when 
snipers were killed, especially if they had wounded or killed close friends. One 
veteran reminisced on his feelings when snipers were shot, "good, they got what 
they deserved. "241 It was often the soldier who actually shot the sniper who felt 
best about his soldierly performance. When Gls killed the enemy preventing 
further bloodshed of their own, they often felt a sense of "pride and sense of 
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accomplishment. "242 For an example, one soldier who shot a sniper that had killed 
several of his fellow soldiers was "so delighted" that he jumped up and down, and 
verbally "gave all the German's hell. "243 
There was the same exhilaration when soldiers demonstrated their skills as 
expert rifle marksmen, killing the enemy with long range shots. Like one soldier 
who shot a German and then proceeded to jump and shout in delight, "I got him! 
I got him!"244 It was not unusual to hear "whoops and shouts", "catcalls", and 
"cheers" when unsuspecting Germans were caught in the open and killed by rifle 
fire. 245 However, not all soldiers delighted in the destruction of the enemy, but for 
many, the true delight was in their own survival. Inspecting the perimeter of his 
front line a battalion commander witnessed this incident. 
A stretch of farmland along the bottom of the ravine was in full view, 
as we watched, three or four Germans appeared, trudging along in 
single file .... Very much as in a shooting gallery, one of our 
riflemen crumpled them into gray bundles .... The rifleman who had 
done the shooting had a wolfish grin; the rest looked on without 
speaking. There were few avid killer in our ranks. 246 
That there were "few avid killers" is supported by experiences of most 
veterans in this sample, however there were those very few avid killers. These 
soldiers were so uncommon they stood out, only one veteran spoke of a soldier 
like this. He was a seventeen year old who lied about his age to get into the 
army, the man characterized him as an "eager beaver." The "eager beaver" 
enjoyed keeping count of how many he shot, and then notching his rifle whenever 
he added to his tally. He also found humor every morning by waking everyone up, 
saying it was time to "go kill some more krauts. "247 There is evidence there were 
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soldiers that kept count of how many they shot, as notches on their rifle butts 
confirm. 248 However, when most had to kill, if at all, the real delight came in their 
own survival. 
Two veterans spoke of this feeling. One said, 
if we were pinned down by a tank that was hidden in a part of a 
building, or a machine gun in a German building, and the artillery, or 
air force would knock it out. There would be a good hurrah. 249 
Soldiers often experienced this relief and rejoicing when the enemy was destroyed, 
"it's much the same way as a point after touchdown I guess, it's one for our 
side. "25° Feelings and actions like these were the cathartic release of the pent-up 
fear and stress, unleashed when soldiers suddenly realized they again prevailed. 
Another individual's experience illustrates the delight with survival. This 
veteran, from the 29th Division, mentioned a firefight in Normandy when his 
squad's BAR man saved several soldiers' lives. He recreated the situation: 
we were going across an open field and there was a hedgerow all 
around the field. Up ahead of us, the Germans had cut out a slice 
out of it [the hedgerow] and had a machine gun planted in there. Of 
course they were waiting for us to get out in that field before they 
opened up, which they did .... I don't know how many people got 
hit ... but they kept firing at us, and Brady was right behind me, he 
was the BAR man. He opened up with that BAR and he wiped out 
that machine gun nest. Boy I'm telling you, bullets were just flying 
around me. He was behind me about ten yards or so and every shot 
he fired it just seemed like it was going to hit me right in the back of 
the head .... He saved us that day. He saved a lot of us, not just 
me.251 
The instant after this happened this individual realized the significance of this act. 
He suddenly felt the need to repay his buddy in the only way he knew how. He 
had planned on taking home as a souvenir the Nazi dagger taken from the 
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German prisoner he captured. When taking the dagger from the prisoner the BAR 
man, Brady, commented on how much he like the dagger, and how he would like 
to have one like it. Therefore, as a gesture of his gratitude for the job well done, 
he gave his well deserving buddy the dagger. 
I just pulled it out, and pitched it over to him, 'that's yours.' I said. 
. . . Brady was wanting that you know. 252 
What was obviously most important was the soldier saved the squad, their survival 
is where they found delight. 
For those Gls fortunate to have survived and kept up with their unit, on May 
8, 1945 they experienced what was to that point their greatest delight in 
destruction. Victory in Europe and the destruction of Nazism, what all Gls had 
fought and died for, finally arrived. Rehabilitating in a hospital in Belgium, one 
soldier wrote his wife about the outstanding news. 
This is the day we all have been waiting for .... The boys here are 
quite happy. They rang the church bells in town [Cine, Belgium] and 
the train came by and really gave the whistle. . . . The guys can 
hardly wait ... they will no doubt go on a pass in town and get really 
soused.253 
Situations like this were the same in all units. Once the realization set in 
that Germany finally was defeated, men also experienced a delight with survival, 
this time to a level never felt before. They were successful in their individual 
personal war. One soldier wrote his emotions in his wartime journal. "I have 
made it! ... I, me, myself.''254 Men in all units now had a good reason to rejoice, 
accordingly they "celebrated the evening.''255 The majority of veterans used the 
same word to describe the events that occurred on the night of May 8: 
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"celebration."256 If they had access to alcohol it often flowed to excess, drinking 
was a part of most all celebrations as one veteran could attest. "We burst into 
some cellars and came up with all sorts of goodies and we had a big party."257 
The war in Europe was over, but it still took hardened soldiers some getting 
used to the idea they were no longer in combat. There was no more "black out" 
on the line, also no sound of the distant rumblings of war, men found the silence 
unusual. Men even felt odd being able to light and smoke a cigarette in the dark 
with no worries. 258 However, men could not be too overjoyed, just because the 
war was officially over they were not totally out of danger. There were Nazi 
fanatics still intent of waging a war of their own. On May 9, while one man was 
getting a haircut, a sniper's bullet missed him only by "inches." Fortunately the 
sniper was killed before he shot anyone, but men still had to be on their guard, 
wary of their former enemy.259 Soldiers had to be wary of the former battleground 
as well. One veteran witnessed an ambulance roll over an anti-tank mine, killing 
two medics, days after the war's end.260 
No time for exultation, the euphoria of victory in Europe quickly passed and 
reality set in. The war was only half finished. The other enemy, Japan, still had 
to be defeated and Gls were obligated to serve "for the duration." Accordingly, 
towards the end of the war in Europe, soldiers started worrying about fighting the 
Japanese. What had been rumors, and then confirmed by the army newspaper 
Stars and Stripes, was that infantrymen were needed from Europe to fight the 
Japanese. One man remembered this concern. 
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There was a lot of talk about going to Japan. I was sweating it out 
I sure was .... Of course rumors abound and we were pretty well 
convinced the last few months of the war in Europe that we would 
be committed as a division [the 34th Division committed to Japan].261 
His trepidation was for naught; for he considered himself lucky when it became 
known the 34th Division was not picked to go to Japan.262 However, thousands 
of Gls were sent back to the U.S. to train for the planned invasion. Accordingly, 
out of the men in this sample that were physically able, half of them were selected 
to participate in the expected fighting. 263 
The four men interviewed slated to go to Japan all returned to the U.S. by 
the first week of June 1945, less than one month after VE-day. These men had 
earned the privilege of a one month furlough to go home and re-acquaint 
themselves with their families. However, after the furlough the men were required 
to report back to their unit for "jungle training" before leaving for the Pacific. 264 
After what they had lived through, these combat veterans were not enthusiastic 
about going to Japan, they had enough of combat. One veteran's understatement 
illustrates the collective attitude, he said his unit was "very unhappy .... We 
thought we had to do it again."265 
Another individual knew a man even more unhappy than most. When they 
received their furlough his friend told him with all seriousness, "I'm not going to 
Japan." He wondered if he would ever see his friend again, but when the time 
came he did. He reported back to their unit like everyone else, reluctant, but 
ready to fight when required. 266 However, Gls were no longer needed, Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki determined this. The final delight with destruction, the two atomic 
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bombs termination of the war, saved unknown thousands of Gls from death and 
injury. "That stopped our trip to Japan", one man said with great relief. 267 
Exactly as in the past, Gls would have fought if ordered, even the man who 
once said, "I'm not going to Japan." His actions illustrate the "reluctant obedience" 
of the collective mentality. Gls would gripe and complain, but do what was 
necessary in the safest and most careful way possible. 
CONCLUSION 
My paper demonstrates how the collective mentality gave Gls the will and 
ability to persevere and withstand the horrors of combat. The determination to 
keep fighting resulted from the quintessential aspect of the collective mentality: the 
goal of returning home with their honor intact, presupposing survival. Common 
virtues were loyalty to one's buddies and pride in upholding the respect of these 
men. For the vast majority, desertion and the repercussions in both military and 
civilian life of a dishonorable discharge was unacceptable. Therefore, when 
needed soldiers discovered untapped reserves of energy. One veteran 
commented on this surge, "you pick up energy when you know things have to be 
done."1 
The "good times" soldiers experienced most always came in the form of 
camaraderie; they also functioned as distractions from the misery helping to make 
combat bearable. Men thrived on the powerful sustenance of friendships, 
especially humor. In the hour by hour mundane struggle for existence a respite 
and diversion, where soldiers were not worrying but instead enjoying the fruits of 
camaraderie, was invaluable. Distractions facilitated one's ability to persevere 
whether a personal distraction, letter reading and writing is one example, or a 
group distraction, like chasing down a chicken to cook and eat or dropping German 
furniture three floors. 
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Like their expanded sense of humor (such as frozen enemy corpses as 
sentries), what soldiers did as distractions offers proof of their transient moral and 
ethical lapse. Looting, the "delight in seeing", "delight in destruction", and 
especially "wanton destruction" are other prime examples. "Wanton destruction" 
often resulted from the rage over the death of friends, but was also spawned by 
the aggravation and frustration associated with soldiers' "reluctant obedience." 
When tempers reached a point they could no longer be restrained soldiers had to 
release the anger and frustration of knowing they could be killed anytime, but they 
had to fight on. 
Destroying much of a German town's furniture for spite and thrills illustrates 
how soldiers' adjustment was totally essential if they were to enjoy the outrageous 
things they found amusing. "It doesn't speak well for us does it", said the man 
who witnessed this example delight in "wanton destruction."2 Men in all units 
reacted to combat in the same way; several veterans noticed the "unsavory moral 
change" that came over soldiers in combat. 3 One man's unit came to this 
conclusion while still in combat. He write how his unit had a "discussion of our 
failure as an invading army to present a favorable picture of ourselves . . . all 
types behaved badly."4 Another veteran made the same observation, "the hell of 
it was, in that war we forgot to remember what was right and what was wrong."5 
Reflecting on the atrocities that occurred, another man agreed, "we weren't 
thinking too well."6 Forced to make this adjustment soldiers could permit nothing 
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to interfere with their survival and positive fighting spirit, not their previous moral 
standards, not their emotions, nor their fears. 
Young American men were fighting for what cannot be denied as a noble 
cause, nevertheless, once involved in the fight, these men demonstrated how they 
were not above the moral corruption produced by war. This is demonstrated by 
the atrocities and brutalities committed against German soldiers, along with the 
essentially criminal acts committed against the civilian population and their 
property. The results of Gls' actions, who had a good cause and intention, are 
testimony to the evils of war and why these men fought for peace (see Appendix 
K). 
War's impact on its participants is part of the peculiar wartime paradox: how 
combat produced the best and worst experiences of the participants lives. One 
veteran characterized his experiences as the "ultimate depth and height" of his 
life. 7 Like so many others, despite all the "terrible" things one man experienced, 
he still said, "it's the greatest experience I had in my lifetime." However, because 
it was so "terrible" he had to admit, "but I wouldn't want anybody to go through it."8 
Another veteran felt quite the same, "it was quite an experience. . . . I wouldn't 
take a million dollars for what I experienced, but I wouldn't want to do it again for 
a million dollars."9 Another comment illustrates the collective experience. "It 
wasn't all bad, but I wouldn't want to do it again."10 
Combat fluctuated, usually very rapidly and frequently, between two 
extremes: between the defining apex of soldiers lives, and the nadir of their terror 
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and misery. The Allies' victory over Hitler's murderously repressive regime and 
expansionistic ideology, however marred by the atrocities and moral degradation 
is another example of this paradox. The development and then violent and 
unnatural termination of friendships is another. Friendships, camaraderie, and 
humor created unequaled memories of the simple joyous things in life, but 
veterans can never quit grieving for what is impossible for them to forget: the 
suffering and loss of life of so many good friends. 11 
The pleasure and excitement of Gls' "delight in seeing" was similar. A man 
who saw parts of the world he felt he would not have otherwise seen, described 
his experience as "wonderful. . . . I wouldn't take anything for it. It was exciting 
to see all that stuff. "12 Another veteran commented on this aspect of the collective 
experience. "There were a lot of good sights. You see a lot of good things too." 13 
Nevertheless, always homesick, soldiers always desired to get home to the ones 
they loved. Regardless of the fascinating sights they saw in the process, men 
fought to resume their interrupted life and escape the deprivation, the fear, and 
savagery of combat. One veteran's statement illustrates this. "We saw a lot of 
stuff. I was in Rome three times. . . . But you feel like, 'so what' , you're wanting 
to get back home. "14 
How G Is had many of their best experiences of life, and created unmatched 
bonds of friendships with strangers they met entirely by chance, verifies the 
existence of the collective mentality. First of all, without their moral and emotional 
insensitivity, men never would have had the state of mind to find pleasure amidst 
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the madness. This adjustment allowed soldiers to experience "good times" and 
anything near "wonderful" in such a terribly abnormal situation. 15 Then according 
to the other facet of their way of thinking soldiers accentuated all aspects of life by 
exploiting any anodyne to the fullest degree; especially once they realized how 
quickly their life could be ended. 
That most veterans felt they had to readjust to civilian life also supports the 
validity of the collective mentality. Once away from combat men made an effort 
to forget the vile aspects of war and start over; they could be themselves again, 
and regain their civilian moral standards. One man commented, "after the fact, I 
think people pretty much revert to what they were before the fact." 16 Another 
veteran's opinion illustrates this collective readjustment. "I was an altogether 
different person in combat than I was before or after. . . . We were in artificial 
atmosphere over there. Once the war was over we went back to our old ways."17 
Combat nevertheless left lastingimpressions on the minds of the 
participants. Veterans were compensated in some manner for what they endured 
by the retention of the positive qualities developed during their ordeal; specifically 
patience, tolerance, self-assurance, and self-discipline. 
Appendix A 
Appropriately when studies focus on the individual soldier's perspective the 
strategy of the war assumes a secondary role. Most often Gls were not aware of 
the strategy behind their orders, they were far too preoccupied with staying alive. 
"You've got your own little foxhole and the area surrounding it and that's all you 
think about." # 20 Hill. The following veterans expressed the same opinion about 
their lack of knowledge concerning the strategy of war. "You didn't know 
nothing[sic]", said one man.# 25 Bowen.# 24 Breeze. #18 Everman. #17 Hoenes. 
#23 Hott. 
Appendix B 
"No one can understand the reality of war unless your there yourself. I can't really 
explain it to a person." #23 Hott. One soldier who fought in Italy stated: "I got a 
letter from my folks and my Mom said she was sure glad I wasn't up in Europe 
were all the fighting was going on. That's just because there wasn't as much 
[fighting in Italy] and the newspapers didn't play it up because it wasn't as exciting 
to read." #20 Hill. In a letter to his parents one GI informed them they will "never 
know just what its like when a big shell crashes through the roof of a building in 
which your trying to rest. Hell from start to finish Dad. Home folks will never know 
what it's like." Willis Bowen. Letter to parents. Transcript dated March 16, 1945. 
Appendix C 
The mentality of survival and the resulting desire to stay out of unnecessary 
danger saved a man's life the author otherwise would have never known, his 
grandfather. This occurred while he was temporarily dislocated from his unit after 
being sent to a rear-area aid station for a nagging knee injury. Once arriving at 
the aid station the medics rerouted him and in the process of trying to find the 
other aid station he got himself lost. He thus decided there was nothing else to 
do but walk back to where he knew his unit was when he left them. However, 
when he arrived to where they had been, his unit was gone. All he could do was 
head off down a road in the direction he believed his unit had gone. Walking 
down he began to hear explosions and small arms fire in the distance. He 
concluded the sound of battle was his unit involved in heavy fighting to occupy a 
town straddling the road ahead. Around that time a tank retriever came up the 
road and the driver stopped the vehicle and asked if it was the town of Rhienberg 
ahead, where he was needed to pick up some knocked out U.S. tanks. The GI 
was not positive of the name of the town, but he told the driver he did know there 
was some heavy fighting going on in the town. After an exchange of pleasantries 
this GI turned down the offer of a ride, the driver thought it would be easier than 
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walking. Considering what was going on around the town, this GI was totally 
content with walking and wasting as much time as possible in hope that the 
fighting would slack off. As a result the driver drove off to complete his duty, and 
the GI continued toward the town in a deliberately slow gate. Minutes later he 
heard a large explosion and noticed smoke bellowing above the road ahead. 
Quickening his pace to see what had happened, he soon discovered the tank 
retriever had hit an anti-truck mine and lay in the ditch in a mangled burning 
wreck. This GI looked over the truck for any sign of the driver and finally found 
the him amidst the wreckage, but he was beyond help. The driver was mortally 
wounded in the blast that totally destroyed the passengers side of the vehicle. 
Accordingly this man has always felt extremely lucky about the decision that he is 
positive saved his life. #25 Bowen. 
Appendix D 
When men were injured or wounded, often regardless of severity, they commonly 
experienced a long drawn out recovery period full of army red tape. The man shot 
in the upper part of his right arm spent a total of twenty-two months in and out of 
various hospitals in England and the U.S. After four operations this man still had 
a physical impairment he had to adjust to. Due to the wound the man can grip 
with his right hand, but nerve damage will not allow his muscles to retract his 
grasp. This is in addition to a restricted freedom of motion in his entire arm. 
Nevertheless, the man learned to overcome his difficulties and enjoy a happy 
life.#24 Breeze. The man that lost three toes to frostbite spent close to one year 
in various hospitals. After his foot healed from his operation he found out he 
needed to learn how to walk again without the aid of the balance three toes 
provide. For the first six months out of the hospital he was forced to walk with a 
cane, but he quickly learned how to adapt and walk normally. #19 Evermon. The 
man who was severely wounded by shrapnel from an artillery blast spent over one 
year recovering in a hospital bed. His injuries required the doctors to remove three 
of his ribs, his spleen, and parts of his small intestines. How this man fully 
recovered and has lived well into his seventies is testimony to the resilience of the 
human body. #9 Kingery. The other man that was wounded by shrapnel received 
not as severe wounds to his elbow and the side of his back. He was wounded in 
late October 1944 and remained in a hospital in England until the spring of 1944. 
His wounds nevertheless kept him from being sent back to his unit until the war 
was over in May. #15 Hott. The man hospitalized for his knee injury spent the 
months of April and May 1945 rehabilitating until he was sent back to his unit in 
June. #8 Bowen. 
Appendix E 
The personal experiences of the veterans in this sample verify that in an infantry 
division rifle companies had a higher rate of attrition than rear area units, such as 
headquarters companies, anti-tank companies, and medical companies. The only 
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two men who were original members of rifle companies both sustained wounds in 
action. #23 Hott. #24 Breeze. Moreover, evidence that soldiers in the rifle 
companies bore the brunt of the casualties is that four of the five replacements 
polled were assigned to rifle companies. One of these replacements commented 
on how even in April 1945, when he entered the unit, because of prior losses his 
squad was never to full complement. He also added that since his division, the 
8th, had been in combat since North Africa not a single man was an original 
member of the unit, all the men he knew had been replacements as one time or 
another. #14 Brick. A replacement that went to the 34th Division, also in combat 
since North Africa, commented on the very same thing; all the men in his squad 
had been replacements. #18 Hill. One veteran's experience is a good indication 
of how one's chances of becoming a casualty was far greater in rifle companies 
than in rear-area units. This man was first made a replacement in an anti-tank 
unit, and in the month with this unit during the Battle of the Bulge they never 
suffered any casualties. However, after the losses the rifle companies incurred in 
the Ardennes, he was transferred into Company I, 137th Regiment to help fill the 
depleted ranks. When this man found out about his transfer he thought "well that's 
my tail ... I also got mad about it because I thought I had a better deal riding on 
the trucks." He quickly determined how much more dangerous it was in the rifle 
companies. His unit never suffered any wounded when he was in the anti-tank 
company, but in the rifle company he said "guys would get knocked down all the 
time." #8 Bowen. Another replacement that ended up as a truck driver in an anti-
tank squad felt lucky since he knew rifle companies were more dangerous and 
physically demanding. #12 Buser. A sergeant of an anti-tank squad said his 
squad suffered some casualties, but not as much as they would have if he had 
been in a rifle company. "I was fortunate, had I been in a line company I would 
have probably lost more." #1 O Mercer. A man that was a veteran of a 
headquarters company said that despite being only 500 to 800 yards behind the 
front lines, there was a "wide gulf' in the intensity of action and likelihood of 
becoming a casualty between his unit and the rifle companies. Bearing this out, 
five of the six men that served in rear-area units survived their entire tour of duty 
casualty free. #10 McKenna. #12 Buser. #16 Curran. #17 Hoenes. #21 Mercer. 
However, men in rear-area units were never totally immune to casualties, one 
veteran of an anti-tank unit suffered three wounds during his stay in combat. #9 
Kingery. 
Appendix F 
A sergeant of an anti-tank squad confirmed that confrontations between 57 mm 
anti-tank gun crews and German tanks were rare. This man was in combat seven 
months with the 95th Division, from October 1944 until the end of the war, and 
only fired on three German tanks under combat conditions. This man stressed 
that the 57 mm was more of defensive weapon, while the U.S. forces were most 
often on the offensive. #1 O Mercer. Another sergeant of an anti-tank squad said 
they used the weapon more often on enemy fortifications and observation towers 
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than against tanks. #9 Kingery. The other two veterans that were members of 
anti-tank units had no encounters with German tanks. One of these men was in 
his anti-tank squad from the 5th Division from late January until the war's end. 
#12 Buser. The other GI was in an anti-tank unit of the 35th Division for one 
month, between mid-December 1944 and mid-January 1945. #8 Bowen. Only two 
infantrymen in this sample mentioned combat involving German tanks. #15 Hott. 
#21 Mercer. Another source came to a similar conclusion. "The 29ers [men of the 
29th division] usually had little use for their anti-tank companies in combat since 
they rarely encountered German tanks." Balkosi, 116. 
Appendix G 
The following stories illustrate how the mentality of survival influenced men to 
disobey trivial orders they found intolerable. The following situation occurred when 
soldiers trapped behind enemy lines were ordered to make their way back to 
friendly forces. "They gave us orders to take our ammunition out of our guns and 
fix bayonets. We were going to fight our way out by hand. . . . We weren't 
supposed to shoot any of our own weapons." The soldiers had these orders since 
the sound of their rifles would give away their positions. Figuring they were 
outgunned it was better to try to sneak through. It turned out there was too much 
hype for nothing since the soldiers silently made it to their lines with no mishaps. 
The man recalled what his buddy told him after this. '"Whenever they told me to 
take my ammunition out, boy that jarred my teeth!' he said. I said, 'boy me too!' 
We got to talking and I don't think anybody took their ammunition out. ... I 
thought that was pretty good, no one was going to let anybody get close enough 
to us for us to have to stab them." #24 Breeze. Another man spoke of how the 
men in his unit kept their guns off of safety when in forested areas despite orders 
to the contrary. The men thought if they saw the enemy unexpectedly, because 
it was difficult to see in the thick forest, they needed to have a "quick shot back." 
#8 Bowen. Men aslo ignored regulations for convenience, anything to make their 
hard life a little easier. With all soldiers had to carry, one man said his unit often 
carried their K-rations inside their gas masks; this was if they even kept their gas 
mask at all. "You weren't supposed to do it, but everyone did." #15 Hott. 
Appendix H 
Men were often in a state of such utter exhaustion that they learned to sleep 
whenever and wherever possible. One man who said he had to learn to sleep with 
the eerie sound of combat made a statement that illustrates this. "You'd sleep 
whenever you got a chance. Everybody was as tired as could be." #14 Brick. 
"We could sleep anytime." #9 Kingery. Men that made similar comments are as 
follows. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #10 McKenna. #16 Curran. #17 Hoenes. #18 Hill. 
#21 Mercer. #23 Hott. Accordingly men often had to find sleep in odd places. 
One man recalled how he once slept in a bath tub, and another time he slept on 
top of a billiards table. #8 Bowen. Another man said some of the best sleep he 
had while in his ten days of combat came in a rain filled foxhole. #13 Breeze. 
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This man said he once slept in a "compost heap." #23 Hott. One veteran in an 
anti-tank unit recalled how the men developed ways they could sleep while on the 
move in their trucks. The trucks had canvas straps holding ammunition securely 
in place in the bed and he said the men would "fasten their belt around that strap 
and lay there on that ammunition ... They would sleep maybe four or five hours 
while we were driving." #9 Kingery. 
Appendix I 
Three veterans made use of the phrase "foxhole Christian." #3 McKenna. #14 
Brick. #25 Bowen. Several sources agree that soldiers thought of religion more 
often because of the real possibility of death. As one man said, "it made you think 
about things like that." #5 Buser. "A lot of the guys didn't think praying did any 
good until they got over there." #14 Brick. Another man said it was common to 
pray that one would not be killed or injured. #4 Curran. One source stipulated that 
"there are no atheists in the foxholes." Kennett, 138. The following sources agree 
that most men became more contemplative about religion and what comes after 
life. Astor, 210. Atwell, 317. Nevertheless, war's reality did make some men 
question there religious beliefs. Giles, 24. 
Appendix J 
This originates from when one veteran was the first GI into the home of a 
prominent member of the Nazi Government. "I was the first GI into the home of 
the Vice-Chancellor Franz van Poppen. I cut off the epaulets of his son's uniform 
and stuck them in my pocket." At the time he was "traveling very light" so he only 
took the epaulets. However, looking back on the situation he recalled "what I 
really regret ... is that he had a whole shelf of the Foreign Affairs Quarterly by the 
United States Department of State .... I regret that I never picked one of those 
up and brought it home." The attraction to collecting souvenirs, the spoils of war, 
was so powerful that this man had no question of his right to have taken what he 
wanted, regardless if it was another man's property. The irony of this story was 
that this man knew who van Poppen was while most others would not have know. 
"I don't suppose many of them [the other Gls] would have know much about him, 
but I had happened to read his biography years before." #1 O McKenna. 
Appendix K 
One veteran referred to World War II, as so many have, as the "good war." #12 
Buser. However, considering what actually happened, this is a problematic 
catchword. It is impossible to relate atrocities, looting, and the injustices that 
occurred to anything "good", but the war can be seen as "good" only in one sense: 
the end result. Gls were not fighting for conquest, they were fighting to turn back 
and defend against aggression. Gls fought and then went home, while the U.S. 
aided in the establishment of German self-government. Rather occupy and settle 
conquered lands, Gls went back to their homes and families, as peace loving 
civilians. Indicative of this is the life of one veteran who spent his entire life living 
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in the same rural farm house in which he was born in 1922. This man's bedroom 
even happens to be the same room where he was born. #12 Buser. One man 
had this to say about the so-called "good war." "God damn war, even the good 
one." Nichols, xiv. 
INTRODUCTION NOTES 
1. Stephen Ambrose. Band of Brothers: E Company. 506th Regiment. 
101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagles Nest. (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1992). Gerald Astor. A Blood-Dimmed Tide: The Battle of the Bulge by 
the Men Who Fought It. (New York: Donald I. Fine, Inc., 1992). John D. Campbell 
and Harold Lienbaugh, The Men of Company K. (New York: William Morrow and 
Company, 1985). Edwin P. Hoyt The Gl's War : U.S. Soldiers in Europe. (New 
York: McGraw and Hill Book Company, 1988). 
2. S. L. A. Marshall. Men Against Fire. (New York: William Morrow & 
Company, 1947) 22-6. 
3. Many historians presently believe their "main concern" is "recreating 
the mind sets, the mentalite' of the past; immersing themselves in the data so that 
they think, see, and feel in the way in which people with whom they were dealing 
saw and felt, and thus understanding why they did the things which they did." 
Michael Howard in Richard H. Kohn, "The Scholarship on World War II : Its 
Present Condition and Future Possibilities" The Journal of Military History 55 
(July 1991 ), 375-376. 
4. Several sources postulate the same basic principles as facilitating 
soldiers perseverance. Joseph Balkosi, Beyond the Beachhead : The 29th 
Division in Normandy. (New York: Dell Publishing, 1989), xi. John Ellis, The Sharp 
End of the War : The Fighting Man in World War 11. (London: David and Charles, 
1980), 241. Lee Kennett, GI : The American Soldier in World War II. (New York: 
Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1987) 138-143. Anthony Kellet, Combat Motivation 
: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle. (Boston: Kluwer Publishing, 1982), passim. 
S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire. 142. Bradford Perkins, "Impressions of 
Wartime" Journal of American History 77 (September, 1990), 566. Roger Spiller, 
"My Guns: A Memoir of the Second World War" American Heritage 42 
(December 1991 ), 49. Samuel Stouffer, The American Soldier : Combat and its 
Aftermath. Volume 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), 95-112. 
5. Samuel, Stouffer. The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army 
Life. Vol. 1 and Vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949). War 
Department. What the Soldier Thinks: A Digest of War Department Studies on 
the Attitudes of American Troops. December 1942-September 1945. 
173 
174 
6. Hoyt, xiii-xiv. Paul Fussell Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in 
World War 11. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) Fussell entitled one of 
his chapters "The Real War Will Never Get in the Books", 267-297. Kohn, 367. 
Spiller, 45-9. The most prominent sources that omit the more controversial items 
is the series published as the "U.S. Army in World War II." In this study the author 
will consult the following books within the subheading "European Theater of 
Operations." Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge. (U.S. Army in 
WW II, 1965). G.A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack. (U.S. Army in WW II, 1951). 
Charles MacDonald, The Last Offensive. (U.S. Army in WW II, 1973). Charles 
MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign. (U.S. Army in WW II, 1963). Lida Mayo, 
The Ordinance Department : On the Beachhead and Battlefront. (U.S. Army in 
World War II, 1968). Two commanders personal biographies also contain 
interesting omissions. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade In Europe (New York: 
Doubleday and Company, 1948). George S. Patton, War As I Knew It. (New 
York: Bantam Books, 1989, reprint of 1947 edition). 
7. Fussell, Wartime, 285. 
8. Fussell, 285. Kohn, 367. 
9. Spiller, 45-9. 
10. "Now it can be told I suppose." Robert Hill, Interview with author, # 
20 (10-13-92), Tape recording at Mattoon VFW Post #4325; "I shouldn't have told 
that on here[pointing to the tape recorder]." Oscar Hoenes, Interview with author, 
# 17 (10-10-92). Tape recording at interviewee's residence. 1109 South Lawn 
Drive, Mattoon, II. 
11. Paul Fussell, "The Real War 1939-45" in The Atlantic Monthly 
(August 1989) 34-40. Spiller, 45-9. 
12. Kohn, 382. Several recent studies focused on finding the truth about 
soldiers' personal experiences; to "tell it like it was. "Hoyt, xiii. One article was 
subtitled, "Seeking the answer to a simple and terrible question: What was it 
like?" Spiller, 45. Another author utilized letters to answer the "persisting question: 
What was the American experience like."Annette Tappert ed., Lines of Battle: An 
Anthology of Letters by American Servicemen. (New York: Times Books, 1987), 
viii. 
13. McKenna, Ray. Interview with author, # 10 (9-29-92). Tape 
recording at interviewee's residence. 2755 Whipporwill Drive, Charleston II. See 
also Appendix B. 
14. Kennett, 91. Fussell, in The Atlantic Monthly, 34. Spiller, 51. 
175 
15. Kennett, 66. 
16. Kennett, 66. Charles MacDonald. Company Commander. (New 
York: Bantam Books, 1987 reprint of 1947 edition), preface. Cawthon, xvii. 
17. U.S. Army Air Corps. Jay Knott, Interview with author, # 6 (3-27-92) 
Tape recording at interviewee's residence. 515 Hall Court, Charleston II. U.S. 
Navy. Clair McCall jr., Interview with author, # 2 (3-6-92). Tape recording at the 
Mattoon American Legion, Interviewee's residence 2609 Richmond. 
18. Kennett, ix. 
19. John Dollard, Fear in Battle. Washington DC: The Infantry Journal 
[Press], 1944. 
20. It is essential to point out however, that even within an Infantry 
division there were separate groupings of men that would again engender a more 
distinctive collective experience. For example, infantry replacements as whole have 
more of a distinct collective experience than that of men who were members of a 
division's original complement. This distinction in the collective experience 
between replacements and original divisional complement is merely the most 
profound nuance of the Infantryman's collective experience. Select variables which 
narrowed down a group's collective experience listed in no specific order are: rank, 
time into the service, assignment to either a rifle, anti-tank, or headquarters 
company, time into combat, intensity of combat, duration of combat, age, marital 
status, age. 
21. Several men felt a repugnance towards all of the killing and dying 
that occurred during the war. Expressing this sentiment all one old soldier could 
utter was "shame, shame. So many killed and maimed on both sides." # 25 
Bowen. The following men declared similar feelings. #13 Breeze. Carleton Curran, 
Interviews with author, #4 (3-18-92); #16 (10-9-92). Tape recordings in 
interviewee's office. Coleman Hall, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston II. John 
Everman, Interviews with author, #19 (10-16-92); #22 (10-30-92). Tape recordings 
at interviewee's residence. 2912 Marion, Mattoon, II. Robert Hill, Interview with 
author, #20 (10-26-92). Ray McKenna, Interviews with author, #3 (3-16-92); #1 O 
(9-29-92). Tape recordings at interviewee's residence. 2755 Whipporwill Drive, 
Charleston II. Hugh Mercer, Interviews with author, #11 (10-1-92); #21 (10-30-
92). Tape recordings at interviewee's residence. 410 West Pierce, Charleston II. 
Not only did Gls find out what war was really about but so did the vanquished only 
to a greater degree. What was left of a German family informed a GI that after 
they lost the men of the family in Russia and lost their house to the advancing 
Americans that "six years of krieg is bad." Owen Buser, Interview with author, #12 
(10-2-92). Tape recordings at interviewee's residence. RR 1, Box 158, Hum bolt 
176 
II. Ambrose, 238. Hemingway, xi. "The surest way to become a pacifist is to join 
the infantry." Bill Mauldin, Up Front (New York; The World Publishing Company, 
1945), 13. Audie Murphy, To Hell and Back , (New York: Holt Publishers, 1949; 
reprint Tabb Books, 1988), 15. 
22. #25 Bowen. 
23. #20 Hill. 
24. Thirty-four men had the opportunity to divulge their story, but only 
fourteen veterans agreed to participate. The reasons most declined to discuss their 
role in the war was that they did not remember, or they did not want to "relive" 
their experience. One man in particular rejected previous opportunities to tell his 
story but has since tried to come to grips with what he went through. "It took me 
a long time before I could even talk about it. It still bothers me to talk about it 
sometimes." #24 Breeze. 
25. "Some things are vivid in your mind and some are blotted out." This 
man still remembers one particularly gruesome scene that is etched in his mind: 
"I've thought about that a lot." #24 Breeze. Another individual deduced that "the 
human mind blots out the . . . truly unpleasant situations", however this same 
individual still had one incident that was to distressing to reveal. When asked if 
he could elaborate on the incident he replied: "Yes, but I'm not going to tell you 
ok. "#16 Curran. "There is one incident that stuck in my mind." This ex-soldier 
was referring to when a barn took a direct hit by an artillery round and several men 
were killed directly in front of him.#19 Everman. 
26. "I'll never forget that. . . . I remember it just like it was 
yesterday."Brick, Frank. Interview by author. #14 (10-6-92). Tape recording at 
interviewee's residence. RR 1, Box 24, Neoga, II. "I remember that vividly." #10 
McKenna. "Some things are vivid in your mind."#24 Breeze. "I can remember that 
so clear and so vividly."#25 Bowen. 
27. #10 McKenna. 
28. #12 Buser. 
CHAPTER ONE NOTES 
1. Transcript by Willis Bowen, November, 1944. 
2. Fussell, Wartime, 143. 
3. "The Japanese attack galvanized opinion." #16 Curran. The following 
incident typifies the outrage and hysteria resulting from the Japanese attack. 
"Shortly after that [the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor over the radio] 
a bunch of other guys on fraternity row [at the University of Iowa] all came by the 
house in just kind of an impromptu parade. Some of the guys had sticks and 
stones like they were expecting the Japanese to invade Iowa City." #18 Hill. Men 
that never wanted to fight and loved peace held an unequivocally bitter opinion of 
Hitler, someone who intentionally led a country to war. One individual who had 
read Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf came to the "general conclusion was that he [Hitler] 
was a nut." #1 O McKenna. Another veteran thought that Hitler was just a "wild 
lunatic." #25 Bowen. "We just hated him like everybody else, we thought he was 
nuts." #11 Mercer. 
4. #1 O Mercer. The American people understood the "inevitability and 
worth-whileness of whatever sacrifice lay ahead." The war was viewed as simply 
"unavoidable." Samuel Stouffer, The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army 
Life, Vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949) 81, 149. Several 
veterans made comments in regard to Nazi aggression, one recalled, "there was 
no question he [Hitler] was on the rampage ... it was very evident. He was just 
gobbling up hunks of Europe." #1 O McKenna. Another said, "the Germans invaded 
those other countries over there and they were fighting in Russia and they started 
bombing England. So you knew there was no way in the world we could keep out 
of it." #20 Hill. "It was a necessary war. After all remember Japan and Germany 
declared war on us. So you could say it was a matter of defense of our country. 
I think most of the people understood this. In fact that was the most elementary 
reason that could be given." #1 O McKenna. Men also comprehended the threat 
to American soil as long as Nazi Germany existed. "We knew what was coming 
if we didn't fight. It's best to fight on their soil than it is on ours. We were fighting 
to keep them from coming over here." #24 Breeze. "It seemed he [Hitler] was 
getting stronger all the time and taking over all those countries. Something had 
to be done about it before he jumped over here on us. . . . You had to realize 
that if we didn't go over there and settle things down, there was a good chance 
they might start coming back over on us. We sure didn't want any of those jokers 
177 
178 
over here tearing things up." #8,25 Bowen. "The overwhelming majority of 
Americans agreed it was a war that had to be fought." Roy, Hoppes. American's 
Remember the Home Front: An Oral Narrative of the World War II Years in 
America (New York: Berkeley Books, 1977; reprint with introduction, 1992) xvii. 
5. Some men sampled paid considerable attention to the international 
developments that surrounded the war, while others paid very little attention due 
to their disinterest. For example, one individual stated, "I didn't follow the war too 
much until about the time I got drafted. Germany, I knew they were the enemy." 
#22 Everman. At the other extreme, there were men who fell into the category of 
men who were "quite interested" in the war. Incidentally both of these men were 
future scholars. #1 O McKenna. #16 Curran. 
6. Fussell, Wartime, 180-1. Newspapers, magazines, radio, popular 
music, advertisements, cartoons, motion pictures, books, and discussions between 
both family and friends all focused on the same rhetoric. For a random example, 
the introduction to the New Soldiers Handbook stated that according to the 
Selective Service Act, the American citizen was required to "defend our right to live 
in our own American way and continue to enjoy the benefits and privilege which 
are granted to the citizens of no other countries." War Department, New Soldier's 
Handbook. (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1941) vii. 
Another contemporary source declared Americans "must fight to defeat an enemy 
who is cunning and ruthless and determined on the destruction of all that has been 
most precious to us." Marquis Childs, This is Your War (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1942) 15. The same general message is repeated in all sources 
published between 1941 and 1945. "No people ever had a work that meant more 
than ours, either to themselves or to this earth. No Army and Navy of people ever 
had a prouder, more glorious aim in hand and mind and heart than ours now has." 
Joseph, Greene, The Infantry Journal Reader (New York: Doubleday, Foran, and 
Company, Inc. 1943), 542. Another medium of communication that followed the 
same course was the Why We Fight film indoctrination series. Explanatory in the 
series title, the film defined the reasons for which Americans fought. The series 
expounded the Nazi history of aggression and oppression in contrast to the history 
of freedom and democracy in the United State and other Allied countries. The 
series made it a point of showing how America had worked for peace in the 
interwar period, while Nazi Germany prepared for total war. All recruits were 
exposed to this film series during training, nevertheless it made a very little 
impression on the men sampled. Only one individual out of twelve, remembered 
enough about the film to comment on the series. #16 Curran. Two men 
179 
remembered the VD, and personal hygiene films, but not the Why We Fight series. 
#13 Breeze; #18 Hill. One individual stated, "I don't remember any films at all. "#22 
Everman. 
7. "Hitler we had to get rid of him. What he had done wasn't right. I 
was for it all the way. I think it was a good cause." #5 Buser. "There was no 
doubt in my mind that was the thing to do." #15 Hott. "I was always proud of the 
fact that I was in there fighting for our people ... We were in it all the way." #14 
Brick. One individual held very strong feelings for a head of state ordering men to 
war. If men are going to be required to possibly give their life, he felt it must be 
for a "damn good reason." #10 McKenna. All veterans interviewed believed in 
their "cause." #4 Curran. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #13 Breeze. #22 Everman. There 
was "no doubt our cause was just." Perkins, 563. 
8. #13, Breeze. 
9. Harvey S. Ford, What The Citizens Should Know About The Army 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1941), 204. Anthony Kellett, Combat 
Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle (Boston: Kluwer Publishing, 1982), 
140. 
10. #21 Mercer. 
11. #17 Hoenes. 
12. #9 Kingery. 
13. One individual held the opinion that "the depression had conditioned 
us all to an acceptance of things as we found them." Cawthon, Other Clay, 14. 
14. Another individual enlisted for a secure job, and appreciated how the 
army provided for his needs. Janice Holt Giles, ed. The GI Journal of Sergeant 
Giles (New York: Mifflin Company, 1965) 7-10. 
15. The following men did not want to fight and had no idea that they 
would soon go to war. "I didn't think I would have to go to war, so I didn't pay 
much attention." #17 Hoenes. Another man had no idea about the likelihood of 
war "not when I went in no[October 1940] ... I was just a farm boy and I wasn't 
interested in politics or anything." #9 Kingery. A man drafted in April 1941 recalled 
outlook on war and peace. "I didn't have any idea about that [the possibility of 
war]." All the isolationist's held the false belief that "no we weren't going to war." 
#21 Mercer. 
16. Men were focused on serving their one year term and so they could 
180 
go back to their civilian life. This is seen in the lyrics of a popular pre-war song 
which stated that "I'll be back in a year little darling." Men construed this to mean 
that they were heading off to the "Little Darling War" and would be back in one 
year when there term was up. #11 Mercer. 
17. A popular book of the time, See Here Private Hargrove, had the 
intention of providing incoming recruits with advice on how to adjust to the culture 
shock of army life. The author used clever dialogue to advise recruits to bide their 
time with a stiff upper lip, and make the best of their situation with sarcastic humor. 
Marion Hargrove, See Here Private Hargrove (New York: Holt and Company, 
1942), passim. All three men in the army before American involvement in the war 
commented on the growth of new friendships. "We were just like brothers." #9 
Kingery. #17 Hoenes. #21 Mercer. 
18. #18 Everman. 
19. Every veteran sampled acknowledged experiencing fear long before 
combat, while the author found no instance, even in literature, of anyone who 
denied experiencing fear. "Fear is the anticipation of danger." What the Soldier 
Thinks, May 1945, 6-7. Ambrose, 53. Balkosi, 5. Dollard, 8-9. McDonald, 6-7. 
Tappert, 109. 
20. A veteran in the service before Pearl Harbor recalled how after the 
"Japs bombed Pearl Harbor. Naturally we went on from there." #17 Hoenes. 
Another man had a brother in the National Guard and "he just went right in 
naturally", when the guard was activated into Federal service. #10 McKenna. For 
the majority, it seemed that service in the armed forces in the beginning "simply 
happened, that it was action preceding thought, rather than action based on firm 
ideas." Tappert, viii. Use of the word "naturally" suggests men did not make a big 
issue of why they had to fight, but rationalized that rather than refuse orders and 
make their situation worse, it was better to abide the law and take their chances 
later in combat. The following scenario is merely a hypothetical situation which 
illustrates the consequences of breaching the Articles of War. One individual 
sampled, as a member of the 5th Infantry Division, was sent to Iceland to protect 
American interests from Nazi Germany months before the U.S. was at war. 
Theoretically, this man could have been executed if he would have refused to go 
with his unit. For this man there was never a second thought about going. He 
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conviction, "I would have been ashamed to come home with a dishonorable 
discharge." This meant even more to this individual because in his words, "my 
great grandfather was in the Civil War, my grandfather was in World War I, I had 
the history of the family, the Kingery name, I had to uphold that." #9 Kingery. 
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21. #12 Buser. #15 Hott. #22 Everman. The draft was simply a "fact." 
Cawthon, xiv. 
22. #1 O McKenna. 
23. Cawthon, xiv. This was a time when man actually felt an "aversion 
to flag waving and loud heroics." Kennett, 86-9. Out of the men sampled there 
was a decided lack of enthusiasm for the war. This generation learned lesson at 
the expense of the generation that went off enthusiastically to fight WW I. 
24. #1 O McKenna. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Only 0.04 percent of all men registered for Selective Service were 
imprisoned after declaring themselves conscientious objectors. Kennett, 8-12. 
27. #16 Curran. 
28. #10 McKenna. Men knew they didn't like what was ahead, but they 
also held the attitude that regardless, "it has to be done." #16 Curran. 
29. "Of course in those days you didn't burn draft cards[reference to 
protests of the Vietnam war], because even if you did in those days you'd be in the 
hoosegow." #16 Curran. Another individual made a reference to the movement 
of young men refusing the draft during America's involvement in Vietnam in the 
1960's. "I don't think a lot of these draft dodgers who went up to Canada." #13 
Breeze. 
30. One veteran recalled that Gls "on the whole . . . went to the 
battlefield more at the urging of duty and sober conviction." Cawthon, 16. 
"Everybody was urged to get in the war effort." Hoopes, 169. "You knew you had 
to go." #21 Mercer. 
31. #12 Buser. The "general attitude" towards service was that 
"everyone should do what he was assigned as well as he could, but it was not 
considered essential that an individual 'stick his neck out'." Kellett, 179. 
32. Those few that refused service attracted negative attitudes from 
those men who did serve against their wishes. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. 
#10 McKenna. #13 Breeze. #14 Brick. #16 Curran. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. One 
veteran thought that for many conscientious objectors it was "just some way to get 
out of it" and not a true moral stance against war. #8 Bowen. "The occasional 
shirker stood out." Wilson, If You Survive, 157. 
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33. #14 Brick. 
34. #16 Curran. Most men went along and performed up to expectations 
despite their fears out of their "desire for conformity" and want of "group approval." 
Kennett, 60. For example, when one man went into the army for the first time in 
his life he was a "somebody." Giles, 4. A Gl's "reputation" was "the one thing that 
he is likely to value more highly than life." Marshall, 143. 
35. Seven of the twelve men sampled had every offspring of their family 
in the Armed Services. #8 Bowen. #1 O McKenna. #13 Breeze. #16 Curran. #17 
Hoenes. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. Every man sampled had relation and friends that 
also served in the military. Two of these men commented on family jokes that 
originated when all their family's siblings were in the service in one capacity or 
another. One man recalled how he joked with his brothers since he was the last 
of the four to be drafted. "I told them I had to get into the war for them." #24 
Breeze. Another man commented of how everyone always joked that his sister 
was the only one in the family of four other boys good enough to get into the 
Marines. #1 O McKenna. This introduces another important aspect of people giving 
their all for the war effort. To a greater extent than ever before women played a 
tremendous non-combat role in the armed forces and in the workplace. "My kid 
sister enlisted." #10 McKenna. Two of the men sampled had their sisters working 
in Washington, D.C. for the government. #10 McKenna. #22 Everman. Another 
Gl's wife worked on a lathe in a defense plant, it helped her quit worrying about 
her husband. #25 Bowen. 
36. One individual held the prominent attitude of the era, that it was one 
of the "greatest honors" to serve your country when needed. #21 Mercer. Eleven 
of the fourteen individuals sampled referred to the phrase a "sense of duty" when 
describing why they fought. Americans believed that it "was a citizen's duty to 
respond to the country's call." Perkins, 563. 
37. #20 Hill. 
38. Another individual used the analogy that he wanted into the 
ballgame. #12 Buser. Two other men in this sample made decisions about serving 
with the help of their friends. #9 Kingery. #14 Brick. 
39. #12 Buser. 
40. #25 Bowen. "I don't recall anybody thinking that [the war could be 
lost] at all." #20 Hill. The entire country had a "pretty positive outlook." #23 Hott. 
"I just believed in the United States I guess." #22 Everman. "You have to 
understand the innate optimism of the American Public in the power of this 
country." The "dynamic" leadership of President Roosevelt inspired an "optimism 
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... which gave us the confidence that we could do the job." #16 Curran. Kennett, 
124. Stouffer, Vol, 1, 127. 
41. "It was on your mind all the time that you might have to go." #12 
Buser. The following individuals knew that they would serve, but waited to go until 
they were drafted. #3 McKenna. #8 Bowen. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott. #16 Curran. 
#19 Everman. One veteran recalled the common feeling, "I knew sooner or later, 
I'd be in the war." Astor, 15. 
42. One GI had a brother who was twenty-seven and single who enlisted 
in 1942, because "he knew what was coming." This decision paid off when the 
man ended up in the Air Corps, as a Major, based in California. #8 Bowen. 
Another man knew of a friend who enlisted with the hope of bettering his situation. 
#15 Hott. Incidentally, the man in the Navy and the man in the Army Air Corps in 
this sample, enlisted during 1942. #2 McCall. #6 Knott. One of the individuals who 
enlisted into the army understood that it was "so all encompassing that sooner or 
later; I'd go anyway." #20 Hill. 
43. #15 Hott. 
44. #14 Brick. 
45. #16 Curran. 
46. #13 Breeze. Another individual married, but with no children, was 
also drafted in 1943. #3 McKenna. 
47. #1,8 Bowen. Another married man with a child stayed out of service 
while he could, yet once drafted in August 1944 he was driven by the personal 
conviction that "you want to do your part. "#12 Buser. 
48. "Of course, everybody is scared to death . . . nobody wants to get 
in it." #22 Everman. "I wasn't too anxious about it [going into combat]." #14 Brick. 
"A lot of guys were very un-anxious to go." #10 Mercer. "Most of the draftees, I 
say most of them, that I ran into in the service had a different mental attitude than 
those that had enlisted ... There were some after we got in that were not too 
happy about being there." #18 Hill. Another individual was a member of an 
infantry division but "few in it wanted anything to do with combat." Atwell, 12. 
Soldiers were definitely not zealous about going off to war, but served 
nevertheless "because their country required their presence." Astor, 510. Ellis, 
315. Men exhibited a decided "lack of enthusiasm" about having to fight. Stouffer, 
Vol. 2, 5-29. Men "seemed to accept their role to fight for home and country 
without complaint. ... We were not gung ho but quietly went about our duties." 
Wilson, 157. 
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49. Ernest Hemingway, a veteran of WW I, authored the introduction to 
an anthology of war stories he edited and published in 1942. This book expressed 
his thoughts on why American involvement in the war was an unfortunate 
necessity. He declared that he hated war, however "once we have a war there is 
only one thing to do. It must be won. For defeat brings worse things than anything 
that can happen in a war ... The more you hate war, the more you know that 
once you are forced into it, for whatever reason it may be, you have to win it." 
Hemingway, Men at War (New York: Crown Publishing, 1942), xi-xxxi. The Why 
We Fight film series expressed a similar viewpoint. 
50. #22 Everman. 
51. #1 O Mercer. 
52. One man spoke of how he was motivated by his thoughts of home, 
especially getting back to his wife and baby girl. #5 Buser. Another veteran was 
motivated to "get the war over with. We were all in the same boat. We wanted 
to get it over with as soon as we could. I think we all had about the same feeling. 
We were anxious to get over there and get out of our training, our training was 
pretty rough. And then after we got over there [Europe] we wished we weren't 
there too." #14 Brick. "We were just wanting to get in there, get it over with, and 
get out." #22 Everman. The entire time one veteran was in combat he was 
"hoping for the war to end." #21 Mercer. All men sampled referred to this same 
desire which was also shared by veterans in the literature. For example, one GI 
who kept a journal wrote before they entered combat, "we just want to get this 
damn mess over with and get home." Giles, 11. The following sources concurred. 
Kellet, 172. Kennett, 303. Marshall, 142. Mauldin, 73. Murphy, 28. Stouffer, Vol. 
1, 172. 
53. #25 Bowen. 
54. #13 Breeze. 
55. War Department, New Soldiers Handbook (Washington, D.C.; United 
States Government Printing Office, 1941 ), vii. All aspects of training were focused 
on keeping the soldier alive including training manuals, pamphlets, and training 
films. "To put a soldier out on the front line, it takes a lot of training to get him 
ready to go." #25 Bowen. 
56. Joseph Greene, The Infantry Journal Reader, 271. 
57. #15 Hott. Another individual stated the instructors' purpose was to 
"let us know what it was really like." #7 Brick. 
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58. #24 Breeze. One veteran recalled how his instructors lectured to the 
men that "the main objective is to stay alive. Many of you won't come back, but 
learn and you will have a better chance." #8 Bowen. 
59. #8 Bowen Several other individuals agreed that it was important to 
learn all they could while in training. #10 Mercer. #12 Buser. #16 Curran. #18 
Hill. 
60. A former instructor had this to say about discipline. "What we did 
when teaching recruits was survival, and the need to accept the fact that 
somebody above you is responsible for making decision and without question, with 
absolutely no second guessing, without even thinking that well maybe we should 
do it this way." #18 Hill. "It was like a different world, but it's good for you though. 
You learn discipline and things of that nature." #5 Buser. One individual learned 
"how to take orders and make sure you didn't foul up." #17 Hoenes. "Another 
thing that we learned is that we had to take orders, discipline." #9 Kingery. "You 
have to do what your told to do." #16 Curran. "I learned a lot of discipline. Taught 
to say yes sir, no sir." #1 O McKenna. 
61. #14 Brick. 
62. One veteran stated he "learned the hard way" that you had to obey 
orders. #13 Breeze. In one situation an instructor informed a recruit that the 
recruit had not shaved. This veteran relayed his story of how he objected, and 
how the drill instructor then rebuked him. After his sergeant told him he hadn't 
shaved, the recruit replied, "why sergeant you were standing in the latrine last 
night when I shaved. And he said, 'I don't remember that.' But we had a 
conversation during the time. Then pretty soon the lieutenant came down and 
said, 'Curran, you haven't shaved.' And I said, 'but, but, but.' And he said, 'Curran 
when I tell you you haven't shaved, you haven't shaved .... If you continue to 
object I will hit you with a summary court [martial].' I said, "yes sir.'' #4 Curran. 
In another case, objection to orders resulted in an individual being reduced in rank 
twice before he was shipped overseas. When asked why he was "busted" the 
man replied, "I wasn't too respectful to some of the officers, that's probably the 
basic reason why. I questioned some of their orders." #10 McKenna. 
63. #1,8 Bowen. All men came to realize, sooner or later, that even if 
they did not like things they were ordered to do, "you just had to accept it." #19 
Evermon. 
64. #1 O Mercer. Ellis, 10. 
65. #16 Curran. 
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66. For example, a replacement stated he was taught "how to treat your 
fellow buddy, how to treat your officers ... [how to] work together to form one unit. 
. . . We were taught very strictly to praise our next man with us, because we 
were all together as a unit." #25 Bowen. Similarly, a man from an original outfit 
stated he was taught cooperation; "that we couldn't do it ourselves and we had to 
have help. And our buddies couldn't do it themselves, you had to help them." #9 
Kingery. 
67. #16 Curran. Other men cited the same feeling of unity. #9 Kingery. 
#10 McKenna. #11 Mercer. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott. #16 Curran. #17 Hoenes. 
Replacements went into units usually in combat situations where they knew know 
one. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #7 Brick. #18 Hott. #19 Everman. 
68. #24 Breeze. All original members of units commented on the 
camaraderie between the men before going into battle. "I was in a pretty good 
outfit." #11 Mercer. Another man said during training his unit became "just like 
brothers." #9 Kingery. Officers were also an integral part of a well functioning unit. 
"We had good officers ... they were just like one of us. They knew they had a 
job to do and they knew they weren't any better than anybody else. We were all 
buddy, buddy." #24 Breeze. 
69. One infantry company, like all others, became like a family after their 
training period. "Strong bonds of loyalty and friendship developed during those 
long, grueling months of back breaking training." John D. Campbell and Harold P. 
Leinbaugh, The Men of Company K (New York: William Morrow and Company, 
1985), 25. Another veteran recalled how all men in his unit "had been through 
months and years of wartime confusion and strains; marched countless tedious 
miles; lived in mud and dust, heat and cold. I knew their problems both duty and 
personal and they knew mine." Cawthon, 71. 
70. #24 Breeze. 
71. A formal drill instructor and combat veteran recalled how "you had 
to acquaint yourself with the weapons of war. I taught infantry basic which 
consisted of just hand grenades and machine guns, the M-1 rifle, the carbine, and 
bayonet." Training consisted of "an introduction to weapons and how to take care 
of them and what to do if this goes wrong and that goes wrong." #18,20 Hill. 
Training stressed that "you had to take good care of our equipment." #14 Brick. 
Recruits were taught their rifle meant their life, so it was mandatory they cherish 
it, and keep it operational. Weapons training was taught by repetition to make it 
a reflex, "to make you just react." #4 Curran. This was mirrored by an individual 
who said the men were trained so that they just would react, like a "robot" in crisis 
situations. #20 Hill. The success of repetitive training can be gauged by 
considering two veterans stood up and demonstrated the bayonet stance and 
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thrusting procedure with no prodding whatsoever. #8 Bowen. #24 Breeze. 
72. #12 Buser. 
73. Kill or Get Killed. Rex Applegate, Kill or Get Killed (The Infantry 
Journal [Press]), 1943; reprint, Boulder Colorado, Paladin Press, 1976). Men 
interviewed did not remember any exposure to the manual, however they did 
remember their instructors making constant use of the phrase. 
74. Applegate, Kill or Get Killed, 7. Instructors also taught the recruits 
to "be there first" and "shoot and ask questions later." #8 Bowen. 
75. #13 Breeze. Also referred to as "hand-to-hand combat." #3 McKenna 
76. War Department, Scouting and Patrolling; The Soldier. The Enemy. 
The Ground (Washington, DC: The Infantry Journal Press, 1943), no page 
numbers. 
77. Kennett, 51. One live fire training course was the infiltration course 
with live machine gun fire thirty inches above the recruit. Men were required to 
crawl underneath barbed wire thus avoiding the machine gun fire. 
78. #4 Curran. All infantrymen sampled traversed the infiltration course 
and did not find it a pleasurable experience. 
79. War Department, Soldier's Handbook Basic Field Manual 
(Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1941 ), 44. 
80. #21 Mercer. 
81. Men that commented on advanced training aids. #8 Bowen. #10 
McKenna. #14 Brick. #15 Hott. #16 Curran. #18 Hill. #22 Evermon. 
82. The individual who witnessed a training fatality recalled, "one of our 
training missions was supposed to be just like the real thing." The men were 
ordered to "take that hill" while live artillery fire was called in on the nearby hill. 
During the process of the staged attack a man was struck in the neck by shrapnel 
and killed right before the men. This occurred during January 1945. #14 Brick. 
Anytime men trained with live fire there was the possibility of accidents. Cawthon 
29, 33. 
83. "The men looked up to them." #14 Brick. Another replacement's 
instructors were "experienced and tough ... they knew what was coming." #19 
Evermon. "The sergeants and lieutenants down there [Fort Blanding, Florida] in 
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my outfit ... were professionals. We had two or three guys that had already been 
over to Anzio." One instructor made such a big impression he still remembered his 
name. "Lt. Sutherland he was a good instructor. He knew what he was talking 
about. . . . He helped us guys out an awful lot." #25 Bowen. 
84. #9 Kingery. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott. #16 Curran. #17 Hoenes. #21 
Mercer. Two men interviewed were forced by necessity to be drill instructors, 
despite the fact they had no combat experience. During the time they were 
instructors there were not enough men with combat experience to fill the positions. 
#9 Kingery. #18 Hill. 
85. #1 O Mercer. 
86. "The whole damn thing was an endurance test from the very 
beginning to the time I got home." #8 Bowen. All men felt after training they were 
in prime physical condition and made great physical improvements. "We trained 
for about two years before we went overseas. Physically I had been toughened 
up very considerably." #10 Mercer. "I felt better physically. I really did." #12 
Buser. Training stressed "physical fitness" in order to "get people into shape." #16 
Curran. "Most of basic training of course is physical." #18 Hill. "It's pretty tough. 
It's physical. ... My only trouble was I couldn't climb the rope. I'm telling you I 
had more trouble getting up the rope and climbing over walls than anything. I 
finally got where I could get a big run and get up it." #21 Mercer. After training a 
man thought he was in "pretty good physical condition. It was fairly rough ... I 
can understand why it was that way. When you got overseas you had to live 
under some pretty bad conditions." #23 Hott. "You're young and in your prime 
then, I never felt so better in all my life." #24 Breeze. "I felt like a million dollars." 
#25 Bowen. 
87. When this individual ran the obstacle course he admitted, "I usually 
didn't make the best times, but I managed to do the job." This was an 
accomplishment for this nineteen year old who wanted to "succeed and not fail." 
#16 Curran. 
88. #3 Mercer. 
89. #5 Buser. #13 Breeze. "I felt like I had kind of matured ... quite a 
little bit." #23 Hott. Several other men stated the same opinion. #16 Curran. #18 
Hill. #19 Everman. 
90. #23 Hott. For example one individual stated, "I thought my training 
was excellent." #8 Bowen. Another man believed his training was very good and 
afterwards he felt he was " able to do what I had to do." #12 Buser. Another man 
who was an instructor for over one year in the U.S. before going overseas 
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considered himself well trained and ready for any situation. #18 Hill. Nine of the 
twelve men sampled felt they were well trained. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #11 
Mercer. #12 Buser. #13 Breeze. #14 Brick. #16 Curran. #19 Everman. #22 Hill. 
Literature agrees with these findings. It was common to have men say, "I think my 
training was excellent." Astor, 137. Cawthon, 71. Giles, 9. The majority of the men 
polled before they saw action felt they wold rather stay out of combat, but they 
were nevertheless "ready to go when my turn comes." Stouffer, Vol. 1, 45. 
91. #18 Hill. "Everybody was nervous you were bound to be." #14 Brick. 
"Of course, everybody is scared to death." #22 Everman. "Sure you're scared 
you're bound to be." #21 Mercer. One man described a feeling of "apprehension . 
. . . There is always fear of the unknown." #20 Hill. Several men noted that the 
"apprehension" bothered them the most. #8 Bowen. #1 O McKenna. #17 Hoenes. 
One veteran labeled the feeling a "nervous tension." Grey, 13. There was a 
prevailing feeling of "anxiety" in the men before Company K went into battle for the 
first time. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 40. Another source cited the "anticipation is 
the worst." Nichols, 304. Stouffer, Vol.2, 131. 
92. #21 Mercer. 
93. Giles, 14-5. 
94. Knowing nothing about where they were going to go, or what would 
happen when they got there, men always experienced uncertainty over their future. 
One individual was sent to Iceland in 1941, and then to North Africa in November, 
1942, and never knew where he was headed when he left aboard ship. #9 
Kingery. Another veteran, who was a medic, also participated in Operation Torch 
and had "no clue" as to where he was going to land. #17 Hoenes. These two men 
made it a point to stress the uncertainty over the situation, for all they knew they 
were making an invasion on the European continent. 
95. #16 Curran. 
96. Other men sampled had the same feeling. #8 Bowen; #11 Mercer; 
#13 Breeze; #18 Hill; #19 Everman. Men always had questions like "how will I 
react under fire." Ambrose, 65. A replacement captain expressed in his memoirs 
his dire hope that he could function effectively when he got into "it." It was very 
important for him to win the respect of the experienced soldiers he was going to 
have to lead. To do this, he knew that he could not allow his fears to show. 
McDonald, 6-7. It was commonplace for men to have fears that they might show 
themselves cowardly. Men experienced a "fear about showing fear." John Dollard, 
Fear in Battle (Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal [Press], 1944) 17-18. 
97. One man recalled how his drill instructors "said all you guys when 
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you go up on the firing line you're gonna be scared. They said, it's natural your 
a damn funny character if you don't." #25 Bowen. The pamphlet, Fear in Battle, 
was designed to accustom men to the fact they would be scared and it was 
nothing to be ashamed of, they had to learn to control fear. Dollard, Fear in Battle. 
Other sources offered the same advice, such as the following statement. "True 
courage is the ability to act as you believe you should in the face of recognized 
danger." Greene, Infantry Journal Reader, 271. Fear in Battle provided men with 
the very important advice that is necessary to "distract" the mind from fear by 
concentrating on the task at hand. The manual also stated that humor was an 
important device to reach this end. Dollard, 30-1. 
98. #24 Breeze. 
99. #23 Hott. #25 Bowen. 
100. #1 O Mercer. 
101. The man who used this popular wartime phrase was already in the 
service at the outbreak of war, and heard President Roosevelt's speech, declaring 
war on Japan, on the radio at Fort Benning. The reaction among the men was 
that "we knew we would never get out. We knew we were in for the duration." #21 
Mercer. Infantrymen were required to fight "for the duration and six months." 
Charles McDonald, The Mighty Endeavor: American Armed Forces in the 
European Theater in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 61. 
102. To explain how men continued to fight, one historian and veteran 
cited having no rotation policy as one of the basic principles. "There were, in 
ground force units, no rotation. We knew that, unless wounded or killed, we were 
there for the duration, and in a way this was consoling." Perkins, 566. 
103. #1 O McKenna. 
104. #8 Bowen. "You had to take the good with the bad." #24 Breeze. 
Another individual also used the words "take" in the same context. #20 Hill. 
105. #20 Hill. 
106. #22 Everman. 
107. #13 Breeze. 
108. All veterans interviewed agreed that men were more concerned with 
being cautious and safe than doing something heroic. One GI wrote in his journal 
before combat that no one had their heart set on being a hero. Giles, 9-10. "The 
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great majority though acting with such prudence and caution as they could, simply 
did their jobs, even when it was dangerous." Perkins, 566. Wilson, 157. 
109. #16 Curran. 
110. Fussell, 143. 
111. #24 Breeze. 
112. A World War I veteran described the general attitude before his 
generation went off to battle as a naive "illusion of immortality." This same phrase 
can be used to describe how human nature would prevent most men from thinking 
they would be killed. Hemingway, Men at War, xvii. The majority of the men 
sampled went into combat thinking they would make it through the war alive. #3 
McKenna. #5 Buser. #7 Brick. #8 Brick. #9 Kingery. #11 Mercer. #13 Breeze. #15 
Hott. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. The following recollection perfectly illustrates the 
collective mentality and the illusion of immortality. This man was informed during 
training that "'every one of you will be either wounded or killed.' We just turned to 
the GI next to us and said, 'That's tough shit fella.' We were eighteen, nineteen 
twenty year-old kids. None of us could believe anything bad could happen to us. 
At most we thought of the million-dollar-wound, getting hit in the leg and being sent 
home a hero." Astor, 3. "Few, I believe, really contemplated being a casualty at 
all." Cawthon, 39. Going into combat men were convinced that it "can't happen 
to them, they would not be killed." Fussell, Wartime, 282. In a letter which 
represents the general attitude a man wrote to his mother that it was "foolish" for 
anyone to worry about him getting killed, because he wasn't going to make any 
stupid mistakes. Tappert, Lines of Battle, 141. 
113. #12 Buser. 
114. #18Hill. 
115. #8 Bowen. After training men should have been aware that anyone 
could be killed because a bullet or shell fragment had no preference. "We all 
knew that somebody was going to be killed. They drilled that into us you know." 
#24 Breeze. The fact that every soldier had to fill out their last will and testament, 
is one time which obviously all men contemplated death. 
116. #24 Breeze. There were some men that found it next to impossible 
to make themselves believe they would survive, but thought opposite. One 
individual referred to these men as "professional pessimists." #16 Curran. 
117. All men interviewed replied affirmative when asked if they felt a 
sense of pride in being an American soldier. 
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118. #13 Breeze. This feeling was widely held considering the GI always 
had "confidence in his country's armed might." Hoopes, xvi. 
119. #24 Breeze. One GI wrote in his journal while waiting for the 
invasion that his and others' "nerves sure are wearing thin." He did not want to 
be in the invasion, but if he did, he hoped it would be soon so they would not have 
to wait any longer. Giles, 14. 
120. This individual felt the men were "propagandized" by army authorities 
to think that way. #16 Curran. 
121. Transcript by Willis Bowen. December 15, 1944. This was an 
ominous attitude to have on the day before the German Ardennes offensive. It 
also speaks for the optimism, and how also soldiers were unaware of the true 
situation due to lack of knowledge. 
122. #25 Bowen. 
123. Two men sampled were replacements shipped to England in 
December, 1944. They were still there at the outset of the Battle of the Bulge, and 
both commented on how they reported to airfields where they attempted to fly to 
the continent, but bad weather prevented the flight. Both men later crossed the 
English Channel by ship. These men were confident, like all others, that the war 
was almost over, but the Bulge made them think differently. #12 Buser. #19 
Everman. 
124. Out of the Gls interviewed, the man who went into combat the latest 
(April, 1945) knew Germany could not hold out much longer, but they could still put 
up a defensive fight on their remaining territory. #14 Brick. 
125. Such as the individual who thought it might be possible to get a 
deferment because he was married with two children, and his brother had already 
been killed. #19 Everman. Another individual drafted in 1942, was made a 
member of the army air corps based in California, and served there until the 
December of 1944. This man felt "fortunate" he landed a job as a truck driver in 
Los Angeles, because he was out of the fighting and still in the states. He lived 
the good life for awhile, until he had the rude shock that he would be made an 
infantryman due to the drastic need for infantry replacements in the winter of 1944-
45. #14 Brick. The system that planned to keep married men out of the war for 
as long as possible actually failed when it became a necessity to pick them later 
in the war, and make them vulnerable replacements. 
126. #19 Everman. 
127. #12 Buser. 
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128. #18 Hill. Ground soldiers, who knew they were the ones who actually 
met the enemy on the field of battle, indeed felt an "arrogance." "The Combat 
Infantryman Badge became one of the most prized pieces of decorative metal of 
the war." Cawthon, 42. Several men were still proud to display their Combat 
Infantryman Badge that they kept in a safe place with all their other personally 
valuable memorabilia. #1 Bowen. #5 Buser. #9 Kingery. #13 Breeze. #21 Mercer. 
129. Men that are represented best by a person like Audie Murphy. 
Murphy wrote that he was primed to get into combat, which he figured to be an 
adventure for a young man. Murphy, To Hell and Back, 1. 
130. The only three men sampled who stated any slight desire to get into 
combat were the ones with the least doubts to their survival. #12 Buser. #16 
Curran. #18 Hill. 
131. #16 Curran. Men in the same predicament in the fall of 1944 
recalled that combat was the "test we had to pass before we could call ourselves 
soldiers .... We would have felt cheated to miss out on the fighting." Campbell 
and Leinbaugh, 16-7. 
132. One individual's unit had orders to participate in the invasion of North 
Africa in the fall of 1942 but they could not sine the Allies did not have enough 
shipping to get them there. This man remembered how his unit was prepared to 
leave and the men got all the way to the POE [point of embarkation] before they 
had to turn back. There was never any doubt that they would have been involved 
if the situation allowed.#21 Mercer. Two other veterans went to North Africa in 
1942 when their units received orders to do so. #9 Kingery. #17 Hoenes. 
133. #23 Hott. 
134. #1 O McKenna. 
135. #21 Mercer. 
136. #25 Bowen. 
137. #23 Hott. 
138. #24 Breeze. Another individual in the 29th Division fell ill before the 
Invasion but not wanting to look like he was trying to get out of going, he went 
along sick. The man told his commanding officer "he did not want to let his squad 
down and would like to go back and do his best." Cawthon, 47. 
139. Men in original outfits cited that it was reassuring to know that they 
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were going in with friends. #9 Kingery. #10 McKenna. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott. #16 
Curran. #17 Hoenes. #21 Mercer. Replacements knew no one when they went 
into units, but they did say they received dome advice from the "old timers." #8 
Bowen. #12 Buser. #14 Brick. #19 Evermon. Several of the replacements said it 
was reassuring to go in with experienced men. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #14 Brick. 
140. Being this individual was involved in an amphibious operation he 
went in loaded down with even more equipment. Because they had to carry in so 
much, a major topic was "what were we going to take in and everything." This 
man alone carried in six anti-tank rocket grenades, his M-1 rifle and extra 
ammunition, and an added bandolier of .30 caliber ammunition crisscrossed over 
his chest, and six regular hand grenades. This was all in addition to his full field 
pack on his back. Just in case he also had a gas mask, strapped under his neck, 
close to his life preserver. "We all had to do that because there was no way to get 
stuff in." #13,24 Breeze. The distraction of preparing for the task also went back 
to the prior weeks of intensive training. Another veteran of the 29th Division 
believed that "on· the whole, I do not believe that all individuals in the invasion 
force were greatly worried, for we were caught up in the complex mechanics of the 
mission and our separate tasks in it. . . . We moved in the heady world of 
preparation and expectation of success." Cawthon, 39,45. 
141. #24 Breeze. 
142. #3 Mercer. All men sampled spoke of humorous situations before 
combat which is also supported by findings in other oral histories. Balkosi, 11. 
Ellis, 107. 
143. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #23 Hott. #24 Breeze. Cawthon, 
48. Men also found time to write a last letter before they went into combat if they 
could find the time. Tappert, 208. 
144. #21 Mercer. 
145. #14 Brick. 
146. #23 Breeze. 
147. #22 Everman. 
CHAPTER TWO NOTES 
1. #24 Breeze. 
2. The confusion in combat was on a much greater scale considering 
this man, being in the 175th Regiment, landed on 0+1, however, he thought he 
had landed on D-Day. Getting to the beach as he did, he never knew any 
differently. It was in fact his own D-Day. "I don't know . . . I kept thinking that 
I went in on D-Day. We were on the boat for so long [five days] and all the planes 
were going in. . . . We were sitting there and all the boats were shooting their 
big cannons in the air. I kept thinking we went in on D-Day, but it was possible 
it was 0+1. It was rough."# 13 Breeze. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Balkosi, 175. 
5. #13 Breeze. 
6. Ibid. 
7. In combat one veteran observed an "intensified life force" which was 
a feeling of "life forced to a hard, bright flame to survive." Cawthon, 71. 
8. What made this incident even more demoralizing was the fact it 
occurred in late October 1944 in Holland. Holland at this time, in most men in this 
unit's opinion, should not have been heavily defended. This was since it was not 
part of the main line of resistance along the German border where the men really 
expected a fight. This man thought the officers of his division were over-optimistic 
in informing them of enemy strength and capabilities. He said he learned to be 
skeptical of future situations since he knew the high command was known to 
"gloss over the difficulties you might be facing." #4, 16 Curran. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Charles McDonald, The Seigfried Line Campaign, 222. 
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12. G.A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 304. 
13. #21 Mercer. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid. 
16. #23 Hott. 
17. Ten of the twelve men sample who experienced casualties before 
they ever faced a German soldier in combat are as follows. #3 McKenna. #5 
Buser. #7 Brick. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #15 Hott. #16 Curran. #17 Hoenes. #18 
Hill. #19 Evermon. Those who cited experiencing artillery fire first are as follows. 
#3 McKenna. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. "We hit 
the artillery first. It started popping around you and then mortar fire." #23 Hott. 
Atwell, 65. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 46-7. Giles, 36. 
18. #16 Curran. 
19. #13 Breeze. The title of Audie Murphy's autobiography, To Hell and 
Back implies what he found combat to be. Before combat, Murphy viewed it as 
awe inspiring adventure, but he found out later that combat was very different than 
he imagined. He stated in his autobiography that he saw combat "as it actually 
is, I do not like it." Murphy, To Hell and Back, 1, 15. 
20. #23 Hott. 
21. #16 Curran. 
22. #8 Bowen. 
23. #24 Breeze. 
24. This man recalled how their village training course "was a lot of fun 
we got a big bang out of it." They surely would not get a big bang out of it if it 
was anything like combat. #8 Bowen. Another veteran commented on how the 
men had fun during exercises in the village training course. #1 O Mercer. Another 
veteran said training was a "big game" compared to combat. #9 Kingery. The 
problem one veteran said was that in training the "instructors stressed what they 
got out of the training manuals." However, when they got into combat they found 
out it was better to improvise and throw away the book. #23 Hott. 
25. Astor, 49. Men in the sample that agreed are as follows. #3 
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McKenna. #4 Curran. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #10 McKenna. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott. 
#18 Hill. #19 Everman. #21 Mercer. Another veteran felt that "there is nothing that 
prepares you for combat." Another "considered the preparation [of training] 
extremely helpful in toughening him up but nothing could approximate the impact 
of combat." Astor, 191, 205. "This was combat and they just hadn't told us what 
it was like." Atwell, 65. When men encountered intense shelling for the first time 
they determined nothing in "training offered an experience remotely comparable. 
. . . We knew the manual, but we didn't know what was happening because we'd 
never been in combat before." Campbell and Leinbaugh, 46-7, 88-9. A 
replacement captain came to the conclusion that his long hours of training 
"seemed pitifully inadequate" once under fire. McDonald, 7. One veteran felt that 
before combat he considered his training "thorough and practical" yet once he had 
combat experience he found "serious gaps in the training." Wilson, 41. 
26. #5 Buser. Another man also knew how it was necessary that one 
just "make do." #16 Curran. 
27. #18 Hill. 
28. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 88-9. 
29. #24 Breeze. 
30. #21 Mercer. 
31. #18 Hill. 
32. #24 Breeze. 
33. #23 Hott. "You just took it as it came and tried to take care of 
yourself." #5 Buser. 
34. #13 Breeze. 
35. #1 O McKenna. 
36. #16 Curran. 
37. #18 Hill. 
38. #25 Bowen. Three of the five replacements stated they were offered 
advice from the veterans. #7 Brick. #12 Buser. #25 Bowen. Three of the five 
replacements cited feeling relieved to be with Gls who were already combat 
experienced. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #18 Hill. From post-war samples, the majority 
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of replacements believed veterans "did as much as the could" to help them out. 
Stouffer, Vol. 2, 242. 
39. #16 Curran. Another replacement who went into the line as a 
sergeant said he got very little advice, all he could do was watch and learn. #18 
Hill. Another replacement stated he was offered no advice upon entering combat 
by any of the experienced men. When we came into the squad he carried an M-1 
rifle, but the other men decided they were going to make him the new bazooka 
man. Being very dangerous to use, it does not take to much of an imagination to 
realize what happened to the last bazooka man. The experienced men, who 
effectively controlled the situation, knew they did not want the dangerous job of 
shooting the weapon, and also the burdensome job of carrying it. It seems that 
these men took advantage of the situation and their seniority. #22 Everman. This 
is similar to another case where a replacement was handed the heavy bazooka 
when he first went into a new squad. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 165. One 
eighteen-year old replacement who entered a company on December 31, 1944, 
in the Ardennes said that no one "offered advice or information." One other 
replacement was given a slight bit of help when the veterans said "when we duck, 
you duck." Campbell and Leinbaugh, 157, 163. Instances were replacements were 
used as "cannon fodder" were not uncommon. Ellis, 337. Murphy, 53. 
40. The following veterans said they helped out new replacements. #3 
McKenna. "We protected those guys." #9 Kingery. #15 Hott. #21 Mercer. 
41. #15 Hott. 
42. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 90-1. Ellis, 13. Indicative of this shortage 
was one man sent to infantry replacement training in the fall of 1944 after two 
years in the army air corps. Procurement planning had not anticipated the serious 
need for combat infantry replacements. #14 Brick. 
43. #12 Buser. 
44. #1 O McKenna. 
45. Replacements had a rapid assimilation into their unit usually "under 
the pressure of necessity." Stouffer, Vol. 2, 280. 
46. #8 Bowen. This quick assimilation is also apparent in this soldier's 
letters to home. On February 13, 1945 after being put into a new unit he wrote, 
"I don't know anymore where I am, makes it bad ... I'm OK just lonesome as 
ever." By March 22, he wrote home about the variety of different men in his 
squad, like mechanics, railroad workers, ranchers, and grocers. This letter said 
they were "a bunch of swell fellows too. Mostly married around 27 years old." 
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Transcripts by Willis Bowen. 
47. One replacement who was only in combat three days said he had no 
time to learn anything. #22 Evermon. 
48. This man recalled that the replacement he tutored "was just a young 
kid. Just about 18. That poor kid didn't know how to strike a match. . . . He 
didn't know how to handle himself. I don't know why they ever put him up there 
in the first place." #25 Bowen. 
49. #14 Brick. 
50. Ibid. 
51. The first time one man experienced seeing dead Gls he stated he felt 
a "revulsion" at the sight. #1 O McKenna. Another veteran also noted a feeling of 
"revulsion" the first time he viewed dead German soldiers. McDonald, 19. It was 
very much the norm for men to be like one GI who considered it disturbing to see 
his first dead German, which was accentuated by the fact that it was also the first 
time the man had ever seen a dead body. Terkel, 42. 
52. #17 Hoenes. 
53. #1 Bowen. 
54. #18 Hill. 
55. #21 Mercer. 
56. #14 Brick. 
57. #8 Bowen. 
58. #12 Buser. 
59. The majority of the men sampled cited feeling mixed emotions. #8 
Bowen. #9 Kingery. #10 McKenna. #12 Buser. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott. #16 Curran. 
#18 Hill. 




63. #7 Brick. 
64. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 160. 
65. #5 Buser. 
66. #15 Hott. 
67. #25 Bowen. 
68. #24 Breeze. 
69. #5 Buser. 
70. #22 Everman. 
71. #8 Bowen. 
72. #22 Everman. 
73. #25 Bowen. 
74. Several men saw dead animals on several occasions. #8 Bowen. #9 
Kingery. #14 Brick. #24 Breeze. 
75. #16 Curran. 
76. #8 Bowen. #10 Mercer. #14 Brick. #16 Curran. #18 Hill. 
77. After a furious German counterattack which decimated this man's 
battalion he reached his "personal depth of the war, and it has remained with me 
as only the events that mark the ultimate depth . . . of one's life." Cawthon, 104. 
Another man commented on the affect of the heavy loses in the Huertgen Forest. 
"We had started out that morning with about 140 riflemen, a couple of medics, 
three noncoms, four company officers, one attached artillery officer, and one 
attached sergeant from H Company. We had lost all the medics, all the noncoms, 
three of the four company officers, and the artillery observer. And we had lost 
ninety riflemen. This was, and still is, the most terrible day of my life." Wilson, 
173. 
78. #24 Breeze. 
79. One veteran had the duty of reporting and confirming those in his unit 
who were killed or wounded. It was always necessary to have an "eyewitness" 
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make a positive identification of a dead body. He stated, "that's what gets me 
about ... these MIAs over in Vietnam. You take a vehicle going down the road 
and you see that thing get hit right in front of you. If they were replacements you 
wouldn't know who was in there. And you couldn't find out who it was. You can't, 
it's impossible. That's what gets me. Even the dog tags would be burnt up, there 
would be nothing left." #11 Mercer. Another veteran mentioned the same thing 
about Vietnam and MIAs. Men who have seen combat firsthand understand what 
the civilian cannot correctly imagine. #18 Hill. 
80. #15 Hott. 
81. For example, one man's friend was killed in front of him and he was 
splattered with his friend's blood. This man was so repulsed and upset that he 
broke down and vomited. Hoyt, 459. One soldier had a good friend mortally 
wounded on May 2, 1945, six days before the German capitulation. He witnessed 
his friend's death as he was powerless to help. As he tried to help his buddy the 
flow of blood made him vomit and breakdown and cry. Giles, 344. It was not 
uncommon for men to cry and unleash their emotions when close friends, and 
other men in their unit were killed. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 160. 
82. The following men commented on how German artillery was the most 
deadly weapon they had to contend with. #3 McKenna. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #9 
Kingery. #11 Mercer. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott. #16 Curran. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. 
Most veterans thought shelling was "combat at its absolute worst." Ambrose, 133. 
Astor, 86-9. One GI wrote in his journal after a heavy barrage: "I hate artillery fire 
. they mortally wear down your nerves." Giles, 53. 
83. These men mentioned incidents with small arms fire but were greatly 
overshadowed by mention of artillery. #7 Brick. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #10 
McKenna. #13 Breeze. #17 Hoenes. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. #21 Mercer. 
84. There were no incidents of hand-to-hand combat in this sample. One 
man saw where it occurred but that was a close as these veterans came. #8 
Bowen. Other veterans sampled specifically spoke about the fear of getting close 
enough to a German to have to fight him a knife or bayonet. #8 Bowen. #13 
Breeze. #14 Brick. #18 Hill. Men would rather use grenades, or their rifles, to fend 
off a close encounter. Those that cited experience with grenades. #5 Buser. #7 
Brick. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #10 McKenna. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott. #18 Hill. #19 
Everman. #21 Mercer. 
85. #8 Bowen. Every man sampled spoke of the 88 mm by name. 
86. #22 Everman. 
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87. #24 Breeze. 
88. Two men described the losses caused by German artillery and 
treebursts by the exact same sentence. "It was demoralizing." It is no 
coincidence that these two men fought in the Huertgen Forest. #15 Hott. #21 
Mercer. 
89. #18 Hill. 
90. Men that experienced air attacks. #2 McCall. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. 
#1 O McKenna. #16 Curran. #17 Hoenes. #19 Evermon. #21 Mercer. 
91. #22 Evermon. 
92. Dollard, 16-7. 
93 #24 Breeze. 
94. #16 Curran. 
95. #8 Bowen. #21 Mercer. 
96. #25 Bowen. Three other men referred to experiences with the 
distinctive sound of the "Screaming Meemee." #7 Brick. #12 Buser. #21 Mercer. 
97. Cawthon, 93. #7 Brick. #8 Bowen. #1 O McKenna. #11 Mercer. #15 
Hott. "They just went off." #18 Hill. 
98. Wilson, 111-12. 
99. The following men sampled noted casualties due to mines. However, 
only one individual actually spoke of incidents with anti-personnel mines. #16 
Curran. The other references to mines were to anti-tank mines which worked 
effectively on all vehicles. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #10 McKenna. #11 Mercer. #16 
Curran. 
100. #24 Breeze. 
101. Murphy, 172. 
102. The following men commented on sniper fire. #13 Breeze. #15 Hott. 
#16 Curran. Seeing a tank was even a rare experience to anti-tank companies 
who were designed to counter them when they appeared. Only two of the four 
men in anti-tank companies had encounters with tanks. #9 Kingery. #10 
L 
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McKenna. Only two other veterans, commented on encounters with German 
tanks. #15 Hott. #21 Mercer. 
103. #20 Hill. 
104. Men that recalled instances of short rounds, and friendly-fire, are as 
follows. #1 Bowen. #5 Buser. #20 Hill. #24 Breeze. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 147. 
McDonald, 235. Three men mentioned the fact that they were not surprised after 
the recent Gulf War with the abundance of friendly fire accidents. #20 Hill. #21 
Mercer. #24 Breeze. 
105. #8 Bowen. The following situations are just examples of the different 
types of accidents. In one situation combat engineers detonated some land mines 
and the explosion knocked out a window and cut a man's face, but luckily not too 
severe. #16 Curran. Another man said his company commander was shot by a 
jittery GI because he did not say the password in time. #15 Hott. In another 
situation a man saw another soldier accidentally shoot himself in the hand cleaning 
a German pistol. #14 Brick. In one instance a captain had his first man killed in 
action under his command due to a trigger happy comrade. McDonald, 81. 
106. #11 Mercer. 
107. Wilson, 138. The following source cited men having to avoid falling 
flak. Giles, 32. 
108. #15 Hott. 
109. #24 Breeze. 
110. #16 Curran. 
111. #8 Bowen. 
112. All men noted instances of luck which is also reflected by the 
literature. Close calls are similar to the following. "One guy was showing me 
where a rifle slug or machine gun slug hit his helmet and put a spot on it and 
glanced off. That's what you call getting awful close." #25 Bowen. Veterans 
always brood over how "chance sorted life and death." Cawthon, 119. 
113. #5 Buser. Another man made a similar statement. "A lot of it was 
luck." #15 Hott. 
114. #13 Breeze. 
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115. #21 Mercer. 
116. #14 Brick. 
117. Ibid. 
118. #1 O McKenna. 
119. Ibid. 
120. #24 Breeze. 
121. Ibid. In another incident a medic received a case of concussion 
when the ambulance he was in drove by a 155mm howitzer just as it fired off a 
round. The blast shook the ambulance and deafened him for a few days. #17 
Hoen es. 
122. #8 Bowen. 
123. #9 Kingery. 
124. Fussell, 282. 
125. #18 Hill. 
126. When the author asked one man if he felt he would ever get hit, he 
replied, "Yes, I felt that a lot of times." #14 Brick. When another man was asked 
the same question he answered, "Oh yeah, everybody did." #19 Everman. 
Another man said, "Oh sure, ... you don't know one day to the next." #21 Mercer. 
The following men also agreed with Fussell's realization process. #5 Buser. #8 
Bowen. #1 O McKenna. #15 Hott. #16 Curran. #18 Hill. #24 Breeze. This realization 
was also prevalent in literature. One airborne soldier felt that the longer he was 
in combat he "was living on borrowed time." Ambrose, 110. In combat Gls came 
to determine that "death plays no favorites." Grey, 108. One GI was once 
overheard to say, "I feel like a fugitive from the law of averages." Mauldin, 39. 
Murphy, 263. The majority of combat veterans cited feeling that at one time in 
their combat career that "it was just a matter of time before they were hit by enemy 
fire and wounded or killed." Stouffer, Vol. 2, 88. There were also those men who 
went into combat thinking they would not be killed, they ended up being very 
wrong. One of the men had a brother that went off to fight in Italy in 1943 talking 
about how he would "get it over with and come home." However, this nineteen 
year old man never did make it home, as he was killed in action. #22 Everman. 
This same situation occurred countless times as in the case of a GI who wrote 
home, "as far as worrying about me getting killed, this is foolish. I have no 
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intention of doing anything but returning. Most men get killed in battle because 
they forget to take cover or make some such tactical mistake. I'll make no mistake 
like that." This GI was killed in his first week on combat. Tappert, 141. This 
illusion of immortality was also apparent in the letter starting Chapter One of this 
paper. 
127. #1 O McKenna. 
128. #24 Breeze. One man recalled it got so bad at one point that he 
gave up all hope ever making back home alive. Atwell, 206. Sometimes soldiers 
developed a fatalism when they knew they would be injured or killed. Ellis, 239. 
Stouffer, Vol. 2, 90. 
129. Fussell, 282. 
130. This man never thought we would be killed. #9 Kingery. 
131. #18 Hill. "You don't know one day from the next [if you would be 
injured or killed]." #12 Buser. 
132. #16 Curran. 
133. Ibid. 
134. #23 Hott. "We only hoped our luck would not run out." Astor, 49. 
135. A "million dollar wound" can be classified as follows. "A wound which 
was a nice easy flesh wound with no complications." #16 Curran. 
136. #14 Brick. 
137. Ibid. 
138. One man stated he thought about getting the million dollar wound to 
get out. "The thought went through my mind after awhile. Well it's always there. 
If you're going to get hit you hoped it's not particularly incapacitating." #18 Hill. 
Another man said, "all of us thought that all the time. We thought if we ever get 
hit at all, let's hope it's the million dollar wound. You get banged up in the legs 
where you'll be taken back." #8 Bowen. One veteran recalled how the men did not 
discuss the possibility of anyone being killed, but they did discuss the million dollar 
wound. Astor, 51. One soldier was actually excited when he was wounded for all 
he could say was, "I'm out. I got a million dollar wound. Boy am I lucky." Atwell, 
47. When another man was hit, he cheerfully passed out his hoarded rations 
because he knew he was going home. The soldier "rejoiced" when he had "finally 
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been hit." Campbell and Leinbaugh, 155. One soldier was hit but not seriously 
wounded and his friends comforted him by saying, "you lucky dog." Kennett, 176. 
Ellis, 254. 
139. #21 Mercer. 
140. #24 Breeze. The Germans, usually being defenders, most always 
had the advantage of fighting behind prepared positions where they knew the 
ground. One veteran often used the phrase "when the Germans opened up on us" 
to describe when his unit took casualties. Often fighting behind prepared 
defensive positions the Germans went to great lengths to catch Gls in traps of 
overlapping machine gun fire. #24 Breeze. Most Gls commented on taking fire 
from prepared defensive positions. #7 Brick. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #15 Hott. #18 
Hill. #19 Everman. #21 Mercer. 
141. This same man said, "I didn't see many jumping out in front with 
machine guns looking for Germans." #23 Hott. Kellett, 332. The "majority are 
unwilling to take extraordinary risks and do not aspire for a hero's role, but they 
are equally unwilling that they be considered the least worthy among those 
present." Marshall, 148-9. A recollection of another man illustrates how men were 
purposely protective. He was in an antitank unit, and since they replaced a truck 
hit by a mine, the men put sandbags of the floorboard of their truck to help shield 
any potential blast. #12 Buser. The medic in this sample, spoke of how they were 
taught by the book in training, but in combat they were, "slam bang", to get in, and 
get the wounded, and get out. #17 Hoenes. 
142. #16 Curran. Another man commented on how his father told him 
never to volunteer for anything. #18 Hill. 
143. #16 Curran. 
144. #20 Hill. 
145. #24 Breeze. 
146. #14 Brick. 
147. Kennett, 164. 
148. #15 Hott. 
149. #24 Breeze. This attitude was exactly how another individual felt 
after he was awarded the Silver Star. "I certainly did not consider myself any sort 
of hero in any of this action. . . . Thoughts of a medal had never occurred to me, 
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though I did appreciate it once it was awarded. My thoughts during the action 
were very rudimentary. How in the hell do we get out of this mess?" Wilson, 27-
28. 





155. #23 Hott. 
156. #24 Breeze. 
157. #23 Hott. 
158. #24 Breeze. 
159. One veteran returned to his unit after two different wounds he 
received in combat, after his third wound he had to be hospitalized for the 
remainder of the war. This man was first wounded by a ricochet machine gun 
bullet in the shoulder in North Africa in the Spring of 1943. His second wound 
came around Metz in the Fall of 1944 when he was stabbed in the back by a 
bayonet. It was in the Spring of 1945 after he had crossed the Rhine that he was 
severely wounded by shrapnel from an 88. #9 Kingery. Two men who authored 
personal biographies experienced wounds and then went back to their former 
units. Cawthon. McDonald. 
160. In this sample only one man stated he had a hatred for the German 
soldier. #16 Curran. This lack of hatred is also apparent in the following sources. 
Astor, 175. Ellis, 317. Kennett, 156. Stouffer, Vol. 2, 156-7. 
161. #24 Breeze. 
162. #20 Hill. 
163. #8 Bowen. This man had a similar viewpoint. #21 Mercer. 
164. #14 Brick. 
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165. #15 Hott. 
166. #22 Everman. 
167. #16 Curran. 
168. #10 Mercer. 
169. #14 Brick. 
170. #24 Breeze. 
171. #8 Bowen. Many men commented on how they would kill in self-
defense just to survive. "You felt sorry for being in such a situation, yet you knew 
it had to be done." #12 Buser. "It didn't seem to bother us." #18 Hill. This was 
the same for a man in a 57mm anti-tank gun crew. "By the time you got over 
there it was either do that or get killed. That's the way you justified it. It made it 
easier for us because there was some distance between them and us." #1 O 
McKenna. Most men felt before combat that having to kill an enemy soldier was 
"just part of the job." Stouffer, Vol. 2, 34. 
172. #9 Kingery. 
173. Several men did not discuss any details surrounding the incidents 
and were obviously uncomfortable talking of when they had to fire their weapon. 
#8 Bowen. #10 McKenna. #11 Mercer. #16 Curran. #24 Breeze. This is consistent 
with veterans personal recollections. When one veteran was asked about the time 
he had to kill a German, he replied, "it is not something I want to talk about." 
Astor, 254. 
174. #24 Breeze. 
175. #8 Bowen. 
176. #24 Breeze. 
177. #20 Hill. 
178. #14 Brick. 
179. #20 Hill. 
180. #14 Brick. 
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181. #24 Breeze. 
182. #8 Bowen. Another veteran made a similar statement. "You'd see 
movement over there, it might not be necessary, but usually guys would squeeze 
off a round or two .... You saw the movement and you'd see a figure. I can't 
say that most of the time we couldn't really tell if it was an Italian farmer maybe 
or a German soldier. But an Italian farmer had no business where he was so you 
had to assume it was a German soldier. They were over there and if you thought 
you could hit him why you took a shot at them." #18 Hill. 
183. This man was never able to ask the loader of the bazooka if he failed 
to arm the missiles correctly because he never saw him after that incident. He 
might have been killed, but in the confusion he was never seen again. What 
illustrates the mentality of survival was how this man discarded the bazooka and 
picked up an M-1 at his closest opportunity. #22 Everman. 
184. Ibid. 
185. Ibid. 
186. #24 Breeze. 
187. #22 Everman. 
188. #3 McKenna. 
189. Ibid. 
190. #5 Buser. 
191. One veteran who was a member of an anti-tank company, made the 
following statement about the gun. "It was too small because the German tanks 
had about five inches of armor in the front. But they were accurate." Like all Gls 
he made sure to accentuate the positive. #9 Kingery. Another veteran had this to 
say about the underpowered 57mm. "Supposedly, it could penetrate four or five 
inches or armor plate. The German tanks had as much as seven inches of armor 
plate. But the gun was capable of knocking off a track and disabling a tank." 
Astor, 12. Another source said the "57mm guns in each American anti-tank 
company were no more effective than peashooters against most German tanks in 
1944." Balkosi, 116. The series the "U.S. Army in World War 11" did point this fact 
out in The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge. The 57mm guns and their crews 
were "simply tank fodder." Cole, 220. It would have been even more disillusioning 
to discover the guns inadequacies in combat if one remembered what the training 
pamphlet, I am a Doughboy, stated about the 57mm. The text described the gun 
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as follows. "It's big enough to stop any enemy tank that's been developed, and 
will do an excellent job on enemy fortifications as well." War Department, I am a 
Doughboy, 26. Another irony of the war was how two sources had the foresight 
to posit the need for better anti-tank weapons, unfortunately this heed was never 
taken. In one instance an essay written in 1943 entitled "The Case for the Anti-
Tank" pointed out the advantages of having an effective anti-tank weapon. "The 
highest morale will be on the side that has the greatest confidence in its weapon. 
And there is no good reason why that should not be the side with an effective anti-
tank defense. . . . By all means let us concentrate on our own anti-tank defense 
until we know that it is unbeatable by anything that moves on wheels or crawls on 
tracks." Greene, Infantry Journal Reader, 83-4. The other example is found in 
Hemingway's Men at War published in 1942. Some of his advice encouraged the 
development of anti-tank weapons that could be "manufactured in larger caliber." 
Hemingway, xxv. 
192. #1 O McKenna. 
193. #9 Kingery. 
194. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #10 McKenna. #12 Buser. 
195. Lida Mayo, Ordinance: On the Beachhead and Battlefront. 
196. #8 Bowen. 
197. Ibid. 
198. George Patton, War as I Knew It, 197. 
199. #8 Bowen. 
200. "Some critics since the war have said that enemy troops, especially 
German troops, were far better soldiers than Gls, but this is a contention far from 
proved." Spiller, 48. 
201. #23 Hott. The majority agreed the Germans were "good soldiers." 
#17 Hoenes. #9 Kingery. #10 McKenna. #12 Buser. #14 Brick. #15 Hott. #16 
Curran. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. #21 Mercer. #25 Bowen. Gls always respected 
and were often impressed with the German soldier's fighting ability. McDonald, 
Mighty Endeavor, 14. 
202. #1 O McKenna. 
203. #3 McKenna. 
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204. #14 Brick. Another source agreed. Giles, 319. One veteran stated 
that the "front-line German soldier ... was professional and competent. I was 
glad there was not more of them." Cawthon, 133. Fussell, 122. 
205. One man sampled felt that later in the war, prisoners they accepted 
were definitely "second rate." However, these were beaten men who were glad 
to surrender. #8 Bowen. "Whenever they shot, they couldn't hit a dime. They 
always shot low." From a man that was shot in the arm by a sniper a few hundred 
yards range. #13 Breeze. It appeared that some men that respected the fighting 
ability of the German soldiers, but were too proud over their victory to ever admit 
the German soldier was better than the GI. 
206. #25 Bowen. 
207. #1 O McKenna. 
208. Another irony of war was that this man was from the 4th Division who 
hoped and believed before the war that Germany would collapse by the time they 
reached Paris. However, this man was in the first American division to make it 
into Paris, but the war was long from over. He still had to go through the fighting 
in the Huertgen Forest in addition to the Battle of the Bulge. The men in his unit 
talked about their misperception, but the still believed that Hitler would commit 
suicide before he actually did; which was another lost hope. #21 Mercer. 
209. Transcript by Willis Bowen. December 15, 1944. 
210. Transcript by Willis Bowen. February 16, 1945. 
211. Men sampled that knew of the Malmedy incident. #5 Buser. #8 
Bowen. #9 Kingery. #10 Mercer. #16 Curran. #19 Everman. Men from different 
divisions all across the American line heard of the incident and decided to gain 
revenge. Astor, 175, 187, 287, 364, 470. One veteran said, "everybody got 
pissed off. I just wanted to get down to Belgium and start killing Germans." 
Another man said, "nobody was particularly anxious to take any prisoners." 
Campbell and Leinbaugh, 131, 159. Several other sources cited no prisoners 
being accepted after the Malmedy Massacre. Giles, 179. Hoyt 525. Kennett, 161. 
212. #19, 22 Everman. 
213. #8 Bowen. 
214. Ibid. There are other instances in this sample that men felt similarly. 
#13 Breeze. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. Astor, 472. 
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215. #25 Bowen. 
216. Cole, Ardennes, 263. 
217. One veteran not involved in the Bulge fighting nevertheless heard of 
such atrocities through rumors. "What you hear and what you see are two 
different things. I have never seen American troops kill prisoners. Now did I hear 
of such instances? Yes." #16 Curran. As always, there will be those that different 
from the norm. One man said he never knew of Malmedy and never heard of Gls 
not taking prisoners. "I didn't know anything about that. I may be wrong, but I 
thought they honored all people they captured." #21 Mercer. The most recent 
account on the Battle of the Bulge is an oral history which documents several 
examples of reprisals for the German act at Malmedy. In several situations units 
were given expressed orders not to accept prisoners. Astor, 469. During the Bulge 
fighting it was common to hear "the boys ain"t takin' any prisoners." Atwell, 154. 
Campbell and Leinbaugh, 153. Giles, 200-1. McDonald, 173. 
218. Sante Fe. The Divisional History of the 35th Division. No page 
numbers, personal possession of Willis Bowen. 
219. "Word spread of scattered executions of American prisoners. Some 
Gls retaliated in kind. . . . We'd picked up rumors that the Germans were 
shooting prisoners at random." Astor, 181, 287. 
220. #21 Mercer. 
221. Astor, 367. "In the heat of battle, prisoners were sometimes killed." 
Campbell and Leinbaugh, 133. Kennett, 160. 
222. Astor, 281. 
223. Gray, 132. This was similar to the popular training phrase one man 
referred to, "shoot first and ask questions later." #8 Bowen. 
224. #8 Bowen. 
225. Sante Fe. In a little of two weeks the "35th took 1,034 prisoners and 
killed and wounded as many more." No page number. 
226. In this incident Gls committed large scale executions of German 
troops after they discovered a Belgium town where the Germans had slaughtered 
some of the civilians. "Two small children actually had their heads smashed in. 
Men were dismembered and shot. One pregnant woman had been cut open and 
left to die. This scene was viewed by hundreds of Gls. . . . [German] prisoners 
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were rounded up . . . stripped of all American clothing . . . and marched, some 
practically naked, most without shoes, to that particular cellar and forced to view 
the awful scene in it. From there, they were marched through the town into a 
wooded section, from whence shortly came the sounds of much shooting. I had 
always read that Americans treated their prisoners justly, but I wonder which prison 
camp these particular prisoners occupied. I have always been glad the 291 st had 
no part in these executions." Giles, 200-1. 
227. #22 Everman. 
228. Stouffer, Vol. 2, 159. 
229. Astor, 367. Kellett, 160. 
230. #15 Hott. 
231. Ibid. 
232. There were several isolated atrocities committed in the name of 
revenge. Astor, 103. Balkosi, 243-4. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 58-9. Hoyt, 409. 
233. #16 Curran. 
234. #25 Bowen. 
235. Ambrose, 132. 
236. #24 Breeze. 
237. #9 Kingery. 
238. Ibid. 
239. In one situation a platoon was under attack and they called the other 
platoon for assistance, however, the other platoon had three prisoners. They could 
not make it with the three Germans in tow because it was dangerous and would 
deny freedom of movement. The prisoners were shot and the company 
commander wrote, "Company G today committed a war crime. They are going to 
win the war, however, so I don't suppose it really matters." McDonald, 212-5. 
240. The following sources made no mention of any orders not to accept 
prisoners in the initial Normandy landings. Eisenhower. The Great Crusade. 
Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack. 
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241. A GI from the 115th Regiment of the 29th Division stated his unit had 
orders not to accept prisoners during the initial assault. They were told they "were 
to take no prisoners, to show no quarter." Hoyt, 367. Another soldier from the 
101 st Airborne was ordered by the general of the division "don't take any 
prisoners." In other cases in the 101 st, individual airplanes were told by ranking 
officers to take "no prisoners. We are taking no prisoners." Ambrose, 63, 65. 
242. #24 Breeze. 
243. Ibid. 
244. Ibid. 
245. #16 Curran. 
246. #18 Hill. One of the men sampled spoke of the most common 
symptoms of this pervasive fear. "You always have something going around in the 
middle of your stomach." #1 O McKenna. Another man who fought through North 
Africa until past the Rhine, when he was wounded for the third and last time, said 
he never got over his fears. "I wasn't brave now don't get me wrong. I was scared 
to death a lot of times. I was scared bad enough one time I shit my pants. I didn't 
know until an hour later." #9 Kingery. The following individuals stated their fear 
never subsided. #11 Mercer. #16 Curran. #19 Everman. #20 Hill. #23 Hott. #24 
Breeze. Veterans in literature cited the same experience. Atwell, 237. Ambrose, 
207. Cawthon, 119. Dollard, 5. Another GI felt that "you don't ever get over being 
afraid." Giles, 219. Ellis, 102. Kellett, 276. Marshall, 124. Every time one GI was 
in action he stated how his "old fear swelled up again." McDonald, 74. Murphy, 39. 
Another veteran said that whenever he was in combat he felt the "intestinal 
stirrings of fear." Wilson, 9. 
247. #10 McKenna. 
248. #21 Mercer. 
249. #5 Buser. Other men felt similarly. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #18 Hill. 
250. One veteran said the common feeling of "anxiety" and "fear of the 
unknown" that was the most bothersome. #18 Hill. Another man said the 
"apprehension" of knowing one could be killed at any moment was the worst. #1 O 
McKenna. Another man said he was most bothered by the "mental attitude. You 
didn't know what was going on or how to go about different things." #19 Everman. 
Other men sampled that agreed. #8 Bowen. #10 Buser. #15 Hott. #17 Hoenes. 
#21 Mercer. 
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251. Ellis, 10, 55. 
252. #18 Hill. 
253. #8 Bowen. One man said he went on two patrols, and the one at 
night was the "real scary one." #10 McKenna. #13 Breeze. #18 Hill. 
254. #21 Mercer. 
255. #8 Bowen. 
256. Ibid. 
257. #20 Hill. One man commented on hatred and frustration that was 
due to shelling, because there was no real way to fight back. #16 Curran. Astor, 
89-90. Artillery could land anywhere, it was just "a matter of purest chance." 
Atwell, 65. Ambrose, 133. 
258. Some of the few cases of self-inflicted wounds that appear in 
literature. Atwell, 166-7. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 106. Ellis, 242. Whiting, 45. 
All men sampled had heard horror stories and rumors about cases, but they never 
had any first hand experience. 
259. This veteran found out that the deserter had made it all the way back 
to a military hospital in Naples "hundreds of miles south. . . . I don't know how 
he got back there, or why he wasn't sent back on the line. . . . Of course there 
were rumors that went around .... He was a Jewish boy and we just kind of 
figured he had some connections. Of course, I would make statements then I 
wouldn't make now." The men would always bitterly joke and say, "somebody took 
care of him . . . he had connections someplace to desert the line and then end 
up with a cushy job as an orderly." #18, 20 Hill. 
260. Charles Whiting, Hero: The Life and Death of Audie Murphy (New 
York: Jove Books, 1990), xii. 
261. #8 Bowen. 
262. #1 O Mercer. 
263. #18 Hill. One man recalled how he thought, "you kept going until 
they were defeated." #24 Breeze. #16 Curran. #21 Mercer. #23 Hott. 
264. The following men commented on the severe winter weather. #12 
Buser. #26 Curran. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. #21 Mercer. One man's wife is the 
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daughter of a banker and, therefore, he has a fond memory of burning worthless 
German money in a fireplace just to keep warm. #1 O McKenna. Another man 
commented on the weather in the Ardennes. "You had to fight that as much as 
the enemy in that respect. It was a problem to keep warm you couldn't keep 
warm. You had to keep moving ... to keep from freezing to death. Trying to 
keep warm that was a big chore." #25 Bowen. The cold was also a problem in 
Italy. "You did whatever you could to keep from freezing .... It was more of a 
battle with the elements than it was with the enemy." #18 Hill. G Is had to live 
under conditions where there were "multiple physical discomforts." Stouffer, Vol. 
2, 85. 
265. #20 Hill. 
266. #15 Hott. Combat is a "situation of stress." Stouffer, Vol. 2, 59, 86. 
Kellett, 232. 
267. #10 McKenna. 
268. #12 Buser. 
269. #25 Bowen. A GI who landed at Omaha Beach with the initial wave 
of the 29th Division experienced what he described as "intense physical and 
emotional strain" in his first twenty four hours of combat. Therefore, this strain 
could build up in a short period of time. Cawthon, 71. As the war came closer to 
the end men who had been in the line since August discussed that it was nerve 
wracking to be waiting for the known victory and, at the same time, worrying about 
being killed before the victory. These men worried that their luck would run out 
because they knew the law of averages. This was a common way for the stress 
and the nervousness to mount during the last months of the war when the victory 
was in reach, but men were still being killed. Giles, 307, 315. 
270. #12 Buser. 
271. "There is a limit to how long a man can function effectively in this 
topsy-turvy world." Ambrose, 206. One veteran believed that all men have a 
"breaking point." Atwell, 490. Another veteran also believed all men have a 
"breaking point." Cawthon, 72. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 89. Kennett, 145. 
Kellett, 275-6. McDonald, 128. "Every man has his breaking point." Stouffer, Vol. 
2, 191. Spiller, 51. One veteran commented that he was once on the "black 
edges" of a breakdown. Wilson, 42. 
272. Some of the men sampled had no experience with so called "battle 
fatigue." #9 Kingery. #13 Breeze. #12 Buser. #14 Brick. The men who did know 
of battle fatigue had different opinions of what it entailed. For example, when one 
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man was asked about battle fatigue he recalled an instance where a fellow soldier 
"just plain collapsed" due to fear. After the man revived he was fine and was able 
to continue. "#1 O McKenna. Because every case was different, one veteran asked 
the insightful question, "What constitutes battle fatigue? Is it not pressing forward 
instead of hanging back. Is that battle fatigue? . . . I would suppose that a 
number of people blew up over minor items . . . is that battle fatigue or just plain 
fatigue?" This man equated battle fatigue with both fatigue and with a momentary 
lapse of control like the man above. #16 Curran. Only one man commented on 
the classical battle fatigue case where men became despondent succumbing to 
the debilitating pressures. "Some of them just couldn't take it. . . . I saw a few 
cases where they would just break down and start crying. I think they just needed 
to rest." #15 Hott. 
273. Fussell, 281. 
27 4. Without doubt there was a "final insufficiency of all the various 
compulsions, incentives, and supports in the face of extreme stress beyond 
individuals power of control. When all is said and done, no motivational structure 
was adequate to sustain the average soldier in the stress of combat indefinitely." 
Stouffer, Vol. 2, 191. "Even the sustenance of one's own comrades, today 
understood by professionals as the essential cement of any combat unit, proved 
to be unequal to the demands of combat." Spiller, 49. 
Chapter Three Notes 
1 . #9 Kingery. 
2. Ibid. All veterans in this sample commented on the motivation to get 
the war over with so they could get home. All sources concur this was the same 
for all Gls. Astor, 16. "To get home you had to end the war. To end the war was 
the reason you fought it." Fussell, 141. Kellett, 127. "They were fighting mainly 
so they could go home again." Kennett, 140. One GI wrote a letter to his wife 
stating, "I will write when I can again, and perhaps the war will be much nearer its 
end for this nights work." Another letter a man wrote to his wife read, "I've often 
wondered what makes men go on the way they do, and then I think of myself and 
I know that they too think the way I do with something and someone waiting for 
them." Tappert, 241, 255. Terkel, 59. Stouffer, Vol. 2, 184. 
3. #9 Kingery. 
4. Transcript by Willis Bowen. February 16, 1945. 
5. #25 Bowen. 
6. Transcript by Willis Bowen, April 14, 1945. 
7. #23 Everman. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid. 
10. One of the several veterans to use the phrase "orders came down." 
#13 Breeze. "Orders came down." #9 Kingery. Another man commented on how 
the men were always "waiting for orders." #8 Bowen. One man, who was a 
sergeant, commented on how he took his orders from the platoon lieutenant, and 
then passed it down the line to his men. "The chain of command came on down. 
Word came down." #18 Hill. Another man had a close friend who was the squad 
leader, and being the assistant squad leader, he accompanied him to hear the 
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day's orders from the lieutenant, the platoon leader. "He's the one who carried the 
map." #14 Brick. 
11. #21 Mercer. 
12. #8 Bowen. 
13. #14 Brick. 
14. #21 Mercer. One man commented on how every town they took from 
the enemy was pre-planned. "Each one [town they captured] was an individual 
accomplishment." #9 Kingery. Gls always had an objective which kept them 
focused on a short-term goal, the prerequisite to making it home. Campbell and 
Leinbaugh, 27. 
15. Two men sampled were in combat a matter of days, and having 
experienced the raw essence of combat they expressed their real motivation: 
survival. One was in combat only ten days. #24 Breeze. THe other was in 
combat only three days.#19 Everman. All Gls experienced the same motivation, 
"the real war was about staying alive." Perkins, 565. "The desire to survive was 
so intense that it might overshadow other and previous motivation." Stouffer, Vol. 
2, 169. One GI wrote home, "If you could only see us kids killed at eighteen, 
nineteen, and twenty fighting in a country that means nothing to us, fighting 
because it means either kill or be killed, not because you're making the world safe 
for democracy or destroying Nazism." Tappert, 260. 
16. #22 Everman. 
17. #21 Mercer. 
18. #22 Everman. The war correspondent Ernie Pyle once observed a 
squad who had orders to attack a pillbox resting in their path. It was an 
obstruction setting before the objective that had to be reached. Pyle commented 
on the situation before the soldiers moved out. "They were afraid, but it was 
beyond their power to quit. They had no choice." Nichols, 304. 
19. Cawthon, 78. 
20. #25 Bowen. This is similar to the so-called "absolutely fearless 
soldier." Campbell and Leinbaugh, 116. 
21. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 230. 
22. #24 Breeze. 
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23. #15 Hott. 
24. #8 Bowen. 
25. In one incident a leader was shot and killed and it devastated the 
men, many were crying at the occasion. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 160. 
26. #24 Breeze. 
27. One man spoke of the admiration he had for the captain of his 
company. "He was right there with each and everyone of us. He was just like a 
buddy. One of us." #24 Breeze. Another veteran said he had a "very good" 
platoon leader, accordingly, "the guys respected him." #15 Hott. Another 
commented on his good squad leader. "We admired him." #12 Buser. 
28. Balkosi, 221-8. 
29. #24 Breeze. 
30. Ibid. 
31. #21 Mercer. 
32. #20 Hill. 
33. #23 Hott. Griping "makes a hard life of a combat man a little more 
tolerable; therefore, griping is a healthy positive sign." Stouffer, Vol. 2, 4. Atwell, 
38. Cawthon, 14. Kennett, 87. Murphy, 142. Maudlin, 52. McDonald, 79. 
34. #18 Hill. When asked why he kept going on, one man replied: "what 
else are you going to do. Most people will do what they have to do." #16 Curran. 
When addressing why Gls fought on, one historian stated Gls had "habit working 
against instinct." Marshall, 142. 
35. #12 Mercer. 
36. #16 Curran. 
37. The majority of men felt they were adequately supplied with the bare 
essentials. However, there were some isolated problems due to heavy fighting 
and severe weather, especially the winter of 1944-45. #8 Bowen. #1 O McKenna. 
#14 Brick. #16 Curran. #18 Hill. #19 Everman. #21 Mercer. #24 Breeze. 
38. #1 Bowen. 
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39. #12 Buser. Another GI also experienced Nazi concentration camps 
and felt similar. #10 McKenna. 
40. Stouffer, Vol. 2, 156-7. 
41. Ambrose, 20, 45, 152. Astor, 510-2. Balkosi, 96. Campbell and 
Leinbaugh, 109. Gray, 27, 39-40. Ellis, 314, 326, 340. Kennett, 65. Marshall, 42. 
Nichols, xii. Spiller, 49. One GI commented on the great importance of the 
"camaraderie with your fellow soldiers." #16 Curran. 
42. #18 Hill. "We just all got along." #12 Buser. In combat formalities 
often ceased, for example, one man commented on how his unit did not salute 
their officers on the line. This had practical considerations since officers often 
drew sniper fire. #24 Breeze. 
43. #24 Breeze. 
44. #15 Hott. 
45. #9 Kingery. 
46. #10 Mercer. 
47. #14 Brick. 
48. #18 Hill. 
49. #13 Breeze. 
50. #18 Hill. 
51. #12 Buser. 
52. #1 O McKenna. 
53. #21 Mercer. 
54. McDonald, 26. One man held the common attitude, "the men of the 
3rd squad were the best there was." Astor, 8. Another man though his unit 
contained the "best bunch of boys ever." Cawthon, 6. Another was convinced his 
was the "best damned outfit in the Army." Giles, 130. Maudlin, 1-2. Men in this 
sample had great pride in their friendships and the men in their unit. "We were 
just like brother." #9 Kingery. "They were a pretty good pretty good bunch of 
boys." #12 Buser. "I had a lot of good buddies." #24 Breeze. One soldier's letter, 
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who was a replacement, described his new friends as "pretty swell fellows." 
Transcript by Willis Bowen, March 16, 1945. 
55. #23 Hott. 
56. #12 Buser. One veteran said, "some of the guys would argue around 
about something sometime, but it didn't amount to a whole lot. They got along 
pretty good." #14 Brick. 
57. #3 McKenna. Another man commented on how he became friends 
with "all different types" of men. #11 Mercer. 
58. #23 Hott. Another man spoke of how the material differences 
between men leveled out in combat, "experiences of combat has a tendency to 
level that out a good deal." #16 Curran. 
59. Proof of how men let merit influence friendships, with less prejudice, 
is found in the fact that one man was a good friend with a Sioux Indian. When 
men were put together by necessity, in a trying situation, they learned to respect 
each others abilities. #17 Hoenes. This was similar to a man who had a "very 
sharp, and very talented" American born man of Chinese decent in his unit. He 
recalled how he was a good soldier who, "really did his part." #15 Hott. 
60. Fussell, 143. 
61. #12 Buser. 
62. #24 Breeze. "You look out for the guy on your left and right, and 
they do the same thing." #20 Hill. "You had to think about your friends next to 
you. You all worked as a team .... That was a great thing the way we all worked 
together. It was good teamwork." #8 Bowen. "We were all in it together. Each 
one's life depended on what the other one did. With the group we were trying to 
stick together for our own survival." Campbell and Leinbaugh, 186-7. 
63. #24 Breeze. 
64. Perkins, 566. 
65. #16 Curran. 
66. Men citing the motivation of not letting down their friends and unit are 
as follows. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #10 McKenna. #12 Buser. #14 Brick. #16 
Curran. #18 Hill. #21 Mercer. The literature reflects the same. "No one wanted 
to let his unit down." Balkosi, 96. Cawthon, 47. 
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67. #16 Curran. There was a "security of belonging." Stouffer, Vol. 2, 
142-3. 
68. Most all men experienced the "fear of shame." Fussell, 4. Ellis, 106, 
260. Kellett, 99, 334. Spiller, 49. Terkel, 60. A captain stated on several instances 
he was "scared as hell", but "too brave to admit it." McDonald, 41. 
69. Hoyt, 411. 
70. Perkins, 566. 
71. This came from Audie Murphy, the most decorated soldier in WW II. 
Charles Whiting, Hero: The Life and Death of Audie Murphy (New York: Jove 
Books, 1990), 76. "Personal honor is the one thing valued more than life itself by· 
the majority of men." A man's reputation was "the one thing that he is likely to 
value more highly than life." Marshall, 149-50, 153. Cawthon, 47. 
72. #14 Brick. Men struggled to be able to say "I've not let them down." 
Gls held the collective attitude, "if they can stick it. I can stick it." Ellis, 352. 
73. #9 Kingery. Another man commented on how the fear of shame was 
even more powerful for men with an ancestral history of soldiers on the family. 
Astor, 7. 
7 4. The majority sampled cited self-determination as to how they kept 
going. #8 Bowen. #10 McKenna. #12 Buser. #13 Breeze. #14 Brick. #16 Curran. 
The G Is "motivation has to be internal." Ambrose, 157. The determination to keep 
fighting had to be fueled by "innate pride." Cawthon, 119. 
75. #10 McKenna. 
76. #18 Hill. "One thing about combat is that it is emotionally exhausting . 
. . . One time I just passed out I was so dead tired. Had a German walked in I 
wouldn't be here this moment." #10 McKenna. Another man had a similar 
experience and when he awoke he noticed a German grenade, apparently a dud, 
only feet away from his head. He never knew if a German had thrown it there, or 
if another GI was playing a trick. #24 Breeze. 
77. Transcript by Willis Bowen. February 16, 1945. March 12, 1945. 
78. #20 Hill. Astor, 51. Ellis, 105. Prayer was regarded as a "very 
important source of support." Stouffer, Vol. 2, 173. 
79. #9 Kingery. 
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80. Ibid. 
81. Beating the enemy always boosted soldiers' confidence. Campbell 
and Leinbaugh, 181. After a small tactical victory, one captain's company was, 
"elated ... tired but jubilant." McDonald, 215. It was common to feel "triumph and 
elation" with successes over the enemy. Gray, 11. Murphy, 183. Kellett, 330. 
Seeing the results, and the rewards of liberating the oppressed also raised Gls' 
spirits. One veteran commented of such incidents in France. He remembered 
how the people would come out and give them food and drink. "Welcoming us as 
we came through. They were so glad to see us. The people were so 
appreciative." #15 Hott. 
82. This man mentioned reading in Stars and Stripes the "good news all 
the time that our troops were doing all right and the Germans were giving up 
everywhere." #14 Brick. Other men commented on this and the news of the 
Russian advance. #8 Bowen. #10 McKenna. #12 Buser. #16 Curran. #18 Hill. 
83. #12 Buser. 
84. #24 Bowen. One man recalled the "marvelous air support" when the 
weather cleared in the Ardennes. Hoyt, 485. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 133. 
85. McDonald, 254. Another GI commented on how the he always "got 
a big bang" from listening to outgoing artillery fire off, and then whistle overhead, 
and then explode in the German territory. #25 Bowen. Balkosi, 130. 
86. Fussell, 145. 
87. Gray, 28-9. 
88. #17 Hoenes. 
89. #9 Kingery. 
90. What the Soldier Thinks, May 1945, 10. "I tried to laugh at my 
fears." McDonald, 19. 
91. #23 Hott. 
92. Ibid. 
93. #14 Brick. "The rougher it was the bigger the joke." Astor, 379. A 
good example of humor was the way men dealt with a man in their anti-tank unit 
who passed in the process of an expected encounter with a German tank. "We 
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kidded the socks off of him." #10 McKenna. "We naturally kidded each other." 
#21 Mercer. All Gls looked forward to the laughs provided by the Willie and Joe 
cartoons in the "Stars and Stripes." The work of Gls favorite cartoonist/humorist, 
Bill Mauldin, is proof of Gls' contemptuous and sarcastic humor. Mauldin, Upfront. 
94. #20 Hill. 
95. Fussell, 251. McDonald, 218. 
96. #14 Brick. 
97. #24 Breeze. This was like the joke one veteran heard his sergeant 
say to his lieutenant in the beginning of the Battle of the Bulge. "Do you think we'll 
ever get out of here?" #21 Mercer. The following are two examples of GI humor. 
In one man's unit a soldier suffered a minor cut to his face from broken glass, 
which required no hospitalization only a bandage. Later it was determined this 
man was awarded the Purple Heart for his wound. After that this man was riled 
by the rest of the unit and referred to sarcastically as their "big war hero." #16 
Curran. Another man was in the 5th Infantry Division which had a red diamond 
insignia patch. The men in his unit pointed to the patch and informed German 
civilians that they were "Roosevelt's SS" and they better beware. It was a 
humorous way to pass the time. #12 Buser. 
98. #16 Curran. 
99. #23 Hott. 
100. #25 Bowen. Like another veteran who also said, "it bothered you 
at first." #18 Hill. 
101. #1 O McKenna. 
102. #17 Hoenes. 
103. #14 Brick. 
104. #1 O McKenna. 
105. #21 Mercer. 
106. #12 Buser. 
107. #1, #8 Bowen. This was the same as all Gls who made this 
adjustment to cope. Another veteran felt this change "came on gradually" in his 
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case. #9 Kingery. One veteran wrote he had became "callous" to all the death that 
had "become so much a part of our life." Atwell, 157. Sources that sight the 
development of Gls emotional insensitivity. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 155. Giles, 
245. "One becomes incredibly hardened ... [and] inured to cruelty." Grey, 9. 
Hoyt, 378. Terkel, 61. Soldiers developed an "extraordinary callousness. I saw 
two wounded Germans killed simply because their moans bothered a sergeant in 
a foxhole nearby." This veteran termed this insensitivity the "glaze of war." A 
state where soldiers "found it possible to separate themselves psychologically from 
what was going on." Perkins, 565-6. As a result of this men were able to say, 
"dead men, especially enemy dead bring no emotion whatsoever. I was a bit 
shaken at first." Tappert, 167, 244-5. 
108. #21 Mrecer. 
109. Fussell, 116. 
110. #24 Breeze. This type of attitude was very prevalent. One man 
recalled this lack of concern for shooting the enemy, "it was like stepping on a 
bug." Ambrose, 76. For one unit shooting German soldiers became "like shooting 
ducks at a carnival." Astor, 123. 
111. #18Hill. 
112. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 149. 
113. Whiting, Operation Nordwind, 66. 
114. Cawthon, 47. 
115. Several men commented on how they tried to get dead Gls off the 
battlefield as soon as possible, it was not good for morale to have fellow soldiers 
scattered around the area. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #10 McKenna. #16 Curran. #23 
Hott. #24 Breeze. 
116. #24 Breeze. 
117. #1 O McKenna. 
118. One GI never slept in anything other than a foxhole, in his ten days 
in combat. In the Normandy hedgerow fighting houses were not available, this 
came later in the war. #24 Breeze. Another veteran serving at the front from 
August to October 1944, said they were very lucky to find houses to sleep in. If 
they could find a house "that was really living." #23 Hott. Another veteran who 
served from D-day to VE-day, commented on the shortage of houses until the 
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spring of 1945 when they entered Germany. By that time it was still difficult to find 
houses that were not destroyed. #21 Mercer. If men had the opportunity they 
always chose a house or similar structure. #8 Bowen; #10 Mercer; #12 Buser; 
#16 Curran. Nevertheless, one veteran of a rifle company said that his unit 
expected to find a house every night. This was because he fought in the last 
month and a half of the war, primarily in the Ruhr area. #14 Brick. 
119. #8, 25 Bowen. 
120. Ibid. 
121. #19 Everman. 
122. #8 Bowen. 
123. #14 Brick. 
124. #8 Bowen. 
125. #1 O McKenna. 
126. #1 Bowen. 
127. Giles, 239. 
128. Dollard, 30-1, 56. 
129. Balkosi, 247. Sources that cite the same opinion. Fussell, 274. 
Kellett, 287-9. Murphy, 209. The officers guide to leadership, What the Soldier 
Thinks, advised the need of "getting the men's minds off of the danger ahead." 
The best way to do this was to "keep them busy. Don't let them sit and brood." 
What the Soldier Thinks, May, 1945, 9-10. 
130. #8 Bowen. The same is depicted in the following source. McDonald, 
166. 
131. #24 Breeze. Another man felt similarly, "we were on the go all the 
time. We didn't have much time off." #14 Brick. When in the front line soldiers 
were kept busy with their military routines and staying alive. What one man said 
was true for all men, it essential to "take care of your equipment." #5 Buser. 
Another man felt the same. When advancing, worrying about their equipment, and 
tactical considerations took up most of their time. "We didn't have time to worry 
about something to do." #9 Kingery. Several men talked of working so hard, and 
being so busy that they di~n't have time to think of their problems. #16 Curran; 
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#17 Hoenes. Giles, 100. McDonald, 166. One GI wrote home in March 1945, that 
his unit was rapidly moving forward like a "steamroller." Accordingly he was 
extremely "busy with routine matters." Tappert, 241. 
132. #20 Hill. 
133. #17 Hoenes. Another GI saw a man killed directly next to him, and 
he experienced a sudden feeling of "horror and pity", but it quickly passed under 
fire because there was "no time to stop and think." McDonald, 170. 
134. #23 Hott. This is like what one veteran believed. "Yes, there are 
times when you think that it is possible you might get hit. ... [But) you don't dwell 
on that sort of thing." #16 Curran. 
135. #9 Kingery. 
136. #24 Breeze. 
137. Ibid. 
138. #15 Hott. 
139. #1 O McKenna. 
140. What the Soldier Thinks, May, 1945, 9-10. 
141. #25 Bowen. Other sources confirm this was an essential activity. 
Campbell and Leinbaugh, 25. Giles, 42. To illustrate the concept, another 
distraction in another situation would be bettering defensive positions, like digging 
a deeper foxhole or strengthening a bunker. This both gave men something to do 
and also made their positions stronger and safer. #18 Hill. Ellis, 45-6. McDonald, 
39-40, 97. 
142. #16 Curran. 
143. #23 Hott. 
144. #8 Bowen. 
145. #18 Hill. Popular reading material were letters, hometown 
newspapers, and also pocket sized magazines and books especially made for the 
GI. Like many others, one man was always interested in Stars and Stripes 
because of the "interesting cartoons." #5 Buser. Another veteran, who as an 
educator thoroughly enjoyed reading, had his wife send him magazine and books 
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"constantly." #1 O McKenna. One man said he often read the Bible just for 
something to read. #8 Bowen. This was like his fellow soldier who also read the 
Bible, even under fire. #24 Breeze. One man said they always read the Stars and 
Stripes even though it was often weeks old, but it was still new to them. He also 
said they were interested in Willy and Joe cartoons. #20 Hill. Reading was a 
prime source of "escapism" for the GI. Ellis, 299. 
146. #20 Hill. One veteran commented on the "eternal letter writing" of 
the GI. Atwell, 77. A company commander once pondered how the men found 
so much time to write so many letters. McDonald, 58. 
147. This man always appreciated getting baked "goodies" from home, 
and packages of candy. #16 Curran. Another GI wrote home to his wife asking 
her to write as often as she could. He told her that her "letters sure give men a 
boost. ... They change my mood to a higher level." Transcript by Willis Bowen, 
December 15, 1945. "A letter from home. That was always something to look 
forward to." #24 Breeze. "The soldier's life revolves around his mail." Maudlin, 
24. 
148. #23 Hott. Another veteran said that, if they could, the man played 
cards "every night." #1 Bowen. Another man said there were a "lot of poker 
players." #1 O Mercer. Those that agreed. #12 Buser. #14 Brick. #16 Curran. 
#18 Hill. However, another man never played cards in his combat career, in his 
situation the fighting was too intense. At this stage of the war, the Normandy 
hedgerow fighting, men fought and slept, often with no time for play. #24 Breeze. 
149. #10 McKenna. 
150. #15 Hott. 
151. #1 O McKenna. 
152. #16 Curran. 
153. #23 Hott. 
154. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 144. 
155. One of a number of veterans commented on how soldier's "values 
became corrupted" while in combat. Gray, 9-10. Kellett, xviii. Another veteran 
spoke of the "peculiar ethics of war." In war men had to lose their "civilian 
conscience." Murphy, 41, 204. Ernie Pyle made the astute observation when he 
noticed the "unsavory moral changes war thrusts upon young men." Nichols, xiv. 
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Another source stated the existence of the "transmuted values of combat." 
Stouffer, Vol. 2, 197. 
156. #17 Hoenes. 
157. Transcript by Willis Bowen, February 16, 1945. Luxuries became hot 
food, an occasional shower, and change of fatigues to name a few. 
158. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 124. Another veteran commented on the 
same experience. He stated: "It is common in war for visitors from the rear to 
report with wonder on the increasing cheerfulness they encounter on approaching 
the front. I believe they are reporting this phenomenon of intensified life and are 
experiencing it themselves." Cawthon, 77. 
159. One GI wrote in his wartime journal that this change was influenced 
by the fact soldiers could die any minute. "Your life expectancy is durned short. 
Jinx, you might not come back." Therefore, all men were intent on making the 
best of life. Accordingly three things went together "war, sex, [and] drinking." 
Giles, 6. Knowing they could be killed at any moment men often adopted 
"hedonistic drives." Stouffer, Vol. 2, 80. 
160. This also illustrates how quickly the change came on considering this 
occurred in this man's first week in combat. #8, 25 Bowen. Another veteran 
commented on a distraction from boredom which again illustrates Gls insensitivity. 
"Near the end of the war, when we were waiting for the Red Army to show up, I 
directed artillery fire on the German city of Chemnitz ... for no purpose except to 
have something to do." Perkins, 565. 
161. #10 McKenna. 
162. #16 Curran. Humor "turned grisly" in combat. Balkosi, 73-4. Ellis, 
108. Fussell, 35. Kennett, 87. "Gruesome jokes" were the norm. Mauldin, 33. Gls 
from one unit found humor in defecating inside the German houses, vases, and, 
especially, butter churns. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 112. Stouffer, Vol. 2, 190. 
163. #9 Kingery. 
164. Ibid. 
165. Patton, War as I knew it, 258-9. 
166. Cawthon, 180. One man recalled, "I tore a swastika off of a German 
uniform as a souvenir." #14 Brick. Other men that collected souvenirs are as 
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follows. #5 Buser. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. #11 Mercer. #14 Brick. #15 Hott. 
#16 Curran. #17 Hoenes. #19 Everman. #21 Mercer. #24 Breeze. 
167. #24 Breeze. Another man brought home two Nazi daggers and two 
swords. #1 O McKenna. 
168. #19 Everman. It was common for men to lose track of non-regulation 
equipment after being wounded. Another man had a German pistol, but when he 
was wounded and he never saw it again. "Somebody lifted it", he said. #15 Hott. 
Another man had a Luger pistol, but gave to one of their cooks when he heard 
rumors about G Is being shot if they were captured with German pistols. #14 Brick. 
169. #12 Buser. 
170. Men sampled that brought home German pistols. #8 Bowen. #9 
Kingery. #1 O Mercer. #12 Buser. #21 Mercer. Three of the other men had a 
pistol at one time, but they never made it home with it. #14 Brick; #15 Hott; #19 
Everman. The only man that did not have a German pistol was a medic and it 
was prohibited that he carry any form of weapon. #17 Hoenes 
171. This discerning individual had one each of the three popular types; 
the P-38, the Luger, and a Baretta. #21 Mercer. Another man in an antitank 
company said taking weapons out of knocked out vehicles along the roadside was 
a common activity. The men would then give the weapons to the ordinance units 
to destroy, however, they always had enough extra to sell to other units. #12 
Buser. 
172. Transcript by Willis Bowen, March 12, 1945. 
173. A veteran in a medical company in Italy, at this time in 1945 not the 
enemy of the U.S., saw a farmer's wagon he thought they could put to good use. 
Therefore, they "confiscated it, you might want to say .... You weren't supposed 
to actually, but the captain was probably looking the other way that day." #17 
Hoenes. Another man noticed the same tendency, the officers "overlooked a lot 
of it." #10 McKenna. Another GI knew that officers were involved in looting, 
especially those with access to the mail. #8 Bowen. Looting had a "powerful 
group sanction." Ellis, 233. 
174. #14 Brick. 
175. This GI spoke of a situation where the men made off with dozens of 
radios from a small German radio shop. It was common when men entered new 
towns to throw away the old items they looted, and then take the new and novel 
items. #16 Curran. "There was quite a bit of looting." #10 McKenna. Another GI 
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spoke of men lingering in towns and spreading out and looking for valuables. #15 
Hott. One GI said that most men took just "trinkets", but the men took anything, 
especially if it was "something you could use." #12 Buser. This was the case for 
a man in a medical battalion who "confiscated" the Italian farmer's wagon to help 
carry their gear behind their truck. This again illustrates the distinction between 
rear-echelon units and rifle companies. Rear-echelon units were more prone to 
looting because they had more time, it was less dangerous in their areas, and they 
also had access to vehicles to carry objects. Riflemen had to carry everything 
they wanted which limited them considerably. One man in an antitank company 
was positive that looting happened more in rear-area units. He said riflemen 
"didn't have much time for it." #10 McKenna. Other men in rear-area units agreed. 
#12 Buser. #16 Curran. #17 Hoenes. #21 Mercer. 
176. Looting occurred in all areas, even on D-Day. Cawthon, 67. Hoyt, 
369. Looting also occurred in Holland. Ambrose, 145. Gls also looted in 
Luxembourg. Atwell, 186-7. It was not unheard of for German prisoners to be 
robbed of valuables such as rings or watches. Atwell, 397. Hoyt, 404. 
177. #5 Buser. One man in this sample encountered a bobby trapped 
pistol. #13 Breeze. Another man recalled one instance where a candle was wired 
to a grenade in a German home. #25 Bowen. 
178. #9 Kingery. 
179. #18 Hill. 
180. #10 McKenna. 
181. #14 Brick. Another man knew the same, "the infantry soldier never 
gets enough to eat." #18 Hill. One example of how hungry soldiers had to 
supplement their rations occurred in the first week of the Normandy campaign. 
This man was too far forward for two days to get any rations. He couldn't go back 
to get them and nobody could get the rations up to him. Digging a foxhole in a 
French farmer's garden he noticed a bunch of little potatoes. "Boy I was hungry 
and I had to snag some of them." To eat the potatoes he put them into his mouth 
to "wash it off and then spit the dirt out. . . . It was something to put in my 
stomach." #24 Breeze. 
182. On the norm rations sufficed, "you could survive on it", but anything 
different was good "for a change." This man said his favorite was the "pickled 
pork" the German civilians kept in big barrels. #12 Buser. Another veteran agreed 
the food was "nutritionally good, but it wasn't all that good." #18 Hill. "We lived 
on K-rations. It wasn't bad."#21 Mercer. The men looked for anything that "was 
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different than K-rations you'd be eating all the time. You get a little tired of K-
rations." #23 Hott. 
183. #14 Brick. Another veteran laughed about chasing chickens around 
farm yards. #8 Bowen. Another man said his unit supplemented their rations "all 
the time." He fondly recalled "capturing German chickens." #1 o McKenna. 
Another GI had a unique experience while his squad was boiling a chicken on a 
stove in a German home. Before the chicken was finished cooking they started 
to take German shelling. Luckily, the men had time to run into the cellar. "The 
house we were hit, they hit three times. It just about tore darn near all the roof off. 
We came up after that, and that chicken was still on the stove with plaster in it. 
It tasted more like plaster than anything else." #14 Brick. Another man recalled, 
"at the edge of a town you'd usually get some eggs." #23 Hott. 
184. One veteran recalled "a fishing expedition on the Meuse River .... 
Some guys went out fishing with hand grenades." #1 O McKenna. Another man's 
unit did the same thing in another river somewhere in Germany. #8 Bowen. 
185. One man went hunting for deer, but could not find one so he killed 
a cow. Anbrose, 104. In another instance a GI shot and butchered a cow, with 
all the different types of men there were sure to be butchers in the lot. Astor, 5. 
One GI sarcastically recalled how a pig "met with a sudden accident" so the men 
had to butcher it and eat it. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 153. Hoyt, 432. 
186. Several veterans spoke of giving German children food, gum, and 
candy; however the German children always asked for cigarettes. #8 Bowen. #1 O 
Mercer. #12 Buser. #16 Curran. #17 Hoenes. The individual in this sample who 
was a medic was later made a cook in medical company. When they had excess 
food he gave it to Italian civilians, who were often without food. #17 Hoenes. 
Another man spoke of a time when his unit had extra sauerkraut and sausages 
that they gave to some German civilians that gathered around them. However, 
what made this man very angry, was that when higher ranking officers determined 
they were giving the civilians food, the men were ordered to bury their excess in 
pits dug in the ground. #8 Bowen. 
187. #21 Mercer. 
188. Transcript by Willis Bowen. February 16, 1945. 
189. Instances of men stuffing themselves with German civilian's food can 
be found in the following sources. Atwell, 182. Fussell, 199, 291. One GI wrote 
of the times when the men gorged themselves on the luxury of fresh eggs. 
McDonald, 233, 315. 
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190. #1 O McKenna. 
191. #25 Bowen. 
192. #12 Buser. 
193. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 216-7. Another GI said men were "always 
on the hunt" for something to drink. Giles, 252. Another spoke of a persistent 
searching for hidden bottles. There were typically good results when the men 
found alcohol. McDonald, 219, 347. 
194. One veteran considered "a good drink every now and then" good for 
morale. #16 Curran. Another man recalled how his unit found a large wine cellar 
and one of the men made a pledge to take a drink out of every bottle. The man 
gave it all he could, but he became too intoxicated before he got half through. It 
was a funny scene at the time, something to make men laugh. #1 O McKenna. 
"We'd find wine in most of the houses, sometimes we'd find a little cognac .... I 
never was to much of a drinker myself, but I did drink some of the stuff." #14 Brick. 
After a group of Gls found some alcohol the through an "impromptu party." Atwell, 
377. One soldier drank heavily one night to aid in forgetting the loss of a close 
friend. Giles, 293. It was common for men to drink to temporarily forget their 
problems. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 34. Fussell, 96. Gls in rear-echelon units 
were the men who imbibed most often; again it was safer in their area and they 
had more time to look for a steady supply. Once they found alcohol, they also 
had vehicles to store large quantities while they traveled. Three of the six men in 
rear area units commented on carrying five gallon "jerry cans" of alcohol on their 
trucks. Two of the men said they kept red wine on hand to drink because of the 
questionable water supplies. #1 O Mercer. #17 Hoenes. Another man in an antitank 
company said they always tried to keep "stocked up" on indigenous "potato 
schnapps." "That potato schnapps was made out of potato peelings and it was 
kind of greasy, a kind of scum would float around in your cup, but it was pretty 
potent. We drank a little glass, but not to excess." #12 Buser. 
195. #18 Hill. 
196. #9 Kingery. 
197. #8 Bowen. Another veteran heard about Gls getting sick after they 
had tried to drink anti-freeze. #19 Everman. 
198. Kennett, 207-8. 
199. #8 Bowen. 
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200. Eleven of the twelve men smoked in this sample. "You were a funny 
freak if you didn't [smoke]." #8 Bowen. Another man said, "about everybody did 
[smoke]." #14 Brick. Another man said he smoked and "practically everyone did." 
#10 Mercer. "Most of us smoked." #9 Kingery. Fussell, 143-5. Gls were given 
free cigarettes in their rations, and also supplied with free cartons. Ellis, 294. 
Several men smoked during the war but had since quit. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. 
#10 McKenna. #14 Brick. #16 Curran. #21 Mercer. Only three men interviewed 
continue to smoke cigarettes. #12 Buser. #18 Hill. #19 Evermon. 
201. #13 Breeze. 
202. #14 Brick. This was a common experience. Ellis, 294. 
203. #9 Kingery. 
204. Hoyt, 553. 
205. One man recalled how in Belgium the people "practically embraced 
us." #1 O McKenna. "The people were so appreciative." #15 Hoyt. Another veteran 
recalled how so many civilians gathered on a balcony in Belgium to see Gls pass 
through town, that the balcony collapsed and the people fell to the ground, 
fortunately unhurt. #25 Bowen. 
206. One man who was in Italy replied, "non-fraternization, bullshit" when 
asked about contact and conversations with civilians. #17 Hoenes. Several men 
talked with German prisoners and civilians whenever they could, usually out of 
curiosity. #8 Bowen. #10 McKenna. #12 Buser. #14 Brick. #18 Hill. #21 Mercer. 
207. #1 o McKenna. 
208. #12 Buser. 
209. However, the two men in this sample that were not infantrymen both 
mentioned encounters with women. One man was in the Navy, and became 
friendly with a French girl in Marseilles, France. #2 McCall. The other man was 
in the air corps as a B-17 crewmember. He was based in England and he 
mentioned him and his unit making trips into London, to "score" with the British 
women. #6 Knott. 
210. #18 Hill. Men that agreed. #8 Bowen. #10 McKenna. #15 Hott. 
For one man, the only woman he saw in his ten days in combat was a French 
woman who after losing her German boyfriend, charged his unit firing a burp gun. 
The men had no choice but to shoot and kill her, before she shot one of them. 
#24 Breeze. 
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211. #16 Curran. 
212. #12 Buser. 
213. One man was on the line seven months and had only two official 
days R&R, and even then they only went back to a rest station. #1 O McKenna. 
Another man was at the front for ten months and never had anything more than 
a few days rest off the line in a cot in a building safe from artillery fire. "That was 
a big thing." #18 Hill. Several men never had any R&R, usually because they 
were not in combat long enough. #7 Brick. #8 Bowen. #12 Buser. #19 Everman. 
#24 Breeze. 
214. #16 Curran. 
215. #14 Brick. 
216. #25 Bowen. 
217. #25 Bowen. There were other instances of what would have been 
rapes were stopped by other Gls. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 235. However, there 
were also cases that when men found out about a rape, after the fact, they would 
just do nothing about it. The men who knew others in his unit had committed rape 
"just went on and never said anything." #14 Brick. 
218. Gray, 51. 
219. Ibid. 
220. #12 Buser. 
221. #20 Hill. 
222. #25 Bowen. 
223. #9 Kingery. 
224. Gray, 51. 
225. #12 Buser. 
226. #14 Brick. 
227. #10 Mercer. 
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228. #8 Bowen. 
229. Gray, 51. 
230. #1 O Mercer. #16 Curran. 
231. #1 O McKenna. There was often extensive destruction in German 
towns before Gls ever entered them, due to artillery and air attacks. Nevertheless, 
Gls also added to the destruction. One man made a statement which illustrates 
the common way towns were captured, with overwhelming firepower. "We would 
shoot our way through." #14 Brick. Another man talked of Gls knocking down 
doors with their rifle butts. "We did a hell of a lot of damage." #8 Bowen. 
Another man in an antitank unit said driving the trucks over the fences behind 
German homes to position their 57mm guns, was an everyday occurrence. #12 
Buser. There were several cases of Gls getting "carried away" and shooting 
indiscriminately when they captured towns. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 33. In other 
situations men were even shooting pigs for no reason other than to do it. Hoyt, 
409. Another veteran saw where a German house was ransacked and 
demolished. Giles, 245. 
232. #15 Bowen. 
233. Gray, 51. 
234. #16 Curran. 
235. Ibid. 
236. #1 O McKenna. 
237. #16 Curran. 
238. Ibid. 
239. McDonald, The Seigfried Line Campaign, 503-6. 
240. Ambrose, 234. 
241. #16 Curran. 
242. Kennett, 159. 
243. Astor, 216. 
238 
244. Ambrose, 234. Another GI was in a "state of exhilaration" after he 
shot a German soldier. Astor, 202. In another situation when Gls killed the 
Germans that opposed them they were congratulated for killing the "kraut 
bastards." McDonald, 26. 
245. Ambrose, 324. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 183. 
246. Cawthon, 113. 
247. #14 Brick. 
248. The author of this source was a soldier who collected wounded Gls' 
rifles when they came to the aid station. There were rifles with notches, also many 
with names of loved ones. Atwell, 80. Instances of soldiers keeping count of the 
number they shot. Hoyt, 389-492. One veteran made the comment that one man 
in his squad had shot fifteen of the enemy. However, his own experience 
illustrates how not all men kept count out of a sense of accomplishment. This man 
said he had to shoot three enemy soldiers and he was "glad it was that few men." 
The only reason he knew the number was that he could not forget the incidents. 
#8 Bowen. 
249. #23 Hott. Another example of the delight with survival occured when 
a German tank assaulted a rifle company, and in response the captain called in 
artillery on their target. As a result well placed rounds destroyed the German tank. 
The captain who called in the artillery felt a "spine-tingling excitement", while 
expressing his opinion that the "sonofabitch is burning like hell." McDonald, 43. 
250. #20 Hill. 
251. #24 Breeze. 
252. Ibid. 
253. Transcript by Willis Bowen. May 8, 1945. 
254. Giles, 353. 
255. #18 Hill. 
256. #10 McKenna. "We celebrated, it was a great thing." #12 Buser. 
Three other men made use of the word "celebration." #14 Brick. #18 Hill. #21 
Mercer. "They had survived .... A part unequaled." Ambrose, 280. Another 
veteran recalled, we "danced and drank the night away ... all of us celebrated on 
239 
this happy occasion." Wilson, 257. "There was no defining our joy." McDonald, 
367. 
257. #16 Curran. One man said his unit was a "happy bunch" but they 
had no liquor at the time. He said they would have had a "booze party" if they 
would have found alcohol. Their drinking was delayed until they had the 
opportunity in Hamburg when they stole a keg of beer with their lieutenant and 
drank it on a troop train. "I thought that was pretty fun." #14 Brick. Soldiers in one 
unit had a "treasured keg of cognac" for the special occasion. McDonald, 367. 
258. "No black out that was a big deal in itself." #16 Curran. Another man 
said it was odd not to hear the constant sound of shelling in the distance. #1 O 
McKenna. Another man noticed the difference of being able to smoke a cigarette 
in the dark. McDonald, 369. 
259. #1 O McKenna. 
260. #21 Mercer. 
261. #18 Hill. 
262. This man stayed in Italy on occupation duty until he returned to the 
U.S. in December, 1945. #20 Hill. 
263. Eight men in this sample were able to serve in Japan, and the four 
that were picked are as follows. This man was in the 95th Infantry Division. #1 O 
McKenna. This man was in the 5th Infantry Division. #12 Buser. This man was 
in the 8th Infantry Division. #14 Brick. This man was in the 104th Infantry 
Division. #16 Curran. 
264. #1 O McKenna. #12 Buser. 
265. #10 McKenna. Another veteran had the same feeling. Men in his 
unit were "worried" and as such they kept a "wary eye" on the events in the Pacific 
after VE-Day. Wilson, 261. 
266. #12 Buser. 
267. #1 O McKenna. "Hiroshima filled us all with a sense of relief as well 
as satisfaction." Perkins, 567. 
CONCLUSION NOTES 
1. #24 Breeze. Another veteran felt similarly, "when you were convinced that 
your body could stand no more . . . you found out it could." Astor, 202. 
2. #16 Curran. 
3. Nichols, xiv. 
4. Atwell, 367. 
5. #17 Hoenes. 
6. #19 Everman. Men that agreed with this change. #8 Bowen. #9 Kingery. 
#1 O McKenna. #12 Buser. #14 Brick. #15 Hott. #16 Curran. #18 Hill. #21 Mercer. 
7. Cawthon, 104. Spiller, 51. 
8. #24 Breeze. 
9. #25 Bowen. 
10. #23 Hott. 
11. A member of the initial assault wave at Omaha Beach remarked on the 
feelings he will always have for the men in his unit that died on that dreadful day. 
"I feel this void now in liking back upon friends gone on that 6 June .... For the 
rest of us, what has been since has not been the same." Cawthon, 71 
12. #12 Buser. 
13. #9 Kingery. Another man said he felt "privileged" to see things in Italy he 
only had read about in school.#18 Hill. 
14. #17 Hoenes. 
15. Two men who commented on the "good times." #9 Kingery. #17 Hoenes. 
Another man termed his experience "wonderful. "#12 Buser. 
240 
241 
16. #18 Hill. 
17. Campbell and Leinbaugh, 276-279. One veteran commented on how he 
was fighting to "come home and then to forget it after that. "#8 Bowen. Another 
man agreed that men experienced a readjustment stage after the war. "I guess 
like they say 'time heals all wounds.' Fortunately I don't have any mental hangups 
from the war. "#15 Hott. Literature also addressed the subject of readjustment. 
Mauldlin, 28. Nichols, xv. Stouffer, vol. 2. 
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